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ABSTRACT
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B.A., COLUMBIA COLLEGE

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Edmund Gettier

This dissertation is a study of the problem of beliefs

about oneself, or so-called de se beliefs:

beliefs that
'I

I

would express by saying

am in Massachusetts'.

'

I

for example, the

am left-handed' or

The problem arises against the

background conception of belief as a propositional attitude,
i.e., as a relation between conscious subjects and abstract

entities that are either true or false absolutely.

Many philosophers have recently argued that the
intentional objects of one's de se beliefs could not be
propositions:

since, e.g.,

can believe the proposition

I

that Neil Feit is left-handed without believing myself to be

left-handed (if
Feit), and

I

I

somehow fail to realize that

I

am Neil

can believe any proposition expressed by a

sentence of the form 'the

F is

left-handed'

-

where 'the

F'

is a qualitative description - without believing myself to

be left-handed (if
I

I

do not think that 'the F' denotes me).

take the position that the argument is sound, and,

after surveying various attempts to solve the problem,

defend the self-ascription view of belief:
v

I

viz., the view

that to have a belief is to ascribe a property to
oneself.
For example,

I

believe that

I

am left-handed simply by self-

ascribing the property of being left-handed.
I

defend the view against various objections to it,

discuss its relations to other views about the objects of
belief and the other attitudes, and maintain that it can

account for the acceptance of propositions (de dicto belief)
and for beliefs about particular individuals (de re belief)
as well as for beliefs directly about oneself.

I

argue that

belief states are best taken to be self-ascribed properties,
and try to solve some problems about de re belief from the

perspective of the self-ascription view.

vi
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

Suppose that we are acquainted with two people, Adams
and Barber, say, each of whom believes that Adams is a spy:
i.e., Adams believes that he himself is a spy, and Barber

believes that Adams is a spy.

wearing

a

(Perhaps Barber sees Adams

trench coat, and believes that anyone who wears a

trench coat is a spy.)

It is quite plausible to assume that

in this case Adams and Barber believe the same proposition,

viz., the proposition that Adams is a spy.

Whatever sort of

thing we take a proposition to be, it seems clear that if
Barber can believe the proposition that Adams is a spy, then

Adams could believe this proposition while at the same time
failing to believe himself to be a spy.

might see himself in a mirror, wearing

For example, Adams
a

trench coat, but

fail to realize that he is looking at himself.

Suppose that there is a psychological law to the effect
that everyone who believes himself or herself to be a spy is
ipso facto a chronic paranoid.

With respect to the above

example, we could infer from this that Adams is a chronic

paranoid, but not that Barber is.

However, it appears that

we could not infer that Adams is a chronic paranoid merely

from the fact that he believes the proposition that Adams is
a spy - since he could,

like Barber, come to believe this

proposition by entering into some sort of epistemic contact

with himself (e.g.

,

by perceiving himself in a mirror),

without thinking of himself, so to speak, as himself.
the above "law” could not be formulated as follows:

subject x, if x believes the proposition that x is

Thus
for any

a spy,

then x is a chronic paranoid.
What, then, distinguishes one's believing oneself to be
a spy,

on the one hand, from one's believing the proposition

that one is

a spy,

on the other?

More generally, for any

property F whatsoever, what distinguishes believing oneself
to have F from believing the proposition that one has F?

If

there is a genuine difference here, as there certainly seems
to be, then there is also a problem about how to account for

many of our beliefs about ourselves (such as Adams's belief
that he himself is a spy)

- i.e.,

our de se beliefs

-

in

terms of a relation between believers and propositions.

there is more to Adams's belief that he himself is

If

a spy

than belief in the proposition that Adams is a spy, how is
such a belief to be characterized?

This is the problem of

de se belief, an instance of the more comprehensive problem
of de se psychological attitudes.

There are other ways to

present the problem, and some of these will be considered in
the next two chapters.

My main concern in this dissertation is the problem of
de se belief, although

I

will at times discuss analogous

problems having to do with the other so-called propositional
attitudes.

One's de se beliefs are one's beliefs about what

features one has, understood broadly so as to include, e.g.,
2

)

my beliefs that
I

I

am Neil Feit, that

I

am left-handed, that

am presently in Massachusetts, and so on.

With respect to

commonsense psychology, de se attitudes are neither unusual
nor unimportant; in fact, they are commonplace and
central
to the prediction and explanation of purposeful behavior.

This is especially clear in the case of desire and the

locutions that we ordinarily use to attribute desire.
example, the sentences 'Neil wants to be healthy',

For

'Neil

wants lunch' and 'Neil wants to catch the seven o'clock
train' all attribute de se desires to me.
part,

I

(For the most

shall not be concerned with the analysis of

attributions of de se attitudes.

My main topic is the

metaphysics of such attitudes rather than the semantic
analysis of the sentences used to report them.
Some notion of a proposition is essential to the

statement of the present problem.

Like most other problems,

the problem of de se attitudes arises only given a certain

background.

In this case, the background is a cornerstone

of contemporary philosophy of mind:

viz., the view that

psychological attitudes (or, at least, many sorts of them)
are relations between conscious subjects and abstract

propositions.

I

make only two assumptions about the

existence and nature of propositions.

The first is that

there are propositions; and the second is that propositions
have truth values in an absolute sense

-

truth values that

do not vary from time to time, place to place, etc.

3

This

.

second assumption is intended to be equivalent to
the claim
that propositions are the sorts of things that have

possible-worlds truth conditions.

I

will not review here

the many good reasons for thinking that belief, whatever

else it may be, is a propositional attitude.
The differences between the various conceptions of

propositions do not bear on the problem of de se belief, so
long as propositions are taken to have possible-worlds truth

conditions.

I

plan to remain neutral between the different

accounts of propositions, then, unless

I

am discussing the

views of a philosopher who is committed to one rather than

another of those accounts.

Two general accounts will be

relevant to the views being considered in the dissertation.
The first takes propositions to be functions from possible

worlds into truth values, or, equivalently, sets of possible
worlds (it thus requires a view about the nature of possible
worlds).

The second takes propositions to be complexes or

structured entities made up of properties (or concepts of
properties) and objects (or perhaps just concepts of
objects)

(it thus requires a view about the kind of

structures involved)
Again, the problem to be considered in this thesis is

independent of the particulars of these competing views
about propositions.

It thus cuts across the various

accounts of what sorts of things propositions are.

So,

while it may be helpful (at least prima facie) in order to
4

solve some problems about mathematical beliefs,
and about
the mental processes essential to deduction, to
distinguish

between necessarily equivalent propositions

structured propositions view

- it

- as

on the

does not matter to the

issues being considered here.
In this thesis,

I

will not be discussing certain

questions that are more or less related to any work in the

metaphysics of mental content.

I

will not, for instance,

have anything to say about issues concerning degrees of
belief, or of any other attitude.

For simplicity,

I

will

treat belief as if it were an all-or-nothing affair rather
than something that comes in degrees; but what

I

say can

easily be adapted to an account of degrees of belief, e.g.,
a

straightforward account that introduces a probability

distribution, for each subject, over various objects of
belief, instead of a single object of belief.

(Just for

now, we can accept the background view of belief as a

propositional attitude and suppose that the objects of
belief are propositions.)
I

will also have nothing to say in this dissertation

about issues having to do with the explication of the

concept of belief in non-semantic or non-intentional terms.
I

am concerned here with a presentation and evaluation of

various theories about the objects of belief, with respect
to the problem of de se belief, and not with the question

whether there is a correct analysis of belief in purely
5

naturalistic terms.

I

do think that, as a matter of

contingent fact, intentional mental states are physical
states; but

do not think that anything

I

I

say in the thesis

either reguires or precludes any sort of reductive analysis
of the attitudes.

As

I

mentioned earlier, my primary focus is not on the

semantic analysis of belief sentences or of attributions of
a ^titudes

i-

n general.

My aim is to approach the problem of

de se belief from a more metaphysical point of view, by

evaluating some accounts of the belief relation (and hence
of the objects of belief)

belief.

in light of the problem of de se

However, from time to time

I

will not be able to

avoid making some brief remarks about the semantics of
belief sentences.

Most of these remarks occur within the

scope of discussions of particular metaphysical views of
belief, and are not general recommendations for the

treatment of attitude reports.
Chapter

2

of this thesis contains a discussion of the

Triadic View of belief, which has been extracted from the
work of David Kaplan, John Perry, Nathan Salmon and others.
Perry, for example, adopts this view expressly to handle the

problem of de se belief.

According to the sort of account

provided by Perry and the others, one's belief in a certain

proposition is mediated, in a way, by what has come to be
called a belief state or propositional guise.

6

So,

our make-believe spy, Adams, believes the

proposition that Adams is
certain belief state

- a

a

spy in virtue of being in a

state that typically disposes a

speaker of English, for example, to assent to a sentence
like

'

I

am a spy'.

Barber, on the other hand, believes this

very same proposition in virtue of being in a different
belief state

- a

state that might dispose a speaker of

English to assent to a sentence such as 'he is a spy'
perhaps 'the person

I

am looking at is a spy'.

,

or

Many of the

psychological differences between Adams and Barber (maybe,
for example, the fact that Adams is paranoid while Barber
isn't) are taken by proponents of the Triadic View to be

explained, at least in part, by the differences in their

belief states.

What is essential to belief, on this view,

is the three-place relation between subjects, belief states

and believed-true propositions.
In chapter 3,

I

consider a different approach to the

problem of de se belief, due chiefly to the work of David
Lewis and Roderick Chisholm.

proposed what

I

Lewis and Chisholm have

shall call the Property Theory of belief.

Like the Triadic View, the Property Theory rejects the idea

that belief, or the relation that is essential to belief, is
a

two-place relation between a subject and

a

proposition.

Unlike the Triadic View, however, the Property Theory
implies that belief is in fact a binary relation

relation between subjects and properties.
7

- a

According to the view held by Lewis and Chisholm,
to
have a belief is to self-ascribe

a

property.

When Adams

believes himself to be a spy, for example, he does so
in

virtue of self-ascribing the property of being a spy.

The

difference between Adams and Barber is thus accounted for in
terms of the fact that they each have a different object of
belief.
a spy,

Barber does not self-ascribe the property of being
and so the property of being a spy is not an object

of his belief.

Instead, Barber self-ascribes a property

such as the property of looking at someone who is a spy, or

looking at a man in a trench coat who is a spy, or some such
property.
It might appear at first glance that the Triadic View

and the Property Theory are competing views of belief that

could not both be true.

In chapter 4, however,

the two theories are not really competitors.

precise formulation of each view,

I

I

argue that

After giving a

try to show that on very

plausible assumptions, the two views are in a strong sense
equivalent.

Part of this amounts to arguing for the claim

that the correct theory of belief states is the theory of

self-ascription of properties.
the chapter,

I

Finally, in the last part of

provide a set of principles that connect a

subject's self-ascribed properties with the propositions
that the subject may be said to believe.
Both the Triadic View and the Property Theory reject

what

I

shall call the doctrine of propositional objects of

8

. :

.

belief

viz., the view that belief, or any relation that
is

essential to belief, is merely a binary relation between

conscious subject and an abstract proposition.

a

However,

some philosophers - most notably Robert Stalnaker - have

argued that the problem of de se belief can be solved

without resorting to

a

view that rejects the doctrine of

propositional objects of belief.

In chapter 5,

I

examine

the attempt to solve the problem while maintaining this

doctrine
I

also consider, in chapter

5,

an argument given by

Lewis against any view like Stalnaker 's:
the two gods.

Despite Stalnaker 's assertion that Lewis's

argument begs the guestion,
I

Lewis's case of

I

find the argument persuasive.

try to sort out the details and solidify the argument

against the doctrine of propositional objects of belief.
also present

a

I

related argument against Stalnaker's view,

which is based upon another, related, argument sketched by
Lewis
The remainder of the thesis consists mainly of a

defense of the Property Theory as a view of belief and an

application of the theory to some problems having to do with
de re belief.
a

My main thesis is that the Property Theory is

better alternative than any version of the doctrine of

propositional objects of belief.
In chapter 6,

I

consider various arguments that have

been raised against the Property Theory.
9

The arguments that

survey are intended to refute any version of the
Property
Theory, rather than just, say, Lewis's version or
Chisholm's
I

version.

(The differences between these two versions of the

same general view are chiefly due to the different
theories
of properties held by the two philosophers.)
I

In each case,

focus on a careful presentation and explanation of the

argument.

I

do not find any of the arguments to be sound,

and in each case,

present what

I

objection to the argument.

I

take to be the best

Although

I

maintain that each

argument against the Property Theory is unsuccessful

,

I

do

think that each one of them raises some interesting

questions about the objects of belief.
Finally, in chapter 7,

I

turn to a discussion of some

issues concerning the relations between the Property Theory
and de re belief.

I

first briefly review Lewis's account of

the nature of belief in general, and his analysis of de re

belief in particular.

After taking a look at what

I

think

is an unsuccessful argument against Lewis's account of de re

belief,

I

present a case that

to Lewis's analysis:

I

suggest is a counterexample

claim that the analysis implies that

I

a certain subject has a de re belief about a particular

individual, when intuitively it seems that the subject has
no such de re belief.

I

then suggest a way in which we

might modify Lewis's account in order to give a plausible,

property-theoretic view of belief de re.

10

In the remainder of chapter 7,

consider (within the

I

framework of the Property Theory) some questions
concerning
de re beliefs about pluralities and the individuals
that are

contained within them.

In particular,

always necessary, in order to have

a

I

ask whether it is

de re belief about a

given individual, to be acquainted uniquely with that
individual

-

i.e., to stand in a certain relation of

acquaintance to that individual and only to that individual.
I

suggest that it is not necessary in some cases where the

subject is acquainted uniquely with a plurality of things
that contains the individual.

I

also try to formulate some

principles, through a systematic study of cases, connecting

plurally de re beliefs with individually de re beliefs.

11

,

CHAPTER

2

THE TRIADIC VIEW OF BELIEF

In a number of influential papers including "The

Problem of the Essential Indexical

nl

John Perry suggests

that certain features of some of our attitudes about or

toward ourselves tell against the traditional doctrine of

propositional objects of belief, or the view that belief is

ultimately a binary relation between
an abstract proposition.

a

conscious subject and

A proposition, on this view, is a

bearer of truth or falsehood in an absolute sense, and not

merely for a person, or at a time. 2

The attitudes that are

currently in question Perry calls "locating beliefs"

-

they

are "one's beliefs about where one is, when it is, and who
one is." 3
In the first two sections of this chapter,

I

briefly

review the problem that leads Perry to the alternative view
that he favors, and discuss the theory and some of its

consequences.

According to Perry, what often explains our

behavior is not merely the fact that we believe a certain
proposition, but rather the fact that, roughly, we believe
Perry (1979).
I will cite a reprinted version of
Perry's paper in Salmon and Soames (1988), pp. 83-101.
3

Perry favors a theory of propositions according to
which they have a sort of internal structure akin to the
structure of the natural language sentences that express
them.
I will discuss this additional constraint upon the
nature of propositions only when its details are relevant to
the discussion of Perry's treatment of belief.
2

3

Salmon and Soames (1988), p. 85.

it in a certain way,

belief state.

in virtue of being in what he calls a

if this view is correct, then in some of our

successful psychological explanations we convey information
about these belief states, as well as about believed-true
propositions.

It may even be the case that we quantify

implicitly over belief states in all of our ordinary talk
about what we believe.
In the third section,

I

discuss the very similar and

somewhat more detailed view held by Nathan Salmon.

Salmon

and Perry acknowledge a debt to the work of David Kaplan,

who also holds what

I

will call the Triadic View of belief.

Salmon, however, is primarily interested in the philosophy
of language, and in section four of this chapter

I

briefly

explore some semantic views about attributions of locating

beliefs that presuppose the Triadic View.

2

.

1

The Messy Shopper Puzzle

Perry presents the well known case of the messy shopper
as a puzzle for the doctrine of propositional objects of

belief, which implies that change in belief is necessarily

change in a believed-true proposition.

He originally

describes the case as follows:
once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket
floor, pushing my trolly down the aisle on one
side of a tall counter and back along the aisle on
the other, seeking the shopper with the torn bag
With each trip
to tell him he was making a mess.
But
thicker.
became
around the counter, the trail
I

13

.

;

.

seemed unable to catch up.
Finally it dawned on
I was the shopper I was trying to
catch.

I

me.

4

The problem for the proponent of the doctrine of

propositional objects of belief is to pick out two distinct
propositions:

first, the one Perry believed before his

epiphany, viz., the proposition that he would have expressed
by saying 'the shopper with the torn bag is making a mess'

and second, the proposition he comes to believe, the one he

would express by saying

'I am

making a mess'.

According to

Perry,
I believed at the outset that the shopper with a
torn bag was making a mess. And I was right. But
I did not believe that I was making a mess.
That
seems to be something I came to believe. And when
I came to believe that, I stopped following the
trail around the counter, and rearranged the torn
bag in my trolly. 5

We explain why Perry stopped to rearrange the bag of

sugar in part by conveying information about the relevant

change in his beliefs.

Since this change in belief is what

explains his mess-assuaging behavior, the doctrine of

propositional objects of belief must be able to provide the

propositions to give a plausible account for the change.
Perry favors an account of propositions according to

which any two sentences express the same proposition only if
they involve the same concepts, and concern the same objects

“Ibid.
5

,

p.

83

Ibid
14

.

.

and relations. 6

The proposition that Clinton is bigger

than Reich is not the same as the proposition
that the

president of the U.S. is bigger than the Secretary of
Labor,
for example, since although both concern Clinton
and Reich

and the 'bigger than' relation, only the latter involves
the

concept of being the president of the U.S.
This view of propositions need not be worked out in

great detail in order to identify what Perry believed,

according to the doctrine of propositional objects of
belief, before he discovered that he himself had been making
a mess.

He believed the proposition that the shopper with

the torn bag was making a mess.

This proposition is somehow

made up, in part, out of the individual concept of being a

shopper of

a

certain sort, and the property of making a mess

(and perhaps a certain moment or duration of time).

While

the proposition concerns Perry in that he accidentally makes
it true,

it does not involve him essentially, and neither

Perry himself, nor the concept of being Perry, nor even the

concept of being called 'Perry', is a constituent of the

proposition
The problem for the doctrine of propositional objects
of belief arises when the task is to identify the belief

that Perry comes to have when he discovers that he himself
is making a mess - the proposition that he would express by

saying
6

'I

am making a mess', or some such thing.

See ibid.

,

p.

86
15

Again, the

.

doctrine must hold that it is his coming to
believe this
proposition that explains why he stops following

the trail

of sugar on the floor and rearranges
his own torn bag.

Perry first notes that independently of a context,
the
sentence I am making a mess' does not express a
proposition
'

since "this sentence is not true or false absolutely,
but

only as said by one person or another; had another shopper
said it when

I

did, he would have been wrong." 7

What about the proposition that Perry is making a mess?
This may be a singular proposition, made up of Perry himself
and the property of making a mess; or, it may be a quasi-

singular proposition made up out of the individual concept
of being Perry.

discovers?

Could this be the proposition that Perry

He argues that it could not.

The proposition

that he discovers explains some interesting aspect of his
behavior, whereas the proposition that Perry is making a

mess does not.

Attributing to him the belief that Perry is

making a mess explains his behavior only on the assumption
that he believes that he is Perry.

It seems that he could

come to believe the proposition that Perry is making a mess

without thereby coming to believe that he himself is making
a mess - e.g.,

he might see himself in a mirror and fail to

recognize himself. 8
7

Ibid.

,

p.

So, the argument goes, the proposition

87

This assumes that seeing a particular person, under good
conditions, etc., is sufficient for believing a singular, or
object-dependent, proposition about that person.
8

16

that Perry is making a mess cannot be the
one that he comes
to believe when he learns that he himself is
making a mess.

Perhaps there is less need to argue against the
claim
that, of necessity, when Perry discovers himself
to be the

mess-maker, he thinks of himself under an individual
concept

with some descriptive content.

According to this claim, the

proposition that Perry comes to believe is constituted by
the individual concept in question as well as by the concept
or property of making a mess.

suggestion does not work.

But Perry argues that this

He writes:

even if I was thinking of myself as, say, the only
bearded philosopher in a Safeway store west of the
Mississippi, the fact that I came to believe that
the only such philosopher was making a mess
explains my action only on the assumption that I
believed that I was the only such philosopher,
which brings in the indexical again. 9
On the doctrine of propositional objects of belief, the

fact that Perry comes to believe a particular proposition

explains why he engages in some mess-assuaging behavior or
other.

However, the fact that he comes to believe the

proposition that the only bearded philosopher in a Safeway
store west of the Mississippi is making a mess does not

explain such activity.

The same goes for all propositions

that are expressed by sentences lacking indexical terms

designating Perry.
As Perry observes, the only way to preserve the force
of an explanation in which the above proposition is
9

Salmon and Soames (1988), p. 88.
17

.

expressed is to add to it by saying something
like 'and
Perry believes that he is the only bearded
philosopher in
Safeway store west of the Mississippi'.

a

As Perry also

observes, however, this brings the entire problem back
anew.
It seems that there is no way for the proponent
of the

doctrine of propositional objects of belief to say just

which proposition Perry comes to believe when he comes to
believe that he himself is the only bearded philosopher

Reflection on the case of the messy shopper shows that
some of our belief attributions are essentially indexical:

couched partly in terms of indexicals, the substitution of
which with non-indexical terms renders the attributions

devoid of their original explanatory force or meaning.

I

take this to be a claim in epistemology, or perhaps the

philosophy of language.

Perry suggests that a metaphysical

result follows from this (much like the way in which the

claim that the word 'red' expresses the property of being
red entails that there is the property of being red)

.

The

result is that the doctrine of propositional objects of
belief lacks the resources to account for, and hence is

refuted by, cases in which such attributions are true, like
that of the messy shopper.

According to Perry, "there is

something lacking in the propositions offered by the
doctrine, a missing indexical ingredient ." 10

xo

Ibid
18

Since we could not find a proposition

bearer in an absolute sense

-

- a

truth-value

that would explain Perry's

behavior if he were to come to believe it, it seems
likely
that there is no such proposition; for surely we
knew
well

enough where to search.

But the doctrine of propositional

objects of belief implies that there is such a proposition,
indeed, that it is his coming to believe this proposition

that explains why Perry does what he does.

Perry concludes

that we ought instead to search for an alternative to views
of belief as a two-place relation.

chapter

5 a

I

will defer until

detailed discussion of possible objections to

Perry's argument, from the point of view of an adherent to
the doctrine of propositional objects of belief.

2

.

2

Perry's Solution to the Puzzle

The solution to the problem of the essential indexical

favored by Perry involves viewing belief as a three-place

relation between a subject, a proposition, and a belief
state.

What determines the truth, or falsehood, of

attributions of belief to someone is her being, or not
being, one of the relata of such a relation.

He also

maintains that we typically make implicit reference to
belief states in our talk about beliefs, in particular when
we make essentially indexical belief attributions, or

generalizations about locating beliefs:
19

.

We use sentences with indexicals ... to
individuate belief states, for the purposes of
classifying believers in ways useful for
explanation and prediction. That is, belief
states individuated in this way enter into our
commonsense theory about human behaviour and more
sophisticated theories emerging from it. 11

We can think of a belief state, roughly, as a way of

assenting to, or believing, a proposition.

To say that

belief states somehow play a role in the comparison of

believers and their actions, and that they are sometimes

individuated by sentences containing indexicals, is surely
to say something about belief states.

However, a more

precise and thorough characterization of them is needed.
Perry suggests that it is important, in order to

understand our own belief states, that we realize that they
can be individuated by sentences of natural language.

On

this picture, for example, there is a belief state such that

only those people in it are disposed to utter a token of the

sentence

am making a mess'.

'I

Perry comes to be in this

belief state when he realizes that the torn bag of sugar is
his own.

Were someone else to be in the same belief state,

on this view, she would thereby believe a proposition that
is distinct from the one that Perry in fact believes.

Perry certainly does not claim to have analyzed the

notion of a belief state, or to have given necessary and

sufficient conditions for being in a certain belief state,
in terms of a disposition to utter or otherwise assent to a

“Ibid.

,

p.

98
20

.

.

particular sentence.

He says only the following:

That we individuate belief states in this way
doubtless has something to do with the fact that
one criterion for being in the states we
postulate, at least for articulate, sincere
adults, is being disposed to utter the indexical
sentence in question. 12

Clearly Perry is wise not to say that being disposed to
utter a certain sentence is both a necessary and sufficient

condition for being in a given belief state.
plenty of people who do not speak English

-

For one thing,

and hence are

not disposed to utter any English sentences - have been in
the same belief state that led Perry to rearrange the bag of

sugar in his grocery cart.

Moreover, such an analysis would

have the surely implausible result that creatures without

language could not be in belief states.
Perry also acknowledges that "the characterization of
one's belief states may include sentences without any

indexical element." 13

If two people are in a belief state

in which they are disposed to utter 'Everest is [has always

been, always will be] the tallest mountain', then each of

them is related to the same proposition.

We might take the

view that the proposition that Everest is the tallest

mountain has as a constituent Mt. Everest itself, i.e., that
it is a de re or singular proposition.

Perry takes such a

But a belief state that is characterized by a non-

view.

12

Ibid

“Ibid.

,

p.

99
21

indexical sentence may also relate someone to a
proposition
that does not have a (concrete) individual as
a
part.

in

such a case, the belief relation relates a subject,
a belief
state, and a de dicto or general proposition.
In the cases of belief states that are in fact

characterized by sentences with indexical terms, two people
in the same belief state will not in general believe
the

same proposition - i.e., each may be related to that same

belief state and

a

different proposition.

If

I

were in the

same belief state that Perry was in, for example,

I

would

not be related to the same proposition to which he was

related; rather,

I

would be related to the proposition that

Feit is making a mess.
On the other hand, also in cases where belief states

are characterized by sentences with indexicals, two people
in different belief states will not in general believe

distinct propositions.

Consider the supermarket manager,

who sees Perry leaving a sugary trail all over the store,
and is disposed to utter 'he is making a mess'.

In virtue

of being in such a belief state, the manager believes the

same proposition that Perry believes when he identifies

himself with the messy shopper:
is making a mess.

the proposition that Perry

Perry himself is related to this

proposition and a different belief state
14

14
.

The same might be true for two people who are
disposed to utter 'Twain lived in Hartford', and 'Clemens
These people, perhaps,
lived in Hartford', respectively.
22

,

Perry sums up these points as follows:
We have here a metaphysically benign form of
limited accessibility. Anyone at any time can
have access to any proposition.
But not in any
way.
Anyone can believe of John Perry that he is
making a mess. And anyone can be in the belief
state classified by the sentence ' I am making a
mess'.
But only I can have that belief by beina
in that state. 15

According to the account of the case of the messy
shopper offered by Perry, the change in Perry's behavior is

explained not by his coming to believe a new proposition,
but by his coming to be in a new belief state.

Before he

realizes that he himself is the shopper with the torn bag
(but after he has noticed the trail of sugar on the floor)

Perry believes the proposition that Perry is making a mess.
Perhaps he believes this proposition in part because he is
in a belief state that disposes him to utter or somehow

assent to a sentence like 'the shopper who left that trail
of sugar on the floor is making a mess', and in part because

he happens to be the shopper whose trail of sugar he is now

observing.

(Perhaps he would need to be in a position to

demonstrate himself, in a mirror, for example, in order to
believe this proposition; but at this point

I

am not much

concerned with what it takes, according to the proponent of
the Triadic View, to believe a singular proposition.)

are in different belief states, each characterized by a nonindexical sentence. But it is at least plausible to claim
that they believe the same proposition.
15

Salmon and Soames (1988), p. 99.
23

What explains the change in his behavior is
his coming
to believe this same proposition in virtue
of being
in a

new,

"essentially indexical" belief state

- a

state that

disposes him to utter or otherwise assent to the
indexical
sentence

'

I

am making a mess'.

Perry comes to believe, in a

new way, the proposition that he already believes in
some

other way.

The moral:

change in belief is not necessarily

change in propositions believed.

2

.

3

Salmon and the BEL Relation

I

have said that on Perry's view belief is not a two-

place relation between a subject and

a

proposition, but

rather is a three-place relation between a subject, a

proposition and a belief state.

In other terminology, this

is the view that there are two objects of belief rather than

just one. 16

(Perry, however, might object to the use of

this terminology, since he reserves the term 'object of
belief' for the believed-true proposition.)
The first of these objects is, of course, a proposition
(Lewis and Perry use the word 'proposition' in different

senses, but let me continue for the moment to use it to

refer to a kind of structured entity made up out of
properties, relations, perhaps physical objects, etc.).
16

On

Lewis gives this interpretation of Perry's view in
Lewis (1979). My references to this paper are to a reprint
Lewis bases his remarks on Perry (1977).
in Lewis (1983a).
24

.

Lewis's characterization of Perry's view, "the
second object
[of belief] is a function that takes the
subject as argument
and delivers as value the first object ...." 17
Let us,
for

the time being, accept this characterization and
identify a

belief state with a function from (possible) subjects
into

propositions

18
.

Some philosophers writing recently on this topic

notably Nathan Salmon and Robert Stalnaker

-

-

have suggested

that Perry's account is not really incompatible with the

doctrine of propositional objects of belief.

In Frege's

Puzzle, Salmon notes that Perry takes the problem of the

essential indexical to tell against an "account of belief as
a

binary relation between believers and propositions,

sometimes singular propositions ." 19

Salmon, however, goes

on to claim that the doctrine is a consequence of Perry's

own account of belief.

"In fact," he writes,

"Perry's

solution apparently preserves this binary relational
account, and couples it with an existential analysis of

17

Lewis (1983a), p. 151.

18

Consider someone - call him 'Terry' - who at some
time is disposed to utter sincerely a token of 'I am making
a mess'.
Terry, at this time, is in the same belief state
that Perry comes to be in when he realizes that his bag of
sugar is torn. On the current view, each is related to i.e., has as an object of belief - the function that takes
Terry into the proposition that Terry is making a mess, and
Perry into the proposition that Perry is making a mess.
This accounts for the way in which Terry and Perry believe
alike
19

Salmon (1986), p. 173 (fn.
25

1

to chapter 9).

)

,

,

,

.

belief in terms of belief states." 20

what, exactly, is at

issue here?
It appears that Perry does endorse an
existential

analysis of belief sentences according to which
of the form

'

S

a

sentence

believes that p' is true if and only if there

is some belief state b such that the person denoted
by 'S'
is in b,

and the value of b for this person is the

proposition named by the expression 'that p'. 21

On this

view, the truth-maker for attributions of belief is a three-

place relation between a subject, a proposition and a belief
state.

Following Salmon, let us call this relation 'BEL'.

Suppose we have a person called 'S',

a

proposition

called 'P', and a variable over belief states, denoted by
Then it might be the case that there is an x such that

'x'.

BEL( S

P,

,

be true.

x)

then some belief sentence about S will

If so,

.

Of course, it is possible to define two related

relations, called 'B' and 'B*', as follows:
(Dl) B ( S
(

D2

p)

B* ( S

x)

= df

= df

.

there is an x such that BEL( S

,

p,

x)

there is a p such that BEL( S

,

p,

x)

From the fact that there is an x such that BEL( S
follows that B(S, P)

and also that B*(S, x)

,

P,

x)

,

.

it

Salmon, then,

seems to be worried about which relation we call 'belief':

2

°Ibid.

Cf. Stalnaker (1981),

21

fn.

11.

Again, I assume that belief states are functions.
The locution 'in a belief state' may be taken as shorthand
for 'related (in the appropriate sort of way) to a function
from subjects into propositions'.
26

BEL, B or B*

It seems to me that it really doesn't
matter

.

which of these relations we decide to call
'belief'.
Of course,

in English 'believes' is a binary
predicate.

Perhaps Salmon takes this, along with certain
other facts
about belief sentences, to entail that belief is
a binary

relation between subjects and propositions.

This inference,

however, may plausibly be denied, and it appears that
Perry

would wish to deny it.

What Perry and Salmon agree updn is

that in some sense the logical form of a sentence like

'S

believes that p' is something of the form 'there is an x
such that BEL( S

,

p,

x)'

(which is equivalent to 'B(S, p)'

and implies 'B*(S, x)').
Again,

I

do not much care about which relation, two- or

three-place, we call 'belief', and so
to be considerable.

take this agreement

I

Both Perry and Salmon think that BEL is

the truth-maker for belief sentences, and it really doesn't

matter whether we take the word 'belief' to express this
relation, or which of its relata we pick out with the phrase
'object of belief'.

It therefore seems to me that there is

no genuine disagreement about the nature of belief between

Perry and Salmon.
In the remainder of this section,

I

would like to

consider Salmon's account of the BEL relation.

According to

Salmon, the third relatum of BEL is a way of taking, or a

means of grasping, or a "guise" of, a proposition

-

and the

relation BEL is something like "the relation of disposition
27

to inward agreement [to a proposition]
when taken in a

certain way." 22

I

shall disregard any difference there may

be between what Perry calls 'belief states'
and what Salmon
sometimes calls 'guises'. 23

Earlier, we entertained a conception of belief
states
as functions from subjects into propositions.

This seemed

to work well enough for the de se cases under
discussion,

but it may not work straightforwardly for all guises.

For

example, two different guises or belief states intuitively

correspond to the following two sentences:
(i)

(ii)

Mark Twain is Mark Twain
Sam Clemens is Mark Twain.

Here we have two different guises by means of which, on the

view favored by Perry and Salmon, a single proposition may
be believed.

If a guise is a function from subjects into

propositions, however, then it seems that there is no way to

distinguish these two guises.
In order to get around this problem, perhaps we should

give a new account of belief states or propositional guises.
I

suggest that, at least for the time being, we take belief
22

Salmon (1986), p. 111.
Since Salmon is mainly
interested in the logic of belief, he doesn't care much
about whether this is the correct account of the relation in
question. However, the semantic theory he defends requires
that there be some such three-place relation.
23

Perhaps a belief state is a guise to which someone
stands in B*
Perhaps also we should be talking about the
objects of belief states rather than the states themselves;
but this is distinction that I will for the most part ignore
in the text.
.

28

states to be ordered structures that may
contain the
relations that the subject bears to the
constituents of the
(perhaps singular) proposition believed. Very
roughly, if
we believe Russellian propositions, then we
do so by means
of modes of presentation of them, or Fregean
propositions.
(In this chapter,

I

will not say much about individuating

belief states by means of their truth conditions

-

in fact,

the question whether belief states (call them what
you may)

have possible-worlds truth conditions will be one of the

central questions of this thesis.)

Consider again belief states

(i)

and (ii) above.

I

will represent the singular proposition believed as follows:
<MT, =, MT>

.

Then, the belief state that corresponds to (i)

may be represented by the ordered triple:

<R MT

,

=,

RMT >. 24

Rmt is a single relation by means of which a believer may be

acquainted with someone.

For example, it might be the

relation of having heard of someone under the name 'Twain'.
On the other hand, the belief state that corresponds to (ii)

above may be represented by the triple:

<R SC

/

=/

RM t>*

In

this case, R sc and RMT are two different relations of

acquaintance, and so we have a way of distinguishing the

belief states corresponding with (i) and (ii), even though

they are ways of believing the selfsame proposition.
24

Here, I have put the identity relation, given by '=',
into the belief state.
Perhaps what should really go into
the belief state is some mode of presentation, or concept,
of identity, given by 'R = '.
In the text, however, I will
ignore this sort of complication.
29

On this picture, which may accord better
with Salmon's
views on guises, the proposition that a
subject believes may
be recovered from his belief state
together with information
about the identities of the external objects
to which he is
related.
if I am in one of the belief states above,
then

the proposition that

I

believe is determined by replacing

each relation of acguaintance with the individual
to whom

I

bear that relation (if there is such an individual;
see

chapters

4

and

7

for a discussion of other sorts of case).

If there are no relations of acquaintance in the
belief

state, then the proposition believed may just be taken to be

the belief state (but see also fn. 24).
for genuine de dicto belief.

This is the case

For de se cases, belief states

may be taken to be pairs of a special sort of acquaintance

relation

-

the relation of being identical to someone - and

properties.

So, when I believe myself to be making a mess,

my belief state may be represented by the following pair:
<R=,

making a mess>.

The propositional object of my belief

would then be the proposition:

<Feit, making a mess>.

There is a way to reconcile this account with Lewis's

suggestion that belief states are functions from subjects
into propositions.
state:

<R SC

,

=

,

R Mt >

Consider again the following belief
«

We could also represent this as a

propositional function, although the value must not be the
sigular proposition that Twain is Twain.

Using 'x' as a

free variable, we can represent the same belief state as
30

follows:

there is a y and a

and Rmt to z, and y=z
(i)

.

z

such that x bears R sc to
y

The belief state corresponding to

above may be given in a similar way.
For belief states without relations of
acguaintance

e.g.

-

'anything extended has mass' - we may represent
the

,

state as a function whose value will be either true
for all
arguments, or false for all arguments, e.g.:

anything extended has mass.
like <R =

that x=y

For de se cases, a belief state

making a mess> may be given by:

,

,

x is such that

there is a y such

and y is making a mess (or more simply by:

making a mess).

In chapter 4,

I

x is

discuss various conceptions

of belief states in greater detail.

Salmon and Perry arrive at their similar views about

belief in quite different ways.

In particular,

Salmon does

not think that the phenomena related to locating beliefs, or

indexical beliefs, pose a special problem about accounting
for the attitudes.

He argues that other puzzle cases also

require an analysis of belief in terms of the BEL relation:
the general problems posed by self-locating
beliefs and other beliefs formulated by means of
an indexical are not peculiar to these special
subcases of de re beliefs, and arise even with de
re beliefs whose psychological explanatory force
does not involve an "essential indexical." 25
In order to support this claim, Salmon describes a case

that is similar to Frege's Puzzle about identity statements
and thoughts, and Kripke's puzzle about belief.

25

Salmon (1986), p. 174 (fn.
31

1,

chapter 9).

He calls

.

the case 'Elmer's Bef uddlement
length,

I

'

.

Rather than quote at

will summarize the situation as follows. 26

Elmer

is a bounty hunter, somehow affiliated
with the FBI, who is

hot on the trail of an infamous jewel thief,
Bugsy Wabbit.
For some months before January 1, Elmer spends
a good deal
of time scrutinizing various photographs and
movies of

Bugsy, studying FBI documents about Bugsy, etc.
1,

On January

after learning quite a lot about Bugsy Wabbit, Elmer

forms the opinion that Bugsy is (is now, has always been,
and will always be throughout his lifetime)

dangerous...." 27

Unbeknownst to Elmer, however, Bugsy,

having learned that a bounty hunter was after him, endures

major plastic surgery, has his voice altered, and otherwise
changes his publicly observable characteristics.

Elmer's

leads allow him to track down and encounter Bugsy Wabbit;

but Elmer fails to recognize Bugsy as the suspect whom he
has been tracking, and simply thinks that he has met another

person with the same name.

Elmer befriends Bugsy and soon

comes to know a good deal about him.

On April 1, Elmer

overhears a dispute between his friend Bugsy and someone
else, and in virtue of the nature of the fight, "Elmer

decides then and there that this Bugsy Wabbit is also

dangerous man." 28
26

See ibid., pp. 92-8.

27

Ibid.

,

p.

92

Ibid

,

p.

94.

28

.

32

a

.

The story takes a final twist on June

1,

when Elmer

gets some information from the FBI to the
effect that
despite being a criminal, Bugsy might be
relatively harmless
after all. This new information fails to
persuade Elmer to
form the opinion that Bugsy is not dangerous;
however, it
does persuade him to suspend his former opinion
that Bugsy
is dangerous.

So,

as of June 1,

"Elmer feels certain that

his friend Bugsy is dangerous, but still wonders
whether

Bugsy the criminal is dangerous or not." 29
The puzzle may be stated in terms of a guestion about

Elmer s doxastic state on or after June

1

.

Salmon describes

it as follows:

Either Elmer believes that Bugsy is dangerous or
he does not.
Which is it? We seem to be reguired
to say that Elmer does indeed believe that Bugsy
is dangerous, for he remains convinced of his
friend Bugsy's dangerousness. We also seem to be
required to say Elmer does not believe that Bugsy
is dangerous, for he now actively suspends
judgment concerning the criminal's dangerousness.
Yet we are logically prohibited from saying both
together.
How, then, are we to describe
coherently Elmer's doxastic disposition with
respect to the information that Bugsy Wabbit is
dangerous? How can it be consistent for Elmer to
believe that Bugsy is dangerous, on the one hand,
and to withhold that belief, on the other? 30

According to Salmon, the case of Elmer's Beffudlement
poses the same problem as the case of the messy shopper for
the view that belief sentences are to be analyzed ultimately
in terms of a two-place relation between a subject and a
29

3

Ibid

°Ibid.

,

p.

97.
33

)

proposition.

I

would urge that the de se cases may pose

special problems in metaphysics or the philosophy
of mind,
even if they do not in the philosophy of
language.
if

Salmon is right, then cases involving indexical
belief are
not the only ones that provide support for an
existential

analysis of belief sentences in terms of a three-place
relation between
else.

a

subject, a proposition and something

(We may wish, however, to treat belief sentences in

some other way.

chapter

3

I

will briefly discuss this issue in

.

On the theory favored by Salmon, Elmer believes that

Bugsy is dangerous if and only if he stands in

a

certain

relation to the singular proposition that Bugsy is dangerous
- a

relation that would lead us to agree that he has a

belief about Bugsy, to the effect that he is dangerous.

A

consequence of Salmon's version of the Triadic View is this:
even after the events of June

1,

Elmer believes that Bugsy

is dangerous, so that to say that he does not believe this
is to say something literally false.

Despite the fact that Salmon's view has an answer to
the question whether or not Elmer believes that Bugsy is

dangerous, things are not quite so simple.

Elmer's state is

such that (in many ordinary contexts) it would be at least

seriously misleading to say that he believes that Bugsy is
dangerous.

Since Elmer thinks that two different people

share the name 'Bugsy', the belief attributed to Elmer seems
34

.

to be incompatible with some of his
other beliefs.

Elmer's

attitude toward Bugsy's dangerousness changed
substantially
as of June 1, and it would be nice to
be able to account for
this change. What is needed, then, is a way
to distinguish
Elmer's believing that Bugsy is dangerous, on the
one hand,

from his suspending or withholding belief that
Bugsy is

dangerous, on the other.

Salmon presents some principles about belief and the
BEL relation - principles that allow the Triadic View to
entail both that Elmer believes that Bugsy is dangerous,
and
that he withholds belief as to whether Bugsy is dangerous.
The principles help to locate BEL within a certain

conceptual scheme.

According to Salmon:

[A believes p] may be analyzed as (3x)[A
grasps p by means of x & BEL A p, x)],

(i)

(

,

(ii) A may stand in BEL to p and some x by means
of which A grasps p, without standing in BEL
to p and all x by means of which A grasps p,

and
(iii) fA withholds belief from p]
in the sense
relevant to Elmer's bef uddleraent may be
analyzed as (3x)[A grasps p by means of x
~BEL(A, p, x)]. 31
,

,

&

Salmon wants to say that there is a means by which
Elmer grasps the proposition (or information) that Bugsy is

dangerous such that he does not stand in BEL to this

proposition and this particular means of grasping it.

It is

somehow essential to this means of grasping the proposition
31

Ibid.

,

p.

Ill
35

.

that it involves a mental representation
of Bugsy as a
notorious jewel thief, rather than as, say, a
new friend.
The way in which Elmer is acquainted with
Bugsy, according
to Salmon, constitutes in part the guise
by means of which
Elmer grasps the proposition that he is dangerous.
On the plausible assumption that a subject may
stand in

BEL to a proposition and a propositional guise
only if she

grasps the proposition by means of the guise 32

- i.e.,

BEL S

-

(

,

p,

x)

only if s grasps p by means of x

that

we may say

simply that on the view of belief attribution given by
Salmon, a sentence of the form

fA

believes that

p]

is true

if and only if there is a guise x, a subject S such that
A

denotes S, and a proposition P such that p expresses
that BEL( S

,

P,

x).

P,

such

The presumed background for this

semantic thesis is the Triadic View, according to which both

propositions and belief states (or guises) are essential to
belief

2

.

4

Explaining Behavior on the Triadic View

In this section

I

would like to consider again the

issue of how change in belief explains change in behavior.

According to the semantic and metaphysical views of Salmon
and Perry, in English we may use only a two-place predicate
32

I do not think that Salmon would object to this.
may be more or less plausible depending upon how the
metaphor of grasping is cashed out.

36

It

'believes' for the purpose of conveying
information about a
certain three-place relation.
It might be interesting to
see how these views account for the very
sentences in terms
of which Perry originally explained his
behavior in the case
of the messy shopper.
As we have seen, Perry wrote:
I believed at the outset that the
shopper with a
torn bag was making a mess. And I was right. But
I did not believe that I was making
a mess.
That
seems to be something I came to believe. And when
I came to believe that, I stopped following
the
trail around the counter, and rearranged the torn
bag in my trolley. 33

The first sentence of this passage is true, according
to the present semantic view.

The embedded sentence

-

shopper with a torn bag was making a mess' — expresses

'the
a

certain proposition (presumably not a singular proposition,

although complications may arise) such that Perry stood in
BEL to it and some belief state:

Perry, for example, was

disposed to assent to the sentence 'the shopper with a torn
bag is making a mess'.

According to a view like Salmon's, however, the third
sentence of the passage

- viz.,

'I

did not believe that

was making a mess' - could very well have been false.

I

The

embedded sentence here, on the view favored by Salmon and
perhaps Perry as well, expresses the singular proposition
that Perry is making a mess (at the relevant time in the
past)

.

If Elmer could believe singular propositions about

Bugsy Wabbit in virtue of tracking him in a certain fashion,
33

Salmon and Soames (1988), p. 83.
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.

.

.

it seems there is no reason to deny
that Perry could believe

singular propositions about himself in virtue
of following
his own trail of sugar.
If he can, and if the sentence in
question literally means that he did not stand in

BEL to the

singular proposition that Perry is making
appears that the sentence is false:

a mess,

then it

Perry did believe that

he was making a mess (despite the way in which
he would have

expressed his belief) just as Elmer believed that Bugsy
was
dangerous
However, perhaps it takes more than merely following

someone's trail of sugar to believe singular propositions
about that person.
of his example,

Perry also discusses a revised version

in which the relation of acquaintance that

he bears to himself is more direct:

Suppose there were mirrors at either end of the
counter so that as I pushed my trolley down the
aisle in pursuit I saw myself in the mirror.
I
take what I see to be a reflection of the messy
shopper going up the aisle on the other side, not
realizing that what I am really seeing is a
reflection of a reflection of myself. I point and
say, truly, 'I believe that he is making a
mess ' 34
Let us suppose with Perry that these are the facts of
the case.

Then Perry's claim that he did not believe that

he was making a mess really is false, if the role of the

embedded sentence is simply to express the singular

proposition that Perry is making a mess, since in fact he
stood in the BEL relation to the proposition that Perry is
34

Ibid.

,

p.

92
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making a mess (in virtue of pointing to himself)
and some
belief state.
So, the fact that Perry comes to
have a

singular proposition about himself as an object of
belief
does not explain the change in his behavior.

Consider an ordinary explanation of Perry's mess-

assuaging behavior, e.g., 'he rearranged the torn bag in
his
trolley because he came to believe that he was making
mess'.

a

We take this to be true, given the facts of the

case.

On the semantic view taken by Salmon, however, it

seems that the explanation is literally false, since on this

view it was true that Perry came to believe that he was
making a mess when he saw himself in the mirror; but this
caused him to speed off in pursuit of the messy shopper
rather than rearrange his bag of sugar.

Regardless of the literal meaning of the explanation

which

I

will discuss briefly later in this section

-

-

we do

come to understand why Perry rearranged the bag of sugar

when we hear it, and when we read Perry's own explanation of
his behavior.

(Like Elmer, Perry had thought that there

were two distinct people instead of just one.)

We have

already seen how the apparatus of the Triadic View can
account for the behavior of the messy shopper.

What

explains Perry's behavior is not a change with respect to
the propositions he believes; rather, it is a change in

belief state.

The proposition that Perry was making a mess

may have been an object of his belief all along, but the
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belief state that disposes him to utter
surely was not.

'

I

am making a mess'

The fact that he comes to stand in BEL to

this proposition and this particular belief state
explains
why he stopped to check and rearrange his own bag

of sugar.

It will be helpful to characterize the sort of
belief

state under consideration, assuming a previous account
of

belief states in general.
an I-guise

,

will call such a belief state

I

and give the following definition, which makes

use of the notion of grasping a proposition by means of a

guise or belief state:
(IG)

f

is an I-guise = df

.

necessarily, for all agents x

and propositions p, if x grasps p by means of

f,

then there is a property F such that p is

logically equivalent to the singular proposition
that x is

F.

We might have occasion to characterize a belief state, in
part, with a natural language sentence containing an

indexical, such as

'I

am making a mess'.

that is so characterized is an I-guise:
a

The belief state
if a person grasps

proposition by means of it, or stands in BEL to it and

a

proposition, then it is the singular proposition about that

person to the effect that she is making a mess

35

35
.

The class of I-guises is one of many classes of
essentially indexical guises, by means of which different
subjects may believe different propositions. For example,
we might be interested in the notion of a Now-guise, for
grasping propositions directly about the present moment.
40
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How does the Triadic View explain the change
in the

messy shopper's behavior?

Let us suppose that the relevant

change in belief occurs at a particular time, called
't'.
The explanation goes as follows:
there is an I-guise such
that before t. Perry does not stand in BEL to it and
the

proposition that he is making a mess; but as of

t.

Perry

does stand in BEL to it and the proposition that he is

making a mess.

As it happened, before t Perry stood in BEL

to the proposition that he is making a mess, and some guise

or other.

However, that guise (cf.

was not an I-guise:

'he is making a mess')

the supermarket manager might have

grasped a proposition by means of it, but this proposition
is not equivalent to any singular proposition about the

manager
I

would now like to discuss briefly some issues about

the semantic meaning of sentences of the form 'S believes

that he (she) is F', and hence about the meaning of

psychological explanations into which such sentences figure.
These issues are not at all central to the thesis as
whole; but

I

a

will make a few remarks about them with respect

to the Triadic View of belief.

I

will also make a few

remarks about the 'he himself' and 'she herself' locutions
as they occur in belief sentences.

Given the background of the Triadic View, there is
little question that if

I

were to utter, in the ordinary

course of a conversation, the sentence 'Perry believes that
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he is making a mess', where 'he' clearly
refers to Perry, my

remark would convey the information that there is
an I-guise
such that Perry stands in BEL to it and the proposition
that
he is making a mess.

The guestion is whether or not all of

this information is entailed by the literal or semantic

meaning of my utterance.
On Salmon's view, the semantic meaning of the utterance

implies nothing at all about I-guises.

He maintains that

the embedded sentence merely functions to pick out the

singular proposition that Perry is making a mess, and from
his first principle concerning the BEL relation, we get the

result that my remark would be literally true even if

I

said

it at some time during the interval in which Perry was

chasing down the messy shopper in the mirror.

Salmon's view

requires only that there be some way or other, by means of

which Perry grasps the proposition that Perry is making
mess

-

a

and there is such a way, since Perry is pointing to

himself in the mirror and saying 'he is making a mess'.
A case can be made, however, for the claim that this

semantic view does not correctly account for the truth
values of many English sentences.

If Smith watches Perry

chase after a reflection of himself rather than simply

straighten out his bag, and Smith, in

a

report to Jones

concerning Perry's state of mind, says "Perry believes that
he is making a mess," it is plausible to think that Smith

would have said something false.
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Many speakers of English

probably have such intuitions.

If Jones were watching Perry

along with Smith, he could surely reply to him,
truly, in
the following way:
"No.
Of course Perry doesn't believe
he s making a mess.

If he did, he would be rearranging that

torn bag of sugar in his cart." 36

Salmon might reply that so many people would take

Smith's remark to be false because it is easy to confuse

a

statement's semantic meaning with one of its pragmatic
implicatures
commonplace.

,

especially if similar implicatures are
For example, Smith's remark may carry the

conversational implicature that Perry's belief state is an
I-guise, or, perhaps as a consequence, that Perry would

answer "yes" if he were asked "are you making a mess?" 37
If this information - or something like it - is a

conversational implicature of the sentence 'Perry believes
that he is making a mess', we should expect it to be

cancelable by a subsequent utterance of the speaker.
might be claimed that this is what would happen if
say the following:

I

It

were to

"Perry believes that he is making a

mess; but even if he were to express his belief, he would

not express it by saying anything like

mess'."

'I

am making a

Salmon would probably make this claim, maintaining

that the second clause serves to cancel the implicature of
36

I
will not press this point against Salmon here.
view
can
be
his
do think that an even stronger case against
proper
names.
made with certain belief sentences containing
37

I

See, e.g.

,

Salmon (1986), p. 115.
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the first. 38

He might also claim that since it is easier,

from the point of view of communicating in English,
to deny
the (true, on his view) belief attribution in the
first
clause, instead of cancelling it with the second, an
English

speaker would likely do just that, taking it to be false.

Another way of treating this case seems to me to be
more plausible.

We might hold that the second clause in the

monologue above has the effect of selecting between two
different readings of the belief attribution in the first.
On this view, a sentence of the form 'S believes that he/she
is F' would be literally ambiguous:

there is an x such that BEL( S

it may mean (1) that

that S is F, x)

,

39

as on

,

Salmon's view; or, it may mean (2) that there is an x such
that x is an I-guise, and BEL( S

,

that S is

F,

x)

.

Here, the

second reading does imply that the subject grasps the

relevant proposition by means of an I-guise, and this
reading might be forced by certain features of the context
in which such a sentence is used.

One could also hold that sentences of the same general

form are univocal, and that their meanings are given by
above.

If this were correct,

(2)

it would be literally false to

say, before Perry discovers himself to be the mess-maker but

after he sees himself in the mirror, that Perry believes

38

Cf

.

ibid.

,

p.

118.

For ease of exposition, I ignore the use/mention
distinction here and later in this section.
39
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.

that he is making a mess, even with an added
qualification

about Perry's state of mind, as in the monologue
above.

of

these three possible views concerning the semantics
of such
sentences, the second

-

i.e., the view that they are

systematically ambiguous between two sorts of reading

-

seems to me to be the most plausible.
The same options are available, again given the

background of the Triadic View, for the evaluation of
sentences of the form 'S believes that he himself (she
herself) is F'.

On a view like Salmon's, it might be

claimed that the 'he himself' and 'she herself' locutions,
when they occur in belief sentences of the present form,

conventionally indicate the alleged presence of an I-guise.
For example, if

I

were to utter 'Perry believes that he

himself is making a mess', it might be a conventional

implicature of my utterance

-

one that has come to be

associated with the form of words and hence does not depend
upon any special features of the context of utterance

Perry believes the proposition that he is making

a

-

that

mess in

virtue of being in a very special sort of belief state,
viz

.

an I-guise
If this information is a conventional implicature of my

utterance, then it is not part of the proposition expressed

semantically by the words in the utterance itself, and hence
the utterance could be true even if Perry did not grasp the

proposition that he is making a mess by an I-guise (if, for
45

example, he saw himself in the mirror).

However, there is

good reason to think that the information about the
de se
nature of the belief reported in the sentence is
represented
at the level of logical form, and as a result is
not merely

conventional implicature.
This leaves us with the second and third options listed
above.

A proponent of the Triadic View could claim that the

sentences in guestion are ambiguous:

on one reading, a

sentence of the form 'S believes that he himself (she
herself) is F' is true if and only if there is an x such

that BEL(S, that S is F, x)

;

and, on the other reading, a

sentence of this form is true if and only if there is an x
such that x is an I-guise, and BEL( S

,

that S is F, x).

The second reading is much more likely, it seems, to be

intended by a speaker and accommodated by an audience.

For

this reason, it might be tempting to take the third option
and claim that it is the univocal reading of the relevant

form of words.

On this view, if

I

said 'Perry believes that

he himself is making a mess' while he was chasing the messy

shopper in the mirror,

something true.

I

could not possibly have said

It seems to me that the second strategy is

still the best option for a semantic theorist working within
the framework of the Triadic View, although the third

alternative certainly is a plausible candidate as well.
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CHAPTER

3

THE PROPERTY THEORY OF BELIEF

In 1957 Peter Geach asked the following
question about

belief and its attribution, and then went on to restrict
the
range of possible answers:
...if we say of a number of people that each of
them believes that he himself is clever, what
belief exactly are we attributing to all of them?
Certainly they do not all believe the same
proposition, as 'proposition' is commonly
understood by philosophers. 1

As commonly understood by philosophers, of course, the word

'proposition' names a kind of thing that is true or false

simpliciter, and not merely true, say, of one person, and
false of another.

Geach 's question seems to presuppose that the assertion
in question is true provided that there is some entity such

that each person in the relevant domain of quantification
stands in a certain binary relation
to that entity.

-

the belief relation

-

The view to be discussed in this chapter

entails that such a presupposition is correct:

it is the

view that belief, although it is a binary relation, is not

a

relation between subjects and propositions; rather, the view
holds that the objects of belief are properties, and hence
are neither true nor false simpliciter.

The thesis that belief is essentially a relation

between subjects and properties has been developed and

x

Geach (1957),

p.

23.

.

.

defended by both David Lewis and Roderick
Chisholm.

The
view, however, had been to a certain extent
anticipated by
Sydney Shoemaker 2 Shoemaker argues that some
of the
.

statements that we make about ourselves using the
pronoun
'I' are not "subject to error through
misidentif ication"

relative to 'I '. 3

Shoemaker goes on to write:

There are predicates which I apply to others, and
which others apply to me, on the basis of
observations of behavior, but which I do not
ascribe to myself on this basis, and these
predicates are precisely those the self-ascription
of which is immune to error through
misidentif ication
I see nothing wrong with
describing the self-ascription of such predicates
as manifestations of self-knowledge or selfawareness 4
.

.

Shoemaker here considers the self-ascription of

a

predicate (or an attribute) to be a certain kind of speech
act; but the analogy with belief is apparent.

Moreover,

Shoemaker suggests that our ability to self-ascribe the kind
of predicate mentioned above is not to be explicated in

terms of an ability to refer to ourselves by means of

grasping some individual concept

2

5
.

See Shoemaker (1968).

3

Ibid.
My statement, for example, 'I am
p. 557.
tired' is subject to error through misidentif ication
relative to 'I' if and only if it is possible that I should
know that some particular thing is tired, but mistakenly
think that the thing I know to be tired is what my use of
'I' refers to.
Presumably this is not possible, and hence
my statement is immune to error through misidentif ication
,

4

5

Ibid.

,

p.

562

See ibid., pp. 562-3.
48

Brian Loar has also proposed that we
posit a primitive
relation between agents and (something like)
properties:
I suggest taking self-ascriptive
belief as
unanalyzed.
If Cynthia believes that she has the
flu, then what is true is:
B*( Cynthia, y has the flu).
She is related by the self-ascriptive belief
relation to that propositional function. 6

Loar does not, however, go on to make the stronger
claim

made by Lewis and Chisholm:

that necessarily, if someone

believes something, then there is a property such that
she

self-ascribes it; and indeed, that the believing is to be
analyzed in terms of the self-ascription, or direct
attribution, of the property.

3

•

1

Lewis and Self-Ascription

In this section

I

would like to discuss Lewis's

arguments for, and version of, the view that properties are
the objects of belief.

Lewis argues for two theses:

(1) When propositional objects will do, property
objects also will do.
(2) Sometimes property
objects will do and propositional objects won't. 7

It should be noted that Lewis takes propositions to be sets

of possible worlds - the members of the set are the worlds

6

Loar (1976), p. 358. We may identify properties with
propositional functions, since there is a trivial one-one
correspondence between them.
7

Lewis (1983a), p. 134.
Lewis intends the theses to
hold for attitudes other than belief, but here I consider
only the case of belief. Many other cases are analogous.
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where the proposition is true
sets of possible individuals

-

and takes properties to be
the members of the set are

the things that have the property.

(We might think of

propositions as properties of entire worlds.)

As we shall

see in the next section, Chisholm arrives
at essentially the
same view about belief, despite his markedly
different views
about the ontological status of propositions and
properties.

Lewis defends his first thesis by showing that
there is
a

one-one correspondence between all of the propositions

that there are, and some of the properties that there
are.
He observes:

to any set of worlds whatever, there corresponds
the property of inhabiting some world in that set.
In other words, to any proposition there
corresponds the property of inhabiting some world
where that proposition holds. 8

This procedure obviously yields a unigue property

corresponding to each proposition.

The correspondence is

one-one since none of the properties is yielded by more than
one proposition; if there were such a property, then

something at a world where one of the propositions is true
and the other false would both have and fail to have the
property, which of course is impossible.
The motivation for replacing propositional objects of

belief with property objects of belief is provided by

Lewis's second thesis, together with the methodological

principle that positing uniform objects of belief is the
8

Ibid.

,

p.

135
50
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best way to systematize our knowledge
about the causal role
of belief in behavior.
Lewis's strategy for replacing

propositional objects with property ones is
straightforward:
We have a one-one correspondence between
all
propositions and some properties. Whenever it
would be right to assign a proposition as the
object of an attitude, I shall simply assign
the
corresponding property. Since the correspondence
is one-one, no information is lost and no
surplus
information is added. 9
To believe the proposition, for example, that
elms are

deciduous, is by analysis to self-ascribe the corresponding

property of inhabiting

a

possible world where elms are

deciduous (or, being such that elms are deciduous).
section,

I

In this

will not question Lewis's claim that information

is neither gained nor lost in the analysis, even though the

structure of the objects of belief is different:

the

proposition is a set of worlds, and the corresponding
property is a set most of the members of which are not
entire worlds (for Lewis, each world inhabits itself, and of

course so does every proper part of it).

There is an

argument in the literature against the move made here by
Lewis

-

chapter

an unsound argument, in my view

-

which

I

discuss in

6

Considering the objects of the attitudes, Lewis
suggests that since they might just as well be properties as
propositions, they might just as well be properties that

don't correspond to entire worlds as ones that do.
9

Ibid.

,

pp.

135-6
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Of

course, there is no reason to take the
view that properties,
rather than propositions, are the objects
of belief if there
are no cases of belief that may be analyzed
in terms of

property objects but not in terms of propositional
ones.
Lewis's second thesis maintains that there are
such cases.
The standard examples of self-locating or de se
belief
are by now familiar.

Lewis first discusses Perry's example

about Rudolf Lingens, who is an amnesiac and is lost
in Main
Library, Stanford.

Lingens, in a perfectly ordinary sense,

does not know who he is (e.g., that he is Lingens) or
where
he is; yet he has read in the library an accurate biography
of himself and a correct account of the library itself.

Somehow, Lingens could even come to believe that Lingens is

lost in Main Library, without thereby believing that he

himself is in that situation.

What is the nature, then, of

this belief that Lingens lacks? 10

Lewis diagnoses the case as follows:
The more he reads, the more propositions he
believes, and the more he is in a position to
self-ascribe properties of inhabiting such-andsuch a kind of world.
But none of this, by
itself, can guarantee that he knows where in the
world he is. He needs to locate himself not only
in logical space but also in ordinary space.
He
needs to self-ascribe the property of being in
aisle five, floor six, of Main Library, Stanford;
and this is not one of the properties that
corresponds to a proposition. 11

10

Cf.

Perry (1977).

“Lewis (1983a),

p.

138.
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If a property corresponds to
a proposition, then if an

individual has the property, so does everything
else (i.e.,
everything that inhabits the same world that
it inhabits).
The property of being in the fifth aisle
of the sixth floor
of Main Library, then, is not a property
that corresponds to
a

proposition:

Lingens has this property, but most things

that inhabit his world do not.

Lewis claims that the present example shows that

certain beliefs can be analyzed in terms of property
objects
but not in terms of propositional objects, and that
for this

reason his second thesis is true.

Suppose that Lingens

comes to know, and hence believe, that he is in Main Library
-

then his belief can be understood in terms of his self-

ascribing the property of being in a certain building; but
not,

it seems,

in terms of his self-ascribing the property

of being in a certain kind of world.

Perry himself also uses the Lingens case, and others
like it, to argue for the thesis that belief is not a binary

relation between a person and a proposition

-

conceived of

as a Fregean proposition with a kind of syntactic structure;

but Perry ultimately proposes a view that is at least prima

facie distinct from the one endorsed by Lewis. 12
12

For reasons to believe that Lingens does not come to
believe a new Fregean proposition when he learns where he is
or who he is, and for a discussion of Perry's own positive
view, see Chapter 2.
Perry claimed that propositions lack
an "indexical ingredient" needed to account for certain
beliefs; Lewis responds not by giving indexicality to the
objects of belief (since properties are just sets of
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In Chapter 5,

I

discuss Robert Stalnaker's objection
to

Lewis's claims about the Lingens case.

Roughly, Stalnaker

would take the object of Lingens's belief
that he himself is
in Main Library to be a set of possible
situations in which
Lingens (or an epistemic counterpart for himself)
is in that
very building; 13 and he would take the object of
Lingens's
different, previous belief - say, the one that Lingens
would
have expressed by saying 'Lingens is lost in the
library' to be a set of possible situations in which some
person or

other named 'Lingens' (and who has certain other properties)

happens to be lost there.
To be sure, Lewis does not claim that his second thesis

has been proved before he presents his case of the two gods:

Consider the case of the two gods. They inhabit a
certain possible world, and they know exactly
which world it is. Therefore they know every
proposition that is true at their world. Insofar
as knowledge is a propositional attitude, they are
omniscient.
Still I can imagine them to suffer
ignorance:
neither one knows which of the two he
is.
They are not exactly alike. One lives on top
of the tallest mountain and throws down manna; the
other lives on top of the coldest mountain and
throws down thunderbolts. Neither one knows
whether he lives on the tallest mountain or on the
coldest mountain; nor whether he throws manna or
thunderbolts 14
individuals) but by making use of the relation of selfascription, which is necessarily such that any agent can
bear it only to himself or herself (and, when location in
time is important, by claiming that the self-ascribing is
done by a momentary temporal part of the persisting agent).
13

I put off a discussion of the details of Stalnaker's
view until chapter 5.
14

Lewis (1983a), p. 139.
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Lewis claims that the situation is a
possible one, and
is thus a legitimate test case for
our views about knowledge
and belief.
He also suggests that the gods could lack
the
beliefs that they do because "they have an
egually perfect
view of every part of their world, and hence
cannot identify
the perspectives from which they view it." 15
Since the

gods believe every proposition that is true at
their world

but could nevertheless believe (truly) more than they
in
fact do, the argument goes, the objects of the missing

beliefs could not be propositions.
Lewis's solution, as discussed earlier, is to say that
the objects of belief and other attitudes are properties

rather than propositions.

On this view belief is a binary

relation; but not between a subject and

value in any absolute sense.

a

bearer of a truth

If the god on the tallest

mountain were to learn that he himself lived on the tallest
mountain (never mind for the moment that this seems to be
impossible given the description of the case), he would not
come to believe a new proposition; rather, he would self-

ascribe a new property:

tallest mountain.

viz., the property of living on the

This property does not correspond to any

proposition, since the god who lives on the tallest mountain
is the only one in his world who has it. 16
15

Ibid

16

I discuss the debate between Stalnaker and Lewis,
over the correct treatment of the case of the two gods, in
chapter 5
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Lewis suggests that these examples warrant
the analysis
of belief in general as the
self-ascription of a property,
cases where the property corresponds to a
proposition as
well as cases where it does not.
Again, the uniformity in

m

kind of the objects of our attitudes is desirable
since it
best explains the logical relations between them,
reference
to which is indispensable in accounting
systematically
for

how what we think affects what we do.
Lewis coined the phrase 'belief de se' for the self-

ascription of properties.
as follows:

He describes part of his project

"My thesis is that the de se subsumes the de

dicto; but not vice versa.

A general account of belief or

knowledge must therefore be an account of belief or
knowledge de se ." 17

The other part of Lewis's project is

the explication of de re belief also in terms of the self-

ascription of properties.

I

discuss this account briefly in

the third section of this chapter and at greater length in

chapter

7

Although Lewis claims that these two examples suffice
to show that his second thesis is true, he does discuss

another example originally due to Perry.

I

think that

consideration of this example will bring out an interesting
consequence of Lewis's view in particular, and the Property

Theory in general.

The example concerns a certain man

Heimson, who is a bit mad and thinks, wrongly of course,
17

Lewis (1983a), p. 139.
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that he is David Hume

18
.

what is the object of Heimson's

mistaken belief that he is Hume?
Lewis claims that there are two problems
with taking
the object of Heimson's crazy belief
to be a proposition,
neither of which is present if instead it
is taken to be a

property that he self-ascribes

.

Lewis writes:

The first problem is that Heimson couldn't be
Hume.
if he believes the proposition that holds
at just those worlds where he is Hume, then
he
believes the empty proposition that holds at no
worlds 19
.

Whatever the object of Heimson's belief is, according
to
Lewis, it is surely not the necessarily false proposition:

Heimson is deluded, but this proposition does not seem to

appropriately characterize his delusion.
Lewis is right to point out, to anyone who favors

propositional objects of belief (but is unwilling to opt for
the Triadic View), that the object of Heimson's belief that
he himself is Hume should not be taken to be the proposition

that Heimson is Hume (assuming, as Lewis does, that the same

person could not have both the property of being Hume and
the property of being Heimson).

This is not to say,

however, that the problem cannot be solved in a way that is

consistent with a view of belief as a binary propositional
attitude.

One who wishes to save propositional objects of

belief might, for example, want to analyze Heimson's belief
18

See Perry (1977), pp. 487-8.

19

Lewis (1983a), p. 141.
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as a relation to a proposition
that is true at just those
worlds in which Heimson does many of
the things that Hume

actually did

- e.g.,

writing

loving literary fame, etc.

a

book called the Treatise,

(Heimson need not be called

Hume' at such worlds, although he might
be .) 20

Lewis's account of the Heimson case also
avoids mention
of the empty proposition.
He analyzes Heimson's believing
himself to be Hume simply as Heimson's self-ascribing
the

property of being Hume, a possible property that
Hume
actually had

21
.

The fact that Heimson could not have this

property does not entail that he cannot self-ascribe
it.
(We may take the property of being Hume,

in this context, to

be the set of Hume and all of his counterparts.

Since

Heimson is not in this set, and since none of Heimson's

counterparts is in this set, Heimson could not have this
property.

Lewis goes on to give the second problem with taking
the object of Heimson's belief to be a proposition, which

involves the sense in which Hume and Heimson believe the
same thing when each believes himself to be Hume:

2

°Stalnaker, I think, would opt for a treatment along
these lines.
See chapter 5.
21

See Lewis (1983a), pp. 141-2.
Note that Lewis does
not hesitate to say that it is possible that we should selfascribe non-qualitative properties. However, the analysis
of belief in terms of the self-ascription of properties
would be just as plausible if, e.g., we were to claim that
Heimson could not self-ascribe a non-qualitative property
such as that of being (identical to) Hume.
58
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S when we ask why Heimson
5 belleves !!
he 1S H ume.
Hume believed
u
Hume
was right.
if Hume believed he
was Hume by believing a proposition,
that
proposition was true. Heimson believes
just what
Hume did.
But Hume and Heimson are worldmates
Any proposition true for Hume is likewise
true 'for
Heimson.
So Heimson, like Hume, believes he
is
Hume by believing a true proposition.
So he's
right
But he's not right.
He's wrong, because
he believes he's Hume and he isn't. 22

is wrona
that too.

f

Lewis obviously supposes that Heimson believes
just
what Hume did.
if Heimson believed the same proposition
that Hume did, however, his belief could not
be false.
he does falsely believe himself to be Hume.

But

So the object

of both Hume's and Heimson's beliefs is not a
proposition:

both of them, rather, self-ascribe the property of being
Hume
One who favors propositional objects of belief, then,

must say that Hume and Heimson do not, strictly speaking,

believe the same thing.

In itself this is not especially

problematic - Hume believed a proposition about himself, and
Heimson believes one about himself.

But, as Lewis observes,

"there had better also be a central and important sense in

which Heimson and Hume believe alike." 23

After all, we may

say correctly that each one of them believes himself to be

Hume
We have seen that on Perry's view two distinct entities

account for the ways in which Hume and Heimson do, and do
22

Lewis (1983a), p. 142.

23

Ibid.
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not

'

be lieve the same thing:

Hume and Heimson believe

different (singular) propositions, but
each of them is in
the same belief state.
For Perry, perhaps, each of their
dispositions to utter sincerely a token of
the sentence 'I
am Hume'

(or something similar) suffices for
their being in

the same belief state.
It seems to me that even someone like
Stalnaker, who

maintains that belief is analyzable as a binary
relation
between a subject and a proposition, can provide
an account
of how Hume and Heimson both believe the same
thing.
Of

course, they can't believe the same proposition;
but

nevertheless the account could go as follows:

suppose that

two people, say, A and B, believe two propositions,
P and Q,
respectively. Then A and B believe the same thing (in the

relevant sense) if and only if there is a property H such
that necessarily, P is true if and only if A has H and
Q is
true if and only if B has H.

Lewis's solution is simpler because, for example, it
implies that any two people believe the same thing (in the

relevant sense) if and only if the objects of their beliefs
are identical

24
.

However, since Hume and Heimson believe

the same thing but one is right and the other wrong, Lewis

must say that Heimson falsely believes what Hume truly
24

If Lewis were to recognize a sense in which Hume and
Heimson believe differently, he must say that it just
reduces to the fact that they are different people: Hume
self-ascribes a property to Hume, and Heimson self-ascribes
the same property to Heimson.
60

believes.

Insofar as our ordinary practice of
belief

attribution dictates that to falsely
believe something is
just to believe something that
is false, this is fairly
striking.
The property of being Hume, of course,
is neither true
nor false.
So, what Heimson believes, according
to Lewis,
when he believes himself to be Hume, is
not something that
is either true or false:
The solution is that the object is not a
proposition at all.
it is a property:
the
property of being Hume. Hume self-ascribes this
property; he has it; he is right. Heimson,
believing just what Hume does, self-ascribes the
very same property; he lacks it; he is wrong. 25
On Lewis's view, then, to believe falsely is not

necessarily to believe something that is false in any
absolute sense.
viz.

Of course, there is a range of cases

cases of de dicto belief

,

— in

-

which (near enough)

believing falsely just is having a false object of belief,
and believing truly just is having a true object of belief.

Lewis could just give the following definition:
(Tl) y is a true object of x's belief =af

y is a

property that corresponds to a true proposition,
and x self-ascribes y.

Lewis could also maintain that the fact that our

beliefs are true of us is what explains why we believe
truly, and could give the following more general definition

25

Lewis (1983a), p. 143.
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(

T2

)

Y is a true object of x's belief =
df

x self-

ascribes y, and x has y.
As a result, even the god living
on the tallest mountain,
who self -ascribes every property
that corresponds to a true

proposition and no property that corresponds
to a false one,
could still believe something that isn't
true,
e.g., he may

self-ascribe the property of living on the
coldest mountain.

3

•

2

C hisholm and Direct Attribution

In his book The First Person, Chisholm
presents and

defends a view of belief that is essentially the
same as the
one endorsed by Lewis.
In this section, I discuss
the

problem that leads Chisholm to posit a fundamental
relation
between persons and properties, in terms of which all of
our

ordinary discourse about belief may be understood.

Understanding belief as a relation between a believer
and a property, according to Chisholm, is the simplest way
to solve a problem about the logical relations between the

following attributions of belief:

26

(P)

The tallest man believes that the tallest man
is wise.

(Q)

There is an x such that x is identical with
the tallest man and x is believed by x to be
wise

(S)

The tallest man believes that he himself is
wise 26

Chisholm (1981), p. 18.
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.

Each of these sentences is possibly
true.

The problem

is to account for their logical
form in such a way that the

entailment relations between them are
preserved.
might object to this way of stating the

(Lewis

problem, since he

maintains that the semantics of belief sentences
is a topic
distinct from that of assigning objects of
belief.)

The

facts about the logical relations that
interest us here are
as follows:
P does not imply S, and S does not imply
P; and
S implies Q,

although Q does not imply

S.

Chisholm

describes a case in which s would be false but
Q would be
true
In this case the tallest man cannot sincerely say:

'I believe that I am wise'.
Suppose, however,
that he reads the lines on his hand and takes them
to be a sign of wisdom; he doesn't realize the
hand is his; and he is unduly modest and entirely
without conceit. He arrives at the belief, with
respect to the man in question, that he is
27
wise
.

.

.

,

Perhaps various accounts of belief and belief sentences

could provide an adequate solution to the problem.

After

reviewing some of these, including his own earlier view,

Chisholm maintains the following:
The simplest conception, I suggest, is one which
construes believing as a relation involving a
believer and a property - a property which he may
be said to attribute to himself.
Then the various
senses of believing may be understood by reference
to this simple conception. 28

27

28

Ibid.

,

p.

19

Ibid.

,

p.

27
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It should be clear that the
present strategy is

identical in important respects with
Lewis's.

Rather than

constructing properties, by means of sets,
out of possible
individuals, however, Chisholm takes a
Platonistic view of
them.

in particular, he takes as primitive
the notions of

exemplification and de re modality, and defines

a

property

as something that is possibly such that
something

exemplifies it.

I

will avoid the finer points of this view

unless they are essential to the present discussion. 29

Chisholm uses the phrase 'direct attribution' to refer
to the relation of self-ascription between a person
and a

property.

Although he takes this relation to be primitive,

he also affirms the following two principles concerning
the

capabilities of believers to think directly about

themselves
PI

For every x, every y and every z, if x
directly attributes z to y, then x is
identical with y.
.

P2

.

For every x, every y and every z, if x
directly attributes z to y, then z is a
property. 30

29

For example, Chisholm also affirms two principles
about properties that imply that they are qualitative, in a
way, e.g.
that individual essences are not (see his pp. 7Hence Chisholm cannot treat the Hume/Heimson case
8).
analogously to Lewis, who (at least in his discussion of the
case) makes use of the property of being Hume.
Neither view
of properties, of course, is essential to the general thesis
of the Property Theory.
,

30

Chisholm (1981),

p.

28.
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Like Lewis

.

Chisholm wants to say that there are
cases
of believing that can be (best)
accounted for only by taking
belief to relate believers and properties.
I will
,

not

review more examples here.

These cases typically may be

described in terms of the 'he himself' locution.

Chisholm

gives the following definition:
D1

x believes that he himself is F = Df. The
property of being F is such that x directly
attributes it to x 31
.

The logical structure that Chisholm gives to sentence
S

above will be along the lines of D1

What about de re belief, an example of which, perhaps,
is sentence Q?

Chisholm, like Lewis, wishes to analyze de

re belief in terms of direct attribution.

He writes:

I make you my object by attributing a certain
property to myself. The property is one which, in
some sense, singles you out and thus makes you the
object of an indirect attribution. 32

On this account, a person attributes a property to another

thing in virtue of directly attributing a certain property
to himself.

This latter property is somewhat complex:

it

implies that there is exactly one thing to which the person

bears a relation that enables him somehow to single out that
thing, and that the thing to which he bears the relation has

31

Ibid.
Another matter of terminology: Chisholm uses
the term 'content' to describe the attributed property, and
reserves the term 'object' for the individual to which it is
attributed.
32

Ibid.

,

p.

29
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the other relevant property.

(Chisholm would explain this

by saying that the directly attributed
property is

necessarily such that whatever exemplifies it
bears the
relation uniquely to something that exemplifies

the other,

former property.)

Chisholm defines this notion of indirect attribution
with the following pair of definitions:
D2

y is such that, as the thing that x bears R
to, x indirectly attributes to it the
property of being F = Df. x bears R to y
and only to y; and x directly attributes to x
a property which entails the property of
bearing R to just one thing and to a thing
that is F.
.

D3

.

y is such that x indirectly attributes to it
the property of being F = Df There is a
relation R such that x indirectly attributes
to y, as the thing to which x bears R, the
property of being F 33
.

.

Presumably, the right-hand side of D3, after the quantifying

phrase 'There is a relation R such that', is equivalent to
the left-hand side of D2.

We might wish to constrain in

some way the kind of relation that the subject bears to the
res: e.g., we may require it to be a certain relation of

causal acquaintance.

I

discuss this issue in the next

section of this chapter.
Now that Chisholm has posited the relation of direct

attribution - between subjects and properties

- to

underlie

our true attributions of belief, and has defined the

relation of indirect attribution in terms of it, he is ready
33

Ibid.

,

p.

31

66
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to solve the problem of the logical
relations between the
sentences Q and S, shown earlier. The task
was to represent
the two sentences in such a way that S
implies Q, although Q
does not imply s.

According to Chisholm,

S

and Q are essentially

abbreviations for the following two attributions of
belief,
respectively:
There is an x such that x is identical with
the tallest man, and the property of being
wise is such that x directly attributes it to

S'

x.

Q'

There is an x such that x is identical with
the tallest man, and the property of being
wise is one such that x directly or
indirectly attributes it to x 34
.

Given the definitions of direct and indirect attribution, it
is clear that Q' does not imply S', although S'

implies Q'

On Chisholm's view, as on Lewis's, belief is the purely

intentional relation that makes ordinary language belief

sentences true, and so it is the reflexive relation of

directly attributing a property to oneself.
Indirect attribution is also explained in terms of this
relation.

Hence, de re belief (more precisely, the purely

psychological part of de re belief) is reduced to direct
attribution.

Moreover, Chisholm would account for the de

dicto sentence P roughly as Lewis would

-

also by analyzing

it in terms of the direct attribution of a property

(

in the

case of P, the property of being such that the tallest man
34

Ibid.

,

p.

34

67

is wise).

In this way, the claims that P does
not imply s,

and that S does not imply p, can
reasonably be maintained.

3

•

3

Lewis and De Re Belief

Lewis defends a view of de re belief in terms
of the
notions of self-ascription and of a relation of
causal

acquaintance between a subject and a concrete individual.

According to Lewis, de re beliefs

-

our beliefs about

objects, in some intuitive sense of 'about' - are
certain

states of affairs that obtain only partly in virtue of
the

subject's self-ascriptions, and as a result are not beliefs

properly so called.

On this narrowly psychological view of

belief, our self-ascribed properties are all of our beliefs:

Beliefs are in the head; but ... beliefs de re, in
general, are not.
Beliefs de re are not really
beliefs. They are states of affairs that obtain
in virtue of the relations of the subject's
beliefs to the res in question. 35
The relations that Lewis has in mind are those of

causal dependence, and he calls them 'relations of

acquaintance'.

In order for someone to have de re beliefs

about something

- i.e.,

or,

to ascribe a property to an object,

in Chisholm's terms, to indirectly attribute a property

to it - her being in the particular mental state that she is
in must depend in a peculiar way upon some prior state of

the object.
35

As Lewis puts it:

Lewis (1983a), p. 152.
68

.

I and the one of whom I have
beliefs de re
related that there is an extensive causal are so
dependence of my states upon his; and this
causal
dependence is of a sort apt for the reliable
transmission of information. 36

The phrase 'extensive causal dependence'
reflects the
vagueness of de re belief attributions. According
to Lewis,
it is impossible to specify precisely the sorts
of relation

that must hold between a subject and an individual in
order
for the subject to ascribe any property to the
individual.

(Just when, for example, would the detective believe de re,
of the murderer

,

that he was wearing shoes of a certain

type, or that he weighs over two hundred pounds?)

Lewis's strategy is similar in broad respects to
Chisholm's.

He first proposes an account of what it is for

someone to believe something about an object under some

description of that object, or, as Lewis says, to ascribe a
property to an individual under a description

-

where a

description is taken to stand in for a relation between the
believer and the individual: e.g., the relation expressed in
English by the expression 'person whose crime
investigating'.

I

am

Here is Lewis's definition:

A subject ascribes property X to individual Y
under description Z if and only if (1) the subject
bears the relation Z uniquely to Y, and (2) the
subject self-ascribes the property of bearing
relation Z uniquely to something which has
property X. 37

36

37

Ibid.

,

p.

155

Ibid.

,

p.

153
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The account of belief de re uses the
notion of a
relation of acquaintance: a relation between
a conscious
subject and a res that holds exactly when
there is an

extensive causal dependence, of the sort suitable
for the
transmission of information, of the subject's
mental states
upon certain states of the res. We can now
state Lewis's
account of de re belief (or, in his terminology,
the

ascription of a property to an individual) as follows:

a

subject ascribes a property X to an individual Y if and
only
if there is some description

Z

such that

acquaintance between the subject and
ascribes X to Y under
In Chapter 7,

I

Z.

Z

is a relation of

and the subject

Y;

38

discuss some problems for Lewis's

attempt to reduce de re beliefs to de se self-ascriptions

together with relations of acquaintance.
of this section,

I

In the remainder

would like to point out some of the

consequences of this kind of reduction

-

in particular,

its

effect on belief attributions in cases that perhaps are not

paradigm examples of de re belief.
Consider Tony, an ordinary earthling who believes that

aluminum is ductile, but who is unfamiliar with the atomic
facts about aluminum:

that its atomic number is 13, its

atomic weight about 26.98, and so on.
38

Does Tony believe the

I have ignored one of Lewis's sufficient conditions,
viz., that the description Z "captures the essence" of the
res Y.
Lewis observes that "it is unclear that anything is
gained by providing for essence-capturing descriptions as
well as relations of acquaintance." Cf. ibid., p. 155.
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proposition

call it 'Al'

semantically associated with

the English sentence 'aluminum is
ductile'?

(Let us assume

that aluminum is only contingently
ductile, and therefore
that A1 is not the necessary proposition.)

Consider now a counterf actual situation containing

a

near-duplicate of Earth and a microphysical duplicate
of
Tony (viz., Twin-Tony). 39 Twin-Tony's planet

is just like

Earth except for the fact that there is no aluminum
there;
rather, the metal that is called 'aluminum' by those
who
speak what is called 'English' where Twin-Tony lives
has
guite a different structure than aluminum:

number is not 13, and so on.
Tony's world

-

'twaluminum'

,

its atomic

However, the metal in Twinwe may as well say

-

is

qualitatively almost exactly like aluminum, and is used in
exactly the way aluminum is used here on Earth.
Like Tony, Twin-Tony assents to his sentence 'aluminum
is ductile',

and to many other sentences about twaluminum:

'some houses have aluminum siding',

the Earth's crust', and so on.

'aluminum is abundant in

Indeed, throughout their

lives, Tony and Twin-Tony have always had qualitatively

identical thoughts, perceptions, and experiences.

Since

they are psychologically and physically similar in this way,

Tony and Twin-Tony self-ascribe all of the same properties.

39

I assume familiarity with Putnam-style thought
experiments.
For my purposes here, I do not suppose that
the planet upon which Twin-Tony lives is a this-worldly
counterpart of Earth. Cf. Putnam (1975).
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To return to our question:

does Tony believe Al?

Since Tony and Twin-Tony self-ascribe
all of the same
properties, on Lewis's view Tony believes Al
if and only if
Twin-Tony believes Al also. To believe Al
on Lewis's view,
,

is to self-ascribe the property of
inhabiting a world in

which aluminum is ductile.

But Twin-Tony is clearly in no

position to self-ascribe such

a

property, simply because he

has had no causal interaction whatsoever with
aluminum.

(Alternatively, we might imagine that there is some aluminum
in Twin-Tony's world - although of course it is
not called

'aluminum' - and that it is not ductile there, and also that

Tony knows this.

Hence, he would not self-ascribe the

property of inhabiting a world in which aluminum is
ductile

.

Since Twin-Tony does not self-ascribe this property,

neither does Tony.
believe Al.
ductile.

4

°

According to Lewis, then, Tony doesn't

Nevertheless Tony believes that aluminum is

How can this be?

Lewis would say that the

sentence 'Tony believes that aluminum is ductile' is not

wholly about Tony's system of belief; instead it is partly
about his psychology, and partly about his environment and

4

°This is not a peculiarity of Lewis's view.
Stalnaker, for example, would also say that Tony does not
believe Al
There is simply a loose connection between
Tony's beliefs and the meanings of the sentences that he
would most naturally use to express them.
.
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his relationship to it. 41

The most natural way to treat

this sentence, from the perspective of
the Property Theory,
is to view it as involving implicit
quantification over
relations of acquaintance, making it equivalent
to the
following:
'There is a relation of acquaintance R, such
that Tony bears R to aluminum, and only to
aluminum, and
Tony self -ascribes the property of bearing R to
something
ductile'
It seems to me that Lewis should have to say similar

things about almost all of our ordinary attributions of
belief.

Only when we know the essences that natural kind

terms (and perhaps names) express, it appears, may we be in
a position to believe the propositions expressed by natural

language sentences containing those terms.
It might be argued against Lewis's view that it makes

the following, clearly valid, inference come out invalid:
1.

Tony believes that aluminum is ductile.

2.

Twin-Tony believes everything that Tony believes.

3.

Therefore, Twin-Tony believes that aluminum is

ductile
The first premise is true since, as Lewis might put it,

there is some relation of acquaintance R such that Tony
bears R only to aluminum and self-ascribes the property of

bearing R to something ductile.
41

(R might be,

for example,

Cf Lewis (1986), pp. 33-4.
There Lewis discusses
the sentence 'Ralph believes that Bernard is a spy' (fn.
.

25)

.
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the relation of having heard of
something under the name
'aluminum'.)
The second premise is true because Tony
and
Twin-Tony self-ascribe all of the same
properties, and our
self-ascribed properties exhaust all of our beliefs.

However, the conclusion is obviously false.

This is clearly not a devastating objection,
however,
to the view that properties are the objects
of belief.

if

Lewis wanted to save inferences of this sort, he could
reply
that premise (2) is equivocal. On one reading, it
does

assert that Twin-Tony self-ascribes every property that
Tony

self-ascribes

,

in which case the inference does indeed turn

out to be invalid.
(2),

But there is another reading of premise

according to which it asserts that if Tony believes, de

re, of an object, that it has any property, then Twin-Tony

also believes de re, of that object, that it has the same
property.

(In Lewis's terms:

if Tony ascribes a property

to any individual (or kind of individual), then Twin-Tony

also ascribes the property to that individual.

Chisholm's helpful terminology:

Using

any property that Tony

indirectly attributes to an individual is such that TwinTony indirectly attributes it to the same individual.)

On

this reading, Lewis can claim that the inference is indeed

valid one; however, on this reading, premise
to be false.

(2)

a

turns out

Tony ascribes ductility to aluminum, but Twin-

Tony does not ascribe ductility to aluminum (he ascribes it
to twaluminum instead)
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Much of the remainder of this thesis
will be a defense
of the Property Theory as an account
of the objects of the
attitudes, and a revision of the way in which
Lewis applies
it to de re belief.
In chapter 6, I defend the Property
Theory against various objections that have
been raised

against it in the literature.

In chapter 7,

consider the

I

Property Theory in the light of some arguments and
issues

concerning de re belief.

In the next chapter

I

turn to a

discussion of the relation between the Property Theory and
the Triadic View.
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CHAPTER

4

BELIEF STATES AND SELF-ASCRIBED PROPERTIES

A reputable tradition in twentieth-century

Philosophy of Mind takes belief to be the paradigmatic

propositional attitude

-

i.e., as ultimately some sort of

relation between the believer and a proposition.

The word

proposition' is a technical term, and usage does vary.

I

suppose that there are propositions, and make only one

assumption about their nature:

each one is either true or

false, and its truth value is not relative to a person, a
time, a language, etc.

(although it may be relative to a

possible world or situation).
Perhaps believing a proposition may be understood as

being disposed to behave as if it were true; perhaps it may
be understood as conceiving or grasping the proposition in

some way, and accepting it to some degree.

Regardless, the

traditional view that belief is a propositional attitude has

recently come under fire.

There is a persuasive argument

against the view that belief is a binary relation between a
subject and a proposition

(I

suppress mention of the fact

that believing is something that is done at a time, and so

that a time might also be one of the relata).
seen in chapter

2,

As we have

the argument is implicit in some of

Perry's work on indexical or self-locating belief. 1

x

See especially Perry
Soames 1988
(

)

(1979),

reprinted in Salmon and

One of the argument's premises requires
an account of
how a subject's beliefs can explain her
behavior.
in the
first section of this chapter, I sketch an
account that
should suffice for our purposes.
I discuss a version of the
argument in the second section. Consideration of
this

argument (or something like it) has led some
philosophers to
reject the view that belief is in general a propositional
attitude, and to replace it with alternatives.
section,

I

in the third

briefly review two recent alternatives:

Triadic View and the Property Theory.

the

It may appear at

first that these alternatives are incompatible.

However,

I

argue in the fourth section that they are consistent with
one another.

I

also try to show that, on fairly plausible

assumptions, the two views are actually equivalent.

4.1 Explanatory Attribution of Belief

Perry presents his now familiar case of the messy

shopper in the following way:
I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket
floor, pushing my trolly down the aisle on one
side of a tall counter and back along the aisle on
the other, seeking the shopper with the torn bag
to tell him he was making a mess.
With each trip
around the counter, the trail became thicker. But
I seemed unable to catch up.
Finally it dawned on
2
me.
I was the shopper I was trying to catch.

2

Salmon and Soames (1988), p. 83.
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To be kind to Perry, let us suppose
that the messy

shopper is someone else:

call him 'Felix'.

generally a neat person, and has
making messes.

a

Felix is

standing desire to avoid

We may even suppose (as Perry suggests)
that

before it finally dawned on him that he himself
was the
messy shopper, Felix had seen a reflection of a
man in a

supermarket mirror and, without realizing that he was
looking at himself, had thought that he had glimpsed
the

shopper whom he was trying to catch.
Felix's epiphany is a change in belief
think, is uncontroversial

.

-

this much,

I

Somehow, this change in belief

explains his subseguent change in behavior:

Felix stops

following the trail of sugar, and stops making a mess (by

rearranging the torn bag of sugar in his grocery cart)

.

Let

us say that someone's change in belief explains his

subsequent behavior if the statement that attributes
belief to him is one of the premises of

a sound,

a

new

deductive-

nomological argument, the conclusion of which is the

statement that he behaves in the relevant way.
On this conception of psychological explanation, we can

explain why Felix stops making a mess as follows:
(PI) Felix believes himself to be making a mess.
(

P2

Felix desires to avoid making messes.

(

P3

Felix would intend to bring it about that he stops

making a mess, if he both desired to avoid making
messes and believed himself to be making one.
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(

P4

)

For all agents a and states of affairs s,
if a

intends to bring it about that s, then ceteris

paribus a brings it about that

s.

(P5) Ceteris paribus conditions hold for Felix's

intention
(C)

Felix brings it about that he stops making a mess.

In the above explanation,

(PI)

attributes to Felix the

new belief, i.e., the belief that he comes to have when the

truth finally dawns on him.
a

We have assumed that Felix has

standing desire to avoid making messes, and this desire is

attributed to him by (P2).

Premise (P3) presents a

dispositional fact about Felix

-

perhaps it is an instance

of a generalization over a larger domain of agents.

Premise (P4) is a hedged, folk-psychological law

connecting agents' intentions to bring about states of
affairs with their bringing about those states.

hedged by ceteris paribus conditions:

The law is

conditions that,

along with the antecedent, are sufficient for the
consequent.

Such conditions might be (i) that the agent is

able to bring about the state of affairs in question, (ii)

that the agent has no intentions that override the one given
in the antecedent,

(iii) that no heavy object falls on the

agent's head before she can bring about the state of
affairs, and so on.

(P5)

states that in the case of Felix's

intention to stop making a mess, all such conditions hold.
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On this conception of adequate psychological

explanation

,

the proposition that Felix (brings it about

that he) stops making a mess is a logical
consequence of
some empirical propositions and at least one
relevant law.
One of the propositions is expressed by an attribution
of

belief to Felix

-

premise (PI).

The present-tense sentence

that expresses this proposition becomes true at the time
of

Felix's change in belief.

For our purposes in this chapter,

Felix's change in belief explains his mess-assuaging

behavior since the new belief attribution is a premise of a
sound, deductive-nomological argument, the conclusion of

which states that Felix behaves in such a way that he stops

making

4

•

2

a

mess.

The Argument from Explanatory Attribution

Now that we have some idea as to how someone's coming
to believe something can explain some interesting feature of

her behavior, we may take a look at the argument against the

view that coming to believe something is necessarily coming
to believe a new proposition.

The reasoning behind each of

the premises should already be somewhat clear from the

preceding chapters.

The whole argument can be stated simply

as follows:
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(

1

)

If belief

is a binary relation between an agent

and a proposition, then there is a proposition

such that Felix's coming to believe it explains

why he stops making a mess.
(2)

There is no proposition such that Felix's coming
to believe it explains why he stops making a mess.

(3)

Therefore, belief is not a binary relation between
an agent and a proposition.

Call this 'the argument from explanatory attribution'
I

do not know whether Perry himself would consider this

argument to be uncontroversially sound. 4
have seen in chapter

2,

However, as we

he does use something like the

argument from explanatory attribution to motivate a new view
about the nature of the belief relation.

Premise (1) of the argument is obviously true if we
admit that sometimes our behavior is explainable partly in
terms of our beliefs (given the proviso in footnote 3).
Felix's belief that he himself is making a mess is just

If
(a

relation between Felix and) a proposition, then his coming
to believe this proposition explains, in virtue of the

argument in section 4.1, why he stops making a mess.
3

The word 'belief' in this premise is intended to refer
to whatever relation makes true our true belief-attributions
in natural language.
E.g., if Salmon's account of belief
sentences (see chapter 2) is correct, then it refers to the
relation called 'BEL'; even if Salmon refuses to call this
relation 'belief'.
See, e.g., the section entitled 'Limited Accessibility'
in Perry ( 1979 )
4

.
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The second premise is somewhat less obvious
and

somewhat more controversial; nevertheless, Perry
gives us
some reasons to believe it.
Premise (2) says that there is
no proposition such that Felix's coming to
believe it

explains his behavior.

The most plausible candidate for

such a propositional object of Felix's belief appears
to be
the proposition that Felix is making a mess.

(Whatever sort

of entity this proposition is, it is true if Felix
is making
a mess,

and false otherwise.)

Perhaps it is belief in this

proposition that we attribute to Felix when we say that he
believes himself to be making a mess.
However, it seems that Felix's coming to believe this

proposition

-

making a mess.

whatever it is

-

does not explain why he stops

As Perry remarks, this is because whatever

sort of thing this proposition is, it seems that Felix could

believe it without believing that he himself is making a
mess:

e.g., when he looked into the supermarket mirror,

pointed to himself, and thought 'he is making a mess'.
One way to put this point is to say that belief in the

proposition that Felix is making a mess explains Felix's
behavior only given the additional information that he
believes himself to be Felix (which of course re-introduces
the problem)

.

In terms of the deductive-nomological

explanation in section one, if it is merely belief in the

proposition that Felix is making a mess that premise (PI) of
the argument attributes to Felix, then (P3) turns out to be
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false.

After he looks into the mirror, for example,
Felix
himself does not intend to stop making a mess;
rather,
he

keeps on chasing the messy shopper.

Perhaps, to claim that

this proposition is the one that Felix comes to
believe as
of his epiphany is to mistakenly think that
he was

previously lacking merely de re beliefs about himself,
rather than genuine de se ones.
If there were a more or less qualitative way in
which

Felix picked himself out in his thought, this might show

that there is indeed a proposition such that his coming to

believe it explains why he stops making a mess.

The

trouble, however, is that Felix has to pick himself out as

himself, so to speak, and not merely as something that he

believes to have a certain property.

Perry makes this point

as follows:

even if I was thinking of myself as, say, the only
bearded philosopher in a Safeway store west of the
Mississippi, the fact that I came to believe that
the only such philosopher was making a mess
explains my action only on the assumption that I
believed that I was the only such
5
philosopher.
.

.

Returning to the case of Felix and the earlier

explanation of his behavior, premise (PI) says that Felix
believes himself to be making a mess.

If this premise means

that for some more or less qualitative property

X,

Felix

believes the proposition that the thing that has X is making
a

mess - e.g., the proposition that the only bearded
s

Salmon and Soames (1988), p. 88.
83

philosopher in a Safeway store west of the
Mississippi is
making a mess - then line (P3) again turns

out to be false.

Felix could believe any such proposition, it
seems, and
desire to avoid making messes, but fail to intend
to stop
making a mess.
The case for premise (2) of the argument from

explanatory attribution, then, goes something like this:

if

Felix's coming to believe a certain proposition explains
his
behavior, then the proposition must be either gualitative or

non-gualitative

;

but neither alternative yields a plausible

candidate, since all such candidates are consistent with a
lack of genuine self-belief; so there is no proposition such

that Felix's coming to believe it explains, in the

appropriate way, why he stops making

4

•

3

a mess.

Belief States vs. Self-ascribed Properties

Both the Triadic View and the Property Theory of belief
are consistent with the soundness of the argument from

explanatory attribution.

I

have discussed them,

respectively, in chapters

2

and

3.

In this section,

I

briefly review these two alternatives to the view that
belief (or whatever makes belief attributions true) is

ultimately a binary relation between a subject and
proposition.
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a

The Triadic View says that what often
explains

someone's behavior is her believing a certain
proposition by
being in a particular belief state. People
who are in the
same belief state - e.g., the group of people
each of whom
believes himself to be making a mess - will, given
some
other similar attitudes, behave alike in a way
that is of

central importance to commonsense psychology.

On the

Triadic View, the similarity of such behavior is explained
not by which propositions are believed, but instead by
the
fact that everyone involved is in the same belief state.
(More precisely, everyone involved is in the same partial

belief state.)

Belief states, then, are individuated by the

role that they play with respect to purposeful behavior and
the prediction and explanation of such behavior.

Given the metaphysical view, a guestion about the

English word 'belief' arises:

does it express the three-

place relation (viz., BEL) between believer, proposition,
and belief state (believing a proposition by being in a

belief state); or the two-place relation between believer
and proposition believed (or, perhaps the relation between
the believer and whatever characterizes the belief state)?
I

discussed this question briefly in Chapter

2,

but

I

will

avoid it here by stating the Triadic View in a way that is
neutral as to whether belief is a binary or a tertiary
relation, as follows:
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(TV)

Necessarily, a subject S believes something
if and
only if there is a proposition
and a belief
p

state x such that BEL (S, p, x)

Salmon's BEL relation is familiar from chapter

2

-

to

say more about it requires an elucidation of the
concept of
a

belief state, which is one of the tasks of this chapter.

According to (TV), it is the tertiary relation BEL that
makes our belief attributions true.
Most proponents of the Triadic View maintain that the

propositional relata of BEL are structured entities, that
they have absolute truth values, and that it is possible for
two or more people to stand in BEL to the same proposition

while being in different belief states (and perhaps the same
belief state).

In addition to these Fregean claims, most

proponents of the Triadic View maintain that it is possible
for someone to stand in BEL to a singular proposition.

Unlike general propositions, singular structured

propositions have at least one constituent which is not a
property or relation of some order:

e.g., an ordinary

physical object like a person; or, a time; etc.
Let's return briefly to the case of Felix in the light
of the Triadic View.

Since every proposition is such that

Felix could believe it without coming to intend to stop

making a mess, his new intention and subsequent behavior may
be explained only by a change in his belief state.

Let us

suppose that Felix believed the singular proposition that
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Felix is making a mess even before he
realized that he
himself was the mess-maker. What explains his
rearranging
the torn bag of sugar, then, is his coming
to be in a new
belief state, in virtue of which he believes the
selfsame

singular proposition.
What is it about this new belief state that gives
it
such explanatory force?

The answer to this question should

depend on a more precise characterization of belief states.
For the time being, let us appeal to the fact that the

belief state is of the sort that, in chapter
I-guise:

2,

I

called an

necessarily, any subject x who is in this belief

state will believe the singular proposition that x is making
a mess,

in virtue of being in it.

The Property Theory has also been proposed to solve

Perry's problem.

This view implies that what often explains

someone's behavior is her self-ascribing a certain property,
and that the binary relation of self-ascription between a

subject and a property is what makes our belief attributions
true.

I

might, for example, self-ascribe the property of

being left-handed, and thereby believe myself to be lefthanded; or

I

might self-ascribe the property of watching a

spy in virtue of watching Ortcutt and only Ortcutt, and

thereby believe that Ortcutt is a spy.
We may formulate the general claim of the Property

Theory as follows:
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(PT)

Necessarily, a subject S believes something
if and
only if there is a property F such that S
self-

ascribes

F.

The meaning of (PT) depends in part upon what
the word
property' means.
In chapter 3, I considered two versions
of the Property Theory, due to Chisholm and
Lewis.

Despite

the differences in their views about properties,
both

philosophers are happy to make use of such properties as the
property of being left-handed, of having heard of someone as
a

philosopher called 'Hume', of being such that anything

extended has mass, and so on.
The Property Theory applies straightforwardly to the

case of Felix.

At the time of his epiphany, Felix comes to

self-ascribe the property of making
that time, he had only self-ascribed

a mess;
a

whereas before

property such as

looking at someone in the next aisle who is making a mess,
or following the sugar trail of the shopper who is making a
mess.

On this view, premise (PI) of the earlier deductive-

nomological argument must mean that Felix self-ascribes the

property of making a mess, and it is this self-ascription
that explains the change in his behavior.

Earlier, he had

in fact ascribed the property of making a mess to himself;

but this ascription was indirect, obtaining only because he

happened to be the one at whom he was looking in the mirror,
and the one whose trail of sugar he had been following.
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So,

.

there is a difference between (indirectly)
ascribing
property to oneself, and self-ascribing a
property.

^

^

a

Belief—St ates and Self —ascribed Properties

In this section,

I

want to make a case for the claim

that in some strong sense, the Triadic View and
the Property

Theory are not actually rival theories of belief.

I

shall

argue that on certain very plausible assumptions (which,
if
true, are necessarily true), the two views are actually

equivalent, in the sense that each one entails the other.
Finally,

I

will attempt to show that the entities posited by

the Triadic View to play a semantic role in theorizing about

belief

- viz.,

believed-true propositions

-

may be defined

and used by the Property Theory in a systematic way.

In

essence, we can take the Property Theory to be a theory of

belief states, which play a theoretical role with respect to
the explanation of behavior, and then define any other

entities that might be needed to play other theoretical
(e.g., semantic) roles.

I

shall suggest, however, that the

Property Theory enjoys a methodological advantage over the
Triadic View in that it does not need to posit propositions
to explain the sorts of phenomena they are supposed to

explain
Let us recall from chapter

2

the first characterization

of belief states as propositional functions.
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This was

Lewis's suggestion in his paper "Attitudes
De Dicto and De
Se," where he interprets Perry's version
of the Triadic View
to imply that there are two objects of
belief, viz., (l)

structured propositions, and

(2)

belief states.

m

that

paper, Lewis also evaluates Perry's view with
respect to his
own version of the Property Theory.
He writes:

Perry's proposal must work at least as well as
mine, because mine can be subsumed under his.
Whenever I say that someone self-ascribes a
property X, let Perry say that the first object of
his belief is the pair of himself and the property
X.
Let Perry say also that the second object is
the function that assigns to any subject Y the
pair of Y and X. 6
We may take this passage to be an argument for the

conclusion that the Triadic View and the Property Theory are
consistent, since Lewis is maintaining that if the Property

Theory is true, then the Triadic View is also true.

Hence,

if Lewis's remarks are plausible, we have a reason to think

that it is possible for both of the views to be true.
However, these remarks appear to be incompatible with
some of what Perry and Salmon, for example, say about the

Triadic View of belief (or, at least, Lewis's suggestion
seems to be incomplete).

For clear cases of de se belief,

Lewis's translation schema works well enough:

e.g., if

self-ascribe the property of being left-handed, then

proposition that

I

(1)

the

believe is the proposition that Feit is

left-handed, and (2) the belief state that

6

I

Lewis (1983a), p. 151.
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I

am in is the

function that takes any subject
S

S into the

proposition that

is left-handed - and so the belief
state is a way of being

related to a singular proposition about
oneself.

On the

other hand, Lewis's suggestion seems to leave
out some of
what the proponents of the Triadic View say
about de re
belief, and in particular some of what they say
about the
BEL relation.

Let's suppose that

with Ortcutt

view

I

- e.g.,

I

I

am in direct perceptual contact

am watching him - so that on most any

can have de re beliefs about him.

On the version of

the Triadic View favored by Perry and Salmon, for example,
to have a de re belief about an individual is to stand
in

BEL to a singular proposition about that individual, and a

belief state or propositional guise.
Ortcutt, then,

I

If

I

am watching

can easily come to stand in BEL to a

singular proposition about him.

So let us suppose that it

is the proposition that Ortcutt is a spy, and hence that

I

believe de re of Ortcutt that he is a spy.
The way in which Lewis accounts for this de re belief,
as we have seen in chapter 3, is as follows:

Ortcutt and only Ortcutt, and

I

am watching

self-ascribe the property of

watching exactly one person who is a spy.
a suitable relation of acquaintance,

that Ortcutt is a spy.

I

I

Since watching is

thereby believe de re

If Perry were to follow Lewis's

translation schema, however, he would have to say that the
proposition that

I

believe is the proposition that Feit is
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watching one and only one spy, or, the pair
of myself and
the property of watching a unigue spy.
Perry might well
want to say this, indeed he should want to say
it.

The

point is, however, that Lewis's translation procedure
gives
Perry no way to say what he clearly wants to say
in this
case, viz., that the singular proposition that
Ortcutt is a

spy is an object of my belief.

Since the proposition that Ortcutt is a spy and the

proposition that Feit is watching

a

spy do not have the same

truth conditions, the difference is not trivial.

I

am not

arguing that Lewis has not shown that his view is "subsumed"
under the Triadic View.
I

I

think that Lewis has shown this.

am arguing that Lewis's procedure by itself does not let

the proponent of the Triadic View say everything that he

wants to say about the objects of belief, since it cannot

generate believed-true singular propositions about any
individual other than the subject of belief.

Can Lewis's

suggestion be modified in order to incorporate such

propositions as relata for the BEL relation?
discuss this question shortly, since

I

I

shall

think that a worked-

out answer to it will be necessary for any attempt to argue

that the Triadic View and the Property Theory are in

a

strong sense equivalent.
Lewis proposed that a belief state is a function that

takes the subject as an argument, and delivers as a value
the proposition that the subject believes.
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We may not have

to abandon a general view of
belief states along these
lines, but there is now reason to
think that we ought to
look for another characterization of
a belief state.
(There
is also the problem from chapter 2
for an account of belief

states as functions from subjects into
propositions:

the

two sentences 'Twain is Twain' and 'Clemens
is Twain'

characterize two different belief states, but the
belief
states are ways of believing the same singular

proposition,

and so representing them as functions from subjects
into

propositions would wrongly conflate them.)
for another account, however,

I

Before we look

think that it will be

helpful to review briefly some other attempts to say either

what a belief state is, or just when two subjects are in the
same belief state.
I

am not concerned with whether belief states are, or

are reducible to, types of brain states or other possibly

disjunctive physical states; although

I

do think that as a

matter of fact what belief state one is in is determined by
one's intrinsic physical state.

Since belief states are

supposed to play a theoretical role with respect to

information-acquisition and the explanation of behavior, one
might be tempted to view them as relations to things that
have semantic or quasi-semantic properties.

With this in

mind, we might think of belief states as relations to

sentences, such as the sentence
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'I

am making a mess'.

We have seen that Perry at least
entertains such a view
when he suggests that sincere,
articulate adults are often
in the same belief state if and
only if they are disposed to
utter the same or similar sentences. We
have also seen that
this view is implausible, if it is intended
as an analysis
of the concept of a belief state, since
it denies belief
states to creatures without language, and
implies that two
subjects who do not speak the same language cannot
be in the
same belief state.
(Of course, the proposal is useful as a

heuristic device and as a characterization for creatures
speaking the same language.)
Perhaps we could avoid these difficulties by thinking
of belief states as relations to sentences (i.e.,
things

with some kind of syntactic structure) of
language of thought.

a

so-called

This may be the view of philosophers

such as Hartry Field and Jerry Fodor, although they do not
use the terminology of the Triadic View. 7

I

would rather

not commit myself to the existence of a language of thought,
and moreover, it seems plausible that not all belief needs
to be "tokened" in the head like the sentences of a language
of thought.

Regardless, it seems that this view would

suffer at least some of the problems of the previous one,

especially if sentences of the language of thought are

understood as mental tokens of natural language sentences.
This is hardly a thorough look at the language of thought
7

See, e.g., Field (1978) and Fodor (1981).
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hypothesis; however, some other
conception of a belief state
would be appropriate, I think, even
if it turns out to be
correct
A tentative proposal about when two
subjects are in the
same belief state is given by A. J.
Chien. 8 The proposal
is that subjects are in the same
belief state if and only if
they are disposed to utter sentences that
(1) have the same
character (in roughly Kaplan's sense), and
(2) contain pure
indexicals or demonstrative terms of the form
'that F'. 9

This suggestion fares somewhat better than
the one that

required subjects to be speakers of the same natural
language in order to share belief states.
appears to be implausible for

a

However, it

few reasons.

First, it seems too restrictive to say that subjects

are in the same belief state only if they are disposed
to

utter sentences containing indexical or demonstrative
sentences.

Perry himself maintains that belief states may

be classified by sentences without indexicals.

For example,

the indexical-f ree sentences 'Twain is Twain' and 'Clemens
is Twain' serve to classify distinct belief states.

Second,

and more important, this view of belief states still denies

belief states to creatures without dispositions to utter
sentences, which surely is untenable.

8

Chien (1985).

9

See ibid., especially pp. 285-87.
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With this is mind, the next move
is perhaps to forget
about dispositions to utter
sentences and focus on sentencemeanings, or characters.
Some of Kaplan's remarks suggest
that a belief state is a relation
between a subject
and a

character. 10

This is more plausible than the
previous

views, since it is at least reasonable
to think that an
intentional state of a subject without
language could
nevertheless be characterized by a meaning.
Perhaps

sentences are not the only means of being
related to
sentence-meanings
On the present view, Felix believes the
proposition

that he is making a mess in virtue of being
related to a
certain character, which happens to be the
character of the

sentence

'I am

making a mess'.

In this case the character

is a function from possible contexts into
propositions,

where the value for any context is the singular
proposition
about the agent of the context to the effect that he
or she
is making a mess.

We have seen in chapter

2

that Salmon argues for the

conclusion that belief states cannot in general be taken to
be characters of sentences.

(X

will not review the argument

here; but the point is that taking belief states to be

characters would conflate distinct belief states, since a
subject could in effect understand the very same sentence,
and hence the same character, in different ways.)
1Q

See Kaplan (1977), published in Almog et. al.
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Salmon
(1989).

.

.

himself does not offer much in
the way of a positive
characterization of belief states;
however, this is because
he is primarily interested
in the logic, rather than
the

metaphysics, of belief,

salmon's claim is that there is

more to the logical form of belief
attributions than a twoplace relation of assent between a
subject and a proposition
(the relation that Salmon calls
'belief').
In his paper "What is a Belief
State?" Curtis Brown

proposes that we take belief states to be
relations between
subjects and the properties that they
self-ascribe
"Following David Lewis and Roderick Chisholm,"
Brown writes,
"I suggest that belief states are
best characterized
by

properties." 11

Although neither Lewis nor Chisholm employs

the terminology of belief states, perhaps this
is an

explicit statement of their original, general view,
i.e.,
that (the object or content) of a subject's belief
state is
not some mysterious indescribable entity; but rather
is

a

property that the subject self-ascribes
I

would like to argue that the assumption that the

objects of belief states are properties is correct, and
hence that the Triadic View and the Property Theory are
equivalent.

(This will not affect the characterization of

belief states given in chapter

2,

before we had discussed

the Property Theory, since that characterization in terms of

propositional functions is trivially equivalent to the one
xl

Brown (1986), p. 358.
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in terms of properties.)

The technical notion of being
In a
belief state is left unanalyzed
(but, hopefully, understood)
by Perry, as is the technical
notion of self-ascribing a
property by Lewis and Chisholm. There
is good reason to
think that there really is only one
notion at stake.
For example, being in the belief state
that disposes a
sincere, articulate speaker of English
to utter 'I am making
a mess' seems to be the same
thing as self-ascribing the
property of making a mess. In fact, taking
belief states to
be self-ascribed properties explains why
two (articulate,

sincere) people who are in the same belief state
may be

disposed to utter similar sentences of this form,
a fact
that Perry does not explain.
This is because a sentence of
the form 'I am such-and-such' is typically used by
a speaker
to express a self-ascription.

disposed to utter

'I

So,

if Smith and

I

are both

am left-handed', this may be explained

in terms of the fact that we both self-ascribe the
same

property - viz., being left-handed.

This explains our

dispositions in a way that merely saying that we are both in
the belief state that disposes people who are in it to say
'I

am left-handed' does not.

Taking belief states to be self-ascribed properties
also accounts for the way in which belief states are

individuated.

Self-ascribed properties play the same

theoretical role in explanation that belief states are
supposed to play.

If we can explain,
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for example, why Felix

~

,

,

rearranges the torn bag of sugar
in his grocery cart by
appealing to the fact that he is
in the belief state that
disposes one to say 'I am making
a mess', then we can also
explain this behavior by appealing
to the fact that he selfascribes the property of making a
mess (and vice

versa). We
ought to conclude, then, that
self-ascriptions play exactly
the same theoretical role that
belief states are expected to
play.

We have just argued for the claim
that if any subject

s

self ascribes a property x, then x
characterizes s's belief
state; and if x characterizes s's belief
state, then s self-

ascnbes

x.

More precisely (taking 'B*' to denote the

relation between a subject and the object of her
belief
state), we may affirm the following principle:
necessarily,
for all subjects s and for any x, B*(s, x) if
and only if s
se -*-f ascr:*-k es x

*

(The weaker claim that there is a trivial

one-one correspondence between self-ascribed properties
and
belief states would do just as well.)

This, together with

one other item, will let us show that the Triadic View and

the Property Theory are equivalent, in the sense that (TV)

implies (PT), and (PT) implies (TV).
The other item is the claim that when one is in a

belief state, there is always a proposition that one
believes.

This may be stated precisely with the following:

necessarily, for all subjects s and all belief states x, if
B* ( s

x)

there is a proposition p such that BEL( s
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p,

x)

.

,

This is accepted as axiomatic
by proponents of the Triadic
View, who consider belief states
to be a sort of means of
grasping propositions. Moreover,
earlier we saw that Lewis
has shown that the claim is true:
if i, for example, selfascribe a property f (if I am in a
belief state that is
characterized by the property f), then I
will believe the
singular proposition that I have f.
A subject will always
have such access to a singular
proposition about himself.
So, even if we do not think that
this second principle is
analytic, we may note that what makes it
true is the fact
that if B*(s, f), then BEL(s <s,f>, f).
,

On these very plausible assumptions, it is
easy to see

that (TV) and (PT) are equivalent.

We can show that they

are equivalent if we can show that necessarily,
for all

subjects s, there is a proposition
p and a belief state x
such that BEL(s, p, x) if and only if there is a property
such that s self-ascribes

f.

f

This follows from the two

principles just mentioned (together with the fact that if
BEL(s, p, x) then B*(s, x)

for any s, p and x).

Property theorists say that we self-ascribe various
sorts of properties, e.g., the properties of being lefthanded, being such that anything extended has mass, and

looking at one and only one person who is

a spy.

Proponents

of the Triadic View maintain that we believe various sorts
of propositions, e.g., the propositions that anything

extended has mass, and that Ortcutt is a spy.
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The truth or

falsehood of the proposition, on this
view, is what makes
for believing truly or believing
falsely.
Believed-true

propositions may also account for (one
kind of) shared
belief
if I believe that London is pretty
and so do you,
then what we share is belief in the
same proposition - and
for continued belief over time - if
I

was a ski bum, and if

my days, then

I

I

I

believed in 1988 that

remember that fact for the rest of

will have continued to believe the same

proposition, viz., that

I

was a ski bum in 1988

.

The Property Theory by itself has the means to
account
for these phenomena.

However, if the property theorist

wishes to join the proponent of the Triadic View and
explain
them in terms of believed true propositions, it would
be
nice to be able to do so.
I

In the remainder of this section,

will try to show how the property theorist can do this,
by

giving some general principles connecting facts about a
given subject's self-ascriptions and, when necessary, the

situation in which she is located, with facts about which

proposition or propositions she thereby believes.
Given the various explanations offered by proponents
of the Triadic View,

it appears that the identity of any

believed-true proposition must depend upon the particular
sort of property that the subject self-ascribes
example, if

then

I

but if

I

For

self-ascribe the property of being an uncle,

believe the singular proposition that
I

.

I

am an uncle;

self-ascribe the property of being such that there
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are spies, then

believe the general proposition that
there
are spies (as well as the singular
proposition that I
I

am

such that there are spies, which
is not logically equivalent
to the general one).
Let us proceed by distinguishing
properties that

correspond to propositions from those that
do not.
if

Again,

self-ascribe the property of being such that
not all
swans are white, then the proposition
that I believe
I

to be

true, according to the Triadic View, is
the corresponding

proposition that not all swans are white.

We may note that

actually, if something happens to be such that
not all swans
are white, then everything else also is such
that not all

swans are white.

With this in mind, we may locate

class of properties, which for lack of

a

a

better term

certain
I

will

call de dicto properties, by means of the following

definition:
(DD)

property

f

is de dicto = df

necessarily, if there

is an x such that x has f then for any
y, y has f.

Some examples of de dicto properties are the properties
of being such that there are spies, and being such that not

all swans are white.

Each of these properties also has a

proposition that corresponds to it:

in general, the

proposition that corresponds to a de dicto property is the
proposition that, of necessity, is true if and only if
something has the property.

I

should note that (DD) implies

that properties like being red or not red, or being round
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and square, are de dicto
properties, the former because
it
is a necessary truth that
everything has it, and the latter
because it is impossible that something
should have it.We will want to say that if someone
self-ascribes a de
dicto property, then she has the
corresponding proposition
as an object of belief.
Since not all properties are de
dicto, however, we must consider the cases
in which someone
self-ascribes a non-de dicto property. One such
property is
the property of watching one and only one spy someone can
have this property while someone else lacks it.
I will call
a property like this a de re property,
and I suggest the

following definition:
(DR)

property

f

is de re = df

necessarily, for all

x,

f

is not de dicto; and

if x has f then there is a

y such that x bears a relation of acquaintance to
y.
I

13

have discussed the notion of

chapter

a

relation of acquaintance in

To the extent that it is a vague notion,

(DR)

also vague; but this should not be troublesome here.

For

3.

12

is

This will be inconsequential to my project in the
rest of this chapter. We could rule out such properties by
requiring a de dicto property to be contingent; but this
move would exclude from the class of de dicto properties
such ones as the property of being such that no bachelors
are married.
13

The first clause of the definiens is needed to rule
out properties like being such that everyone is watching
someone.
Intuitively, this property is de dicto; but
whoever has it does indeed bear a relation of acquaintance
(viz., watching) to someone.
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convenience,

will not consider identity to be
Of acquaintance.

Finally

I

,

a

relation

we will need the notion of a de
se property.

If a subject self -ascribes
such a property, then he has as

an object of belief the singular
proposition, about himself,
to the effect that he has the
property. We may give the

following simple definition:
(DS)

property

f

is de se = df

.

f

is neither de dicto nor

de re
Clearly,

(DD),

(DR)

and (DS) divide the class of properties

into three exhaustive and exclusive groups.
It will be helpful,

I

think, to list some properties in

order to show where they fall under this classification
scheme.

Consider the following six properties:

1.

being wise

2.

being an uncle

3.

watching someone who is a spy

4

looking at someone whose sister

.

I

remember

5.

being such that anything extended has mass

6.

being such that there are sticks and stones.

The first property is de se, since someone could have it

while someone else lacks it, and someone could have it at

a

time without bearing a relation of acquaintance to anything
at that time.

The second is also de se, even though anyone

who has it does bear some sort of relation to someone else.
The third is de re, since anyone who has it is watching
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someone, and watching is a relation
of acquaintance.
The
fourth is also de re, and it implies
the holding of two
distinct relations of acquaintance.
The fifth is de dicto,
but does not imply the existence
of anything apart from that
which has it (there might be a world
without extension
in

which a single Cartesian mind has this
property).
Finally,
the sixth is also de dicto, although
no conscious subject
could have it without there also being some
things
in

existence apart from the subject.
Suppose now that the Property Theory says that
a given
subject s self-ascribes any property f. The
property f will

either be de se, de dicto, or de re:

it must belong to one

of these classes, and it cannot belong to more
than one of

them.

So,

let us consider each of them in turn.

suppose that s's self-ascribed property
property.

f

First,

is a de se

in this case, we let the Triadic View say that

the believed-true proposition is the singular proposition

that

s

is f.

This accords with what the proponents of the

Triadic View maintain about such a case.
first of our three principles:
is de se, then BEL( s

,

We now have the

if s self-ascribes f, and f

<s,f>, f).

Second, suppose that s's self-ascribed property

de dicto property.

f

is a

In this case, we let the Triadic View

say that s believes the proposition that s has

f,

and the

proposition that corresponds to the de dicto property.
this latter proposition 'p f ':

Call

necessarily, for any de dicto
105

f/

Pf is

true if and only if something
has

f.

So,

if f is

the property of being such that
there are sticks and stones,
then p f is the proposition that
is true if and only if
something is such that there are
sticks and stones, which is
the proposition that there are
sticks and stones.We can now affirm the second of our
three principles

connecting the Triadic View to the Property
Theory:
self -ascribes

and (2) BEL( s

f

,

and
pf

f

is de dicto, then (1) BEL(
s

f).

,

,

if s

<s,f>, f)

If f is de dicto in virtue of being

necessary or impossible property, then
p f will either be
necessary or impossible as well. For example,
a

if I self-

ascribe the property of being human or not human,
then this
propositional object of my belief will be true if and
only
if something is either human or not human,
and hence will be

the necessary proposition.

Again, those who maintain that

there are many distinct necessary propositions may wish
to
say that in this case

I

believe only one of them, perhaps

one that can be recovered from the property that

ascribe.

I

self-

Another possibility would be to claim that if

f

is

de dicto but either necessary or impossible, then a subject

who self-ascribes

f

need not believe the proposition p f

14

.

It may also be the proposition that there are stones
and sticks, which, although necessarily equivalent to the
first, is distinct from it on most views of propositions
favored by Triadic View theorists.
I will basically ignore
such complications in this chapter. p f could be taken to be
a class of equivalent propositions, all of which the subject
believes to be true. Then again, if the property f itself
is a structured entity, there may be some non-arbitrary way
to find a unique corresponding proposition.

106

However,

am not much interested in cases
having to do with
believing the necessary or
impossible.
I

Finally, suppose that s's self-ascribed
property f is a
de re property.
This case is somewhat more
complicated than
the previous two, for a few reasons.
First, it seems that
most proponents of the Triadic View
will want to say that
which propositions are believed depends
upon whether or not
a res is actually present, i.e.,
whether or not s really
does bear a relation of acquaintance
to something.
And
second, some de re properties imply
multiple acquaintance
relations - e.g., the property of looking at
an x and

remembering a y such that y is the sister of x
get a bit messy.

For simplicity,

I

-

which can

suppose here that all de

re properties have the following sort of form:

bearing R to

just one thing and to something that has the
property g. 15

this simplifying assumption, if
and

f

s

self-ascribes

is de re, then f will be a property like:

to exactly one thing that has g.

I

f

bearing R

might, for example,

self-ascribe the property of watching one and only one spy.
On the pictures of de re belief sketched by philosophers who

hold the Triadic View, if

I

really happen to be watching

spy, then one of the things that

15

I

believe

-

a

propositionally

R is a relation of acquaintance, as required by the
definition (DR) in the text. An example of a property of
this form is the property of watching a (unique) spy - where
R is the relation of watching and g is the property of being
a spy.
This form should be familiar from the discussion of
Chisholm and Lewis in chapter 3.
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speaking
x whom

is the singular proposition
about the individual

am watching, to the effect that
x is a spy.
Like
Macbeth and his dagger, however,
it might happen that I
I

self-ascribe the property of watching

watching anybody

-

a spy

without actually

i.e., without actually bearing the

acquaintance relation to anything that
believe to be a spy.

I

could conceivably

might hallucinate, for instance.

i

such a case, it seems that

I

in

do not believe a singular

proposition about any x distinct from myself
to the effect
that x is a spy. What, then, do I believe?
Let us consider
these cases in turn.
The first case is that in which
of acquaintance to a res

property of the form:

16
.

I

do bear the relation

if someone self-ascribes a

bearing R to something that has g,

let us call R 'the self-ascribed relation of
acquaintance'.

From the above discussion of this case, if our subject

s

bears the self-ascribed relation of acquaintance to an
individual, then s believes, according to the Triadic View,
a

singular proposition about that individual,

with respect

to cases in which a subject does not bear the self-ascribed

relation of acquaintance to anything, we must say only that
he believes a singular proposition about himself, to the

16

It might be argued that even when I am hallucinating
I am still watching something:
perhaps a location in
space, or a portion of the atmosphere.
I cannot address
this argument here; although I do think that either it can
be refuted, or else the problems it raises can be handled
a spy,

plausibly.
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effect that he has the self-ascribed
property (just as in
the other cases).
So, if I self-ascribe the
property of
watching a spy without watching
anything, then I believe
only the singular proposition that
I am watching a S py.»
When a property f has the form: bearing
R to something
that has g, I will call
g 'the indirect property of
f

'

Ind( f

'
)

18
.

*

or

we may now give the third principle
connecting

the self-ascription of properties with
the believing of

propositions by being in belief states:
ascribes

f,

and

(a)

if s self-

is de re, and there is an object o such

f

that s bears the self-ascribed relation of
acguaintance to
o, then (1) BEL( s
<s,f>, f) and (2) BEL(
<o,Ind(f)>,
s

,

and (b) if s self-ascribes

f,

and

f

f);

,

is de re, but it is not

true that there is an o such that s bears the
self-ascribed

relation of acquaintance to

o,

then BEL( s

,

<s,f>, f). 19

If the previous simplifying restriction on the form
of

de re properties were dropped, the treatment would have to
be generalized to cover the more complex sorts of these
17

There may be other plausible ways to handle such
cases.
Some might want to say, for example, that what I
believe is a singular proposition involving some of my sense
data or some item of mental experience, such as a visual
image
18

After Chisholm's notion of indirect attribution.

19

The antecedent of part (a) would be true if s stood
in the relation of acquaintance to several things, or to
each of several things, instead of just one. For now, let
us assume that if a subject bears a relation of acquaintance
to something, then she bears it only to that thing.
I
discuss de re beliefs about pluralities and the individuals
of pluralities in chapter 7.
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properties

It seems to me that the
generalization would be

fairly straightforward, if
somewhat tedious, and so would
raise no new issues with respect
to the project of finding
believed-true, singular propositions
to correspond to selfascribed de re properties 20
.

Finally,

would like to take another look at the
case
of Felix in the light of these
considerations.
it may have
been the case, when Felix first noticed
the trail of sugar
on the floor, that he had a merely
de dicto belief
I

to the

effect that the shopper with the torn bag
was making a mess.
(It may have been the case, perhaps;
but more likely Felix
identified the shopper in relation to himself, as
the person
who created the trail of sugar he was following,
and so had
a de re belief about himself.)
When Felix sees himself
in

the mirror, he clearly has a de re belief about
himself.

He

looks at himself (without self-ascribing the property
of

being an x who is looking at x), and says something like
'he
is making a mess!'.

From the point of view of the Property Theory, along

with the principles just discussed, Felix at this point

self-ascribes a property such as looking at exactly one

2

°We may also want principles that generate other de re
beliefs in certain cases. For example, if I self-ascribed
the property of looking at a globe that is orange all over,
in virtue of looking at a globe that is orange all over,
then perhaps I would believe, of the top half of the globe,
that it is orange, and so on. But would I also believe a de
re proposition about the back half of the globe, which I do
not even see?
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person who is making a mess

- and,

in virtue of the facts

that the property is de re and
he is looking at himself
and
nobody else, he believes the
singular proposition that he is

making a mess.
Why, then, doesn't he begin to
tidy up, or at least
check to see what the problem is?
The answer to this

guestion is that Felix does not yet
self-ascribe the
property of making a mess: he thus
believes the singular
proposition by self-ascribing a de re property,
rather than
a de se one.
From the fact that he believes the proposition
that Felix is making a mess we cannot
infer anything
about

his behavior; regardless of how much we
know about his

physical abilities and his desire for cleanliness.
When the truth finally dawns on him (when he
comes to
self-ascribe properties like being an x such that x saw

x in

the mirror, and having made a trail of sugar on
the floor),

Felix comes to self-ascribe the de se property of making
mess.

a

This, and not his believing a singular proposition,

is what explains why he rearranges his bag of sugar.

(Of

course, from the first principle above, he could not self-

ascribe this property without believing the proposition that
he is making a mess.)

The change in belief that explains

his subsequent behavior, then, must be a change in self-

ascription, and need not be a change in believed-true

propositions at all.

Ill

CHAPTER

5

PROPOSITIONS RECONSIDERED

In the last few chapters, we
have considered some

alternatives to the doctrine of
propositional objects of
belief.
These alternatives were proposed to
handle problems
about indexical belief in general,
and de se or selflocating belief in particular.
In the present chapter,

I

wish to consider an attempt to solve
these problems within
the framework of the view that takes
belief to be (or to be

ultimately analyzable in terms of)
a

a

binary relation between

conscious subject and an abstract proposition.

For the

moment, let us assume only that propositions
are things that
are either true or false; and not merely true or
false for a
person, at a time or a place, and so on.

Although many philosophers maintain that all of our
beliefs about ourselves are beliefs in propositions,

I

will

focus on the work of one philosopher, Robert Stalnaker,
who
has considered the allegedly problematic de se cases in some
detail, and who argues that the doctrine of propositional

objects of belief is amenable to the data concerning
indexical belief.

I

will discuss only briefly the views of

others who share Stalnaker' s general thesis.

section of the chapter,

I

consider what

I

In the last

take to be an

important test case for, and an argument against, the

doctrine of propositional objects of belief:

this is

Lewis's puzzling case of the two gods (see chapter 3).

5

1

‘

T he Doctri n e of Propositions and
De Se Bel Pf
i

Stalnaker focuses on John Perry's case
of the amnesiac
lost in the library.
Perry writes as follows:
An amnesiac, Rudolf Lingens, is lost
in
Stanford library. He reads a number of the
thinas in
the library, including a biography of
himself,
and
a detailed account of the library
in which he is
lost
He still won't know who he is, and
where
he is, no matter how much knowledge he
piles up
until that moment when he is ready to say,
This place is ... Main Library, Stanford.
I am Rudolf Lingens. 1

Distinguishing what this man Lingens believes or
knows,
on the one hand, from what he doesn't, on the
other,
Stalnaker glosses the example thus:
He
knows guite a bit about Rudolf Lingens. He
knows, for example, that Lingens is a distant
cousin of a notorious spy. But he does not know
that he is Lingens - that he is a distant cousin
of a notorious spy.
No matter how complete the
biography, it will not by itself give him the
information he lacks. 2
.

.

.

The problem for Stalnaker has two parts.

The first

part is to identify the proposition that the amnesiac

Lingens believes, say, when he believes that Lingens is

cousin of a spy.

a

The second is to identify the distinct

proposition that Lingens would come to believe, were he to
learn that he himself is a cousin of a spy.

Distinguishing

these two propositions is important because, on the view
1

Perry (1977), p. 492. Lingens is a character in
Gottlob Frege's "Thoughts," in Salmon and Soames (1988).
Cf the case of the war hero in Castaneda (1968).
.

2

Stalnaker (1981),

p.

130.
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that propositions are the objects
of belief, the fact that
Lingens comes to believe the second
proposition may explain
some interesting feature of his
behavior, something that his
believing the first proposition could
not explain.
For
example, we may suppose that when
Lingens learns from the
biography that Lingens is currently lost
in Main Library, he
just continues to read; but when he
to comes to believe that
he himself is lost in Main Library,
he consults the detailed
account of the library in search of a way
out.

We should at this point consider Stalnaker's
concept of
a

proposition in somewhat greater detail.

On Stalnaker's

view, a proposition is a function from possible
worlds into

truth values:

possibilities

propositions "are ways of dividing a space of
-

ways of picking out some subset from a set

of alternative ways that things might be." 3

This

conception of a proposition lets Stalnaker say that to
believe something is directly to rule out certain

possibilities while retaining others.

The object of a

belief is, roughly, a rule for doing this.

According to the present view, "propositions are not
structured entities with concepts, objects or senses as
parts; they are not complexes which reflect the grammatical
or semantic structure of the sentences that express them." 4

What about possible worlds, in terms of which propositions
3

4

Ibid.

,

p.

134

Ibid
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are defined?

stalnaker takes these to be abstract
entities
of some sort,
something like maximal properties that
the
world might have, or might have had." 5
Stalnaker seems to maintain that just
as context helps
to determine the attributed proposition
in a belief report,
it also helps to determine what
counts as a possible world
in the very beliefs of the subject.
He writes:
The alternative possibilities used to
define
propositions must be exclusive alternatives
which
are maximally specific, relative to the
distinctions that might be made in the context
at
hand.
But one can make sense of this reguirement
even if there is no ultimate set of possibilities
relative to which any possible distinctions might
be made. 6

Consider, for example, Perry's case of the messy
shopper.

On Stalnaker 's view, there may be a time

- e.g.,

when Perry points to a reflection of himself in the mirror
and says "he is making a mess!" - at which Perry believes
a

proposition that is true at a unique world in which Perry
himself is pushing around a very tidy grocery cart, while
someone else is leaving a sugary trail.

This state of

affairs counts as a possible world, with respect to Perry's
beliefs, even though it is not specific about many things
for example, about whether or not the messy shopper is a

philosopher, or has any children.

This point will be

relevant to the proposal considered in the next section.
5

Ibid.
In this thesis I do not consider
pp. 134-5.
issues about the ontological status of possible worlds.
,

6

Ibid.

,

p.

135.
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2

Stalnaker 's Snlni-inn

With Stalnaker

'

s

view of propositions in mind, let
us

return to the case of Lingens lost in
the library.

if each

of Lingens 's beliefs is a relation
between Lingens and some

proposition, then there is a proposition that
he believes
when, while lost in the library, he
believes that Lingens is
a cousin of a spy.
Which proposition does he believe?

Stalnaker proceeds by enumerating the possible
worlds
that are relevant to attributing to Lingens the
belief that
Lingens is a cousin of a spy. He gives an illustrative
account of the example, according to which there are
three
such worlds - called i, j and k.
Two of these worlds
are

compatible with everything that Lingens believes.

The other

possible world, however, is not one of Lingens 's "belief
worlds":

he rules out this world when he believes that

Lingens is a cousin of a spy.

Stalnaker writes:

"in all

possible worlds compatible with Lingens 's beliefs, there is
a

person named 'Lingens 7 about whom a biography was

written....

[T]he subject of this biography is a distant

cousin of a notorious spy." 7
The possible worlds or situations

i,

j

and k are

described by Stalnaker as follows:
Situation i is the actual situation. Lingens, the
amnesiac, is the subject of the biography, and is
a cousin of a spy.
But in situation j, the
7

Ibid.

,

p.

136
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In the actual situation,

Lingens comes to believe that

Lingens is a cousin of a spy as
a result of reading a
token
of the sentence 'Lingens is
a cousin of
a spy'.

This

sentence expresses in English a
certain proposition.
Stalnaker writes that "this token
exists, not only in the
actual situation, but also in the
other two possible
situations I have described."’ This
observation might make
one wonder just which proposition is
expressed
in each

possible world, by the token that occurs
in that world.
In order to determine which proposition
is expressed by
a token of

'Lingens is a cousin of a spy', Stalnaker
assumes

that a certain semantic account of the sentence
is true.
This account implies that the name 'Lingens'
designates

rigidly a certain individual, and that the predicate
'is

a

8

Ibid., p. 137.
Stalnaker wants worlds i and
to be
compatible with Lingens 's beliefs. He writes that j"in the
original story, Lingens does not believe that he is not
Lingens.
He doesn't have an opinion one way or the other
about who he is" (p. 136). World k is supposed to be
incompatible with Lingens 's beliefs, and hence it cannot
characterize any proposition that he believes. Presumably
Stalnaker includes world k in order to show which sorts of
worlds are ruled out by the proposition Lingens believes.
9

Ibid.
Stalnaker notes that even if the sentence
tokens in the different possible situations are distinct, it
suffices that they "are epistemic counterparts for Lingens"
(fn.

14

)
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cousin of a spy' expresses a
certain relational property,
such that the proposition
expressed by the entire
sentence
is true if and only if the
designated individual has the
property expressed by the predicate.
Here is how Stalnaker evaluates
the token of the
sentence in the actual world:
in situation i, the name 'Lingens'
riqidlv
designates Lingens - our Lingens, the
amnesiac,
his person is a cousin of a spy in
situation i
a COUSln ° f a sp y in
j or in k.
So the
proposition expressed by the sentence
is the one
that is true at i, but false at the
other two
10

situations.

Stalnaker continues to evaluate the sentence
token as it
occurs in the other two possible worlds that
are relevant to
attributing belief to Lingens:
in situation j, the occurrence of 'Lingens'
in
question rigidly designates a different person,
Lingens 2. This man is a cousin of a spy at
j
but presumably does not exist at all at i,
and' is
not a cousin of a spy in k. Hence the proposition
expressed by the token as it occurs in
j is the
one that is false at i, true at j, and false
at k.
In k, the name also rigidly designates Lingens
2,
so the same proposition is expressed as is
expressed in j 11
#

.

In "Indexical Belief," Stalnaker uses what he calls a

propositional concept to help summarize the facts that he
has given above about the propositions expressed by the

sentence 'Lingens is a cousin of a spy'.

In an earlier

paper, "Assertion," he gives the following definition:

10

Ibid., pp. 137-8.

“Ibid.

,

p.

138
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propositional concept is a function
from possible worlds
into propositions, or, equivalently,
a function from an
ordered pair of possible worlds into
a truth value.
The
propositional concept for the sentence
'Lingens is a cousin
of a spy' is represented in
the following matrix:
i

j

k

i

T

F

F

j

F

T

F

k

F

T

F

In the matrix, the horizontal lines
represent the

proposition that is expressed by the sentence
'Lingens is a
cousin of a spy' in each of the relevant possible
situations.

So, the proposition expressed by the sentence

in world i is true at i but false at

Stalnaker has claimed.

expressed in

j

j

and k, and so on, as

Since the same proposition is

and k, only two propositions are represented

horizontally in the matrix.
This sort of approach to the example starts with a

question about just which possibilities are, or are not,
compatible with Lingens 's beliefs.

Stalnaker uses the

propositional concept above to try to determine the content
of the belief we attribute to Lingens when we say, while he
is still lost in the library, that he believes that Lingens
is a cousin of a spy:
12

Stalnaker (1978),

p.

318.
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According to Stalnaker, Lingens 's belief that
Lingens
is a cousin of a spy does not enable
him to exclude either
world i or world j from the set of worlds
compatible with
his beliefs.
For all he believes, either of these worlds
might be actual.
If Lingens believed either one
of the

propositions represented horizontally in the matrix,
however, he would be able to exclude one world or the

other

-

since neither proposition is true at both worlds.

So, Lingens does not believe either one of these

propositions
On the other hand, Lingens 's belief that Lingens is a

cousin of a spy does allow him to exclude world k from the
set of worlds compatible with his beliefs.

This is because

in k the subject of the biography is not a cousin of a spy.

Stalnaker thinks that we should conclude from all of this
that the object of Lingens 's belief is the proposition that
is true at both i and

j

but false at k.

This proposition is

(equivalent to) the proposition that the sentence 'Lingens

“Stalnaker (1981),

p.

138.
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IS a cousin of a spy'
expresses a truth (evaluated
at the
world in which it occurs).
Stalnaker

writes:

This is a different proposition
from either of the
ones represented by rows of the
matrix, but it is
represented on the matrix:
it is the
proposition, the proposition that is diagonal
truest x
(for each x) if and only if the
proposition
expressed in x is true at x. This
proposition i
13 thS belief that Lin ens expresses
9 !®
9
^hen
he says ',,Lingens is a cousin of
a spy,' and the
belief we ascribed when we wrote that
Lingens
believes that Lingens is a [cousin of a]
spy in
describing the example. 14

Saying that the diagonal proposition is the
object of
Lingens 's belief that Lingens is a cousin of
a spy will

allow Stalnaker to say that, were Lingens to
learn that he
himself is a cousin of a spy, he would come to
believe the

proposition represented in the first row of the matrix.
we don't restrict the class of possible worlds
to

if

the three

in question, then presumably this proposition
is equivalent

to the singular proposition, about Lingens, to the
effect

that he is a cousin of a spy.

Only when he learns this

proposition is he ready to exclude world

j

from the set of

worlds compatible with his beliefs.
Let me now summarize Stalnaker 's approach to the

problem of reconciling the doctrine of propositional objects
of belief with the phenomena involving indexical belief.

The problem, with respect to the Lingens case, is somehow to

distinguish two different propositions that can plausibly
serve as the objects of Lingens's beliefs:
14

Ibid

.

,

pp.

138-9

.
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first, his

"third-personal" belief that Lingens is
spy 15 and second, his "first-personal"
;

himself is a cousin of a spy.

binary relation between

a

a

cousin of a

belief that he

on the view that belief is a

conscious subject and an abstract

proposition, these two propositions must be
different, since
Lingens behaves differently when he comes
to believe the
second in addition to (or rather than) the
first.

According to Stalnaker, the context of our
discourse in
general - and our discourse about the psychological
states

of others in particular - often restricts
the domain of

possible worlds in which we are interested.

Stalnaker, in

his discussion of the Lingens example, makes the
simplifying

assumption that the case requires us to consider only
three
possible worlds.

The relevant propositions, then, are

functions from each of these three worlds into truth values.
There are many ways in which the biography that Lingens
reads might have been written about someone else

other person who happens to be the cousin of
these is world

j;

- some

a spy.

but there are countless others.

One of
Likewise,

there are many ways in which Lingens 's belief might have

turned out to be false.
there are others:

One of these is world k; but again,

the subject of the biography might have

15

Stalnaker, it seems to me, does not want to say that
this is a de re belief, or a belief about Lingens (see esp.
(1981), p. 136).
I find many of Stalnaker's remarks on de
re belief puzzling (e.g., pp. 140-41), and partly for this
reason I will not discuss the issue here. See also Austin
(1990), chapter 5 (esp. pp. 93-97).
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been a cousin of an electrician,
or nobody's cousin at all.
The differences between these
possibilities, Stalnaker
presumes, are not relevant to Lingens's
beliefs or to the
context in which we are attributing
belief to Lingens.
In order to attribute a belief to
Lingens, Stalnaker

says, we need to know something about
how Lingens conceives
the world.
Three different possibilities are relevant
to
this example:
in the first, he himself is the subject
of
the biography; in the second, someone else
is; and in the

third, the subject of the biography, whoever
he is, is not

actually a cousin of a spy.

For all that Lingens believes,

the first situation might be actual.

second situation.

The same goes for the

We have seen, however, that Lingens has

ruled out the third possibility.

According to Stalnaker, the propositional object of the
belief that we attribute to Lingens, when we say that he

believes that Lingens is

a

cousin of a spy, is true at the

first possible situation, true at the second, and false at
the third - it is the diagonal proposition of the matrix

shown earlier.

We might compare this with a Fregean view

according to which the sense Lingens associates with the
name 'Lingens' is something like the individual concept:

being the person named 'Lingens' who is the subject of

a

certain biography.
If someone were to tell Lingens that he is Rudolf

Lingens, a cousin of a notorious spy, then he would come to
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believe (assuming that he would believe
what he was told) a
proposition that is true at the first
situation above, but
false at the other two.
There may be some question as to
whether the proposition represented by the

first row of the

matrix

-

i.e., the one semantically associated
with the

English sentence 'Lingens is a cousin of

a spy'

-

would be

the object of Lingens's new belief that he
himself is a
cousin of a spy.
I discuss this issue in the next
section
of the chapter.
It might be helpful to contrast briefly Stalnaker's

view of the example with two other recent and influential

theories about the objects of belief and other attitudes

16
.

According to a theory like the Triadic View, Lingens does
not come to believe a new proposition when he learns or

infers that he himself is a cousin of a spy.

Lingens (we

may assume) believes all along the singular proposition

consisting of Lingens and the property of being
a spy,

a

cousin of

under some guise or other, or in virtue of being in

some belief state or other.

Rather, when he comes to

believe that he himself is a cousin of a spy, Lingens

believes the same proposition in a new way:

by being in a

different belief state, or believing it under a different

16

Stalnaker is careful to avoid giving a theory about
the semantics for belief sentences.
In a footnote to
(1981), he warns that "I am not proposing the hypothesis
that in general x believes that p is true if and only if x
believes the diagonal proposition of the propositional
concept for the expression that p" (fn. 16).
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guxse - an I-guise.

Perhaps this guise is to be
identified

with the meaning, or character,
of the sentence 'I am a
cousin of a spy'. The new way in
which Lingens comes to
believe the same proposition explains
the subsequent change
in his behavior, so that change
in belief is not necessarily
change in believed-true propositions.

According to a theory like the Property
Theory, the
object (or, using Chisholm's terminology,
the content)

of

someone's belief is a property rather than a
proposition. A
person has the various beliefs that he or she
has in virtue
of self-ascribing, or directly attributing
to himself
or

herself, certain properties - entities that are
neither true
nor false.
(In chapter 4, I argued that the theory
of

belief states and that of self-ascribed properties are
not

really different theories.)
On Lewis's version of this view, for example, all along

Lingens has ascribed (indirectly) to Lingens the property of

being a cousin of a spy; but of course Lingens has not yet

self-ascribed this property.

Rather, Lingens must have

self-ascribed some such property as the property of reading
a

biography of someone named 'Lingens' who is a cousin of

spy.

a

Since Lingens was in fact reading about himself, he

did ascribe (or indirectly attribute, as Chisholm would say)
the property of being a cousin of a spy to himself.

However, self-ascribing this property not the same thing as

merely ascribing it, in this indirect way, to himself
125

-

and

Lingens self-ascribes the property
of being
spy only when he discovers himself
to

a

cousin of a

be Lingens, the

subject of the biography.
A number of philosophers maintain
that belief is a
binary relation between a subject and a
proposition, and

would maintain with Stalnaker that the
object of Lingens's
belief that Lingens is a cousin of a spy
is a proposition,

and the object of his belief that he himself
is a cousin of
a spy is another, distinct proposition.
Some of these

philosophers are neo-Fregeans who encounter the
problem of
de se belief by working on the semantics of belief
reports.
Graeme Forbes, for example, follows Frege in saying
that
each of us has a mode of presentation of himself, which
is

inaccessible to anybody else and which plays an essential
role in self-belief

17
.

Consider the sentence 'Ralph believes that he (himself)
is making a mess'.

Forbes represents this as follows:

B (Ralph, [self

In this regimentation,

A
]

Ralph

' [

[

self

making a mess ']). 18
]

Ralph

'

denotes a mode of

presentation of Ralph such that only Ralph could use it in
thought.

According to Forbes, this is a token of the first-

person type of mode of presentation, so that if

I,

for

example, were to believe myself to be making a mess,

17

See Forbes (1987), especially pp. 18-23.
"Thoughts," in Salmon and Soames (1988).
18

Forbes (1987), p. 23.
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Cf.

I

would

Frege's

employ

different token of the same type, which
accounts
for the way in which Ralph and I would
believe alike. 19
a

(The corner quotes are "sense quotes,"
and the symbol

stands for the way in which senses are
concatenated to form
a sinqle complex sense.)
It seems that Forbes and Peacocke must
say that only

Ralph could qrasp the very thouqht that he expresses
when he
says 'I am makinq a mess'.
For suppose that someone
else

call her 'Alice' - thinks a thouqht with the very
same
sense.

Then Alice employs a constituent sense which is at

the same time a mode of presentation of Ralph, and, by

hypothesis, a mode of presentation of herself

-

since it is

a token of the first-person type of mode of presentation.

This does not seem to be possible, since it leads to the

loqical absurdity that her thouqht is possibly such that it
is both true and false.

Since nothinq that Stalnaker says

about propositions entails that certain of them are in

principle inaccessible to certain subjects, perhaps there is
a

reason to prefer his view to the one just considered. 20
Some other accounts of de se belief may also be

classified as versions of the doctrine of propositional

19

Cf. Peacocke (1981).
Peacocke sugqests that only a
thought made up of token senses can play the dual role of
truth-value bearer and object of an attitude.
2

°See Markie (1988)

579-83)

for more discussion (especially pp.

.
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objects of belief

21
.

However,

I

take Stalnaker's view as

a

paradigm and consider it, in the next
section, in the light
of an objection based on a case
developed by
David Lewis.

Lewis's argument can,

I

think, be applied in one way or

another to each of the views alluded to in
this section.

^

Proposition s and the Case of the Two Gods

I

would like now to consider, in greater detail,

Stalnaker's treatment of de se beliefs

- the

beliefs that we

normally express in English with sentences of the form
such-and-such'

- e.g.,

there is the belief that Lingens

comes to have when he learns that he himself is
a spy.

I

'I am

a

cousin of

shall consider some arguments against Stalnaker's

version of the doctrine of propositional objects of belief,
and suggest that the Property Theory is to be preferred.

I

find these arguments to be compelling; needless to say, some

may find them to be inconclusive.
David Lewis has objected that Stalnaker's view cannot

account for self-locating belief properly so called, and
instead accommodates merely de dicto belief.

Lewis presents

an example that, he alleges, shows that the objects of some

beliefs cannot be propositions, and hence that we should not
in general consider belief to be a binary relation between

21

See, e.g., Markie (1988), Schiffer (1978), Zemach
(1985), and Boer and Lycan (1986).
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subjects and propositions.

The example is the case of
the

two gods, discussed in chapter

3.

Here again is what Lewis

says

Consider the case of the two gods.
They inhabit a
certain possible world, and they know
exactly
which world it is. Therefore they know
proposition that is true at their world. every
Insofar
as knowledge is a propositional
attitude, thev are
omniscient.
Still I can imagine them to suffer
ignorance: neither one knows which of the
two he
Th y are not exactly alike. One lives
on top
?
of the tallest mountain and throws down
manna; the
other lives on top of the coldest mountain
and
throws down thunderbolts. Neither one knows
whether he lives on the tallest mountain or on
the
coldest mountain; nor whether he throws manna or
thunderbolts 22
Lewis claims that the situation is

a

possible one, and

is thus a legitimate test case for our views about
knowledge

and belief.

He also suggests that the gods might lack the

beliefs that they do because "they have an egually perfect

view of every part of their world, and hence cannot identify
the perspectives from which they view it." 23

Since the

gods believe all of the propositions true at their world,
but nevertheless could believe more than they in fact do,

according to Lewis, the objects of the missing beliefs could
not be propositions.

Lewis's solution, as discussed earlier, is to say that
the objects of belief and other attitudes are properties

rather than propositions.

On his view, belief is also a

22

Lewis (1983a), p. 139.

23

Ibid
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binary relation, but not between a
subject and
bearer in any absolute sense.
if the

a

truth-value

god on the tallest

mountain were to learn that he himself
lived on the tallest
mountain, he would not come to believe a
new
proposition;

rather, he would self-ascribe a new property:

property of living on the tallest mountain.

viz., the

This property

does not correspond to any proposition, since
the god who
lives on the tallest mountain is the only one in
his world

who has it.
Stalnaker, on the other hand, maintains that the god
on
the tallest mountain would indeed come to believe a
new

proposition, were he to learn that he himself lives on the

tallest mountain

-

just as Lingens would, were he to learn

that he himself is a cousin of a spy.

This view, Stalnaker

holds, follows from the doctrine of Haecceitism

-

the view

that facts about non-qualitative aspects of individuals may

distinguish between the (representative features of the)

qualitatively indiscernible worlds that they inhabit.
According to Stalnaker, Lewis has misdescribed the case
of the two gods by claiming that the gods are omniscient

with respect to all propositions, and hence that they know
exactly which possible world they inhabit.

This reply

allows Stalnaker to maintain that the gods, in each possible

world in which they live, are really ignorant of some of the
propositions that are true there.
example is
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He writes that Lewis's

.

.

case of ignorance of which of
two
possible worlds is actual. One of indiscprnihio
worlds is the actual world (assumingthese possible
theologian's story is true), while thethat the
other is
except that the god who is in fact
on the
tallest mountain is instead on the
coldest
mountain, with all the properties which
the god on
the coldest mountain in fact has. 24
a

^

In the other world, of course, the
god on the coldest

mountain has all of the qualitative properties
that the god
who is in fact on the coldest mountain has;
but they must

have distinct non-qualitative haecceities.

Thus for all

that the god on the tallest mountain believes,
either one of
two qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds
might be

actual
For convenience, let us give some names to these
gods

and the putative worlds that they inhabit.

Let us call the

actual (we are assuming) world 'W' and the other possible
world, in which the gods have traded places, 'V'

And let

'Gl' name the god who is on the tallest mountain in W and on

the coldest mountain in V, and 'G2' name the god who is on
the coldest mountain in W and on the tallest mountain in V.

The context of the case, Stalnaker would say, is such that W
and V are the only worlds that are relevant to attributing

beliefs to Gl and G2.
Let us focus arbitrarily on god Gl and world W.

According to Stalnaker, Gl is ignorant as to whether W or V
is the actual world.

24

When Gl wonders whether he is on the

Stalnaker (1981),

p.

143.
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tallest mountain, the object of
his wondering is the
proposition that is true at w but
false at V. G1 believes
the proposition containing W
and V - the one that is true
at
each of these worlds - but he
doesn't believe the
one

containing w alone - the one that
is true at w but not at V.
If G1 somehow were to learn
that he himself
lives on the

tallest mountain, Stalnaker says,
he would thereby come to
believe the proposition containing W
alone.
On this view,
his coming to believe that he himself
lives on the tallest
mountain gets analyzed as his coming to
believe
this

proposition
Suppose that G1

,

in his state of ignorance,

looks upon

the world and notices the god on the
tallest mountain, then
thinks to himself 'he throws down manna'. Gl
believes,

correctly, that this sentence is true.

Stalnaker must

maintain that Gl does not know which proposition his
sentence expresses, since he believes that the sentence
is
true but fails to believe the proposition that it expresses,
viz., the one that is true at W but false at V.

The object

of Gl's belief that he [demonstrating himself] throws down

manna, on Stalnaker 's view, is the proposition that contains

both W and V.

This follows from Stalnaker 's views on

diagonal ization.
In W, when Gl says 'he throws down manna', his use of
'he' rigidly designates

(and directly refers to) Gl, who

throws down manna in W but not in V.
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But the sentence token

:

occurs in world V also.

in V, Gl's use of 'he' rigidly

designates G2 - the god atop the tallest
mountain there who throws down manna in V but not
in w.
On this view,
then, the object of the belief that
G1 expresses by 'he
throws down manna' is the diagonal
proposition represented
in the following propositional
concept:
W

V

W

T

F

V

F

T

Now for Lewis's objection to Stalnaker.

Lewis argues

that Haecceitism does not do the job that it was
intended to
do, and therefore that there are some beliefs for
which

propositional objects will not account, even if non-

qualitative propositions are countenanced.

He writes as

follows
Let's grant, briefly, that the world W of the gods
has its qualitative duplicate V in which the gods
have traded places. Let the god on the tallest
mountain know that his world is W, not V. Let him
be omniscient about all propositions, not only
qualitative ones. How does that help? Never mind
V, where he knows he doesn't live.
There are
still two different mountains in W where he might,
for all he knows, be living. 25
This may seem like a plea for a more complete account
of the matter rather than an argument against the view that

Haecceitism helps to solve the problem about the gods'
25

Lewis (1983a), p. 141.
In fact, Lewis's paper
precedes Stalnaker 's. Lewis here argues against a standard
Haecceitist view, which Stalnaker favors.
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beliefs.

But Lewis's point,

I

think, is this:

it is

possible that G1 should believe the
proposition containing w
but not V, and at the very same time
wonder about whether or
not he lives on the tallest mountain i.e., he could know
exactly which world is the actual world,
without knowing
where he is located within it.
Since this is possible, it
is incorrect to analyze his coming to
believe that he

himself lives on the tallest mountain as his coming
to
believe the proposition containing W alone instead

of the

one containing both w and V.

Stalnaker replies that Lewis's argument begs the

question against his view.

"One cannot just stipulate that

the god knows that he is in W, and not in V," he writes,
"for on the proposed explanation, that amounts to the

assumption that he knows which mountain he is on." 26

According to this reply, in the first premise of Lewis's
argument it is illegitimately assumed that the (still
ignorant) god knows the proposition containing W alone

- on

Stalnaker 's account of the case, to assume that the god
knows this proposition is to assume that he knows that he
lives on the tallest mountain rather than the coldest one.

Stalnaker, then, maintains that one can know exactly which

world is actual only if one knows one's own place within
it - so that if G1 is ignorant about his location, as Lewis

says, he cannot know the proposition containing W alone.
26

Stalnaker (1981),

p.

144.
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What is going on here?

somewhat as follows.

Stalnaker's reasoning must go

Lewis has assumed that G1 has
ruled

out world V as a world in which he
might be living.
knows that he lives in one, rather than

if G 1

the other, of two

qualitatively indiscernible worlds, then he
must know which
mountain he lives on top of, since by hypothesis

he must be

able to discern the purely haecceitistic
differences between
the two worlds.
Hence, Lewis's assumption is not consistent
with the claim that G1 still doesn't know that
he himself
lives on the tallest mountain.

This claim also follows from Stalnaker's views on

diagonalization.

In world W, Gl's utterance of 'I live on

the tallest mountain' expresses the proposition that is
true
at W but false at V, since his use of 'I' rigidly designates

himself, and he lives on the tallest mountain in W but not
in V.

(So,

if we assume that G1 is still ignorant as to

which world he inhabits, then he does not know whether his
sentence is true or false.)

In world V, Gl's utterance of

live on the tallest mountain' also expresses the

proposition that is true at W but false at
of 'I' again rigidly designates himself.

V,

since his use

The propositional

concept for the god's sentence is therefore as follows:
W

V

W

T

F

V

T

F
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Presumably, this is why Stalnaker claims
that Lewis
begs the question.
Suppose that G1 knows all of
the

propositions that are true at his world, not
only the
qualitative ones, and as a result that he knows

that he

lives in W rather than V.

since G1 knows the proposition

containing W alone, according to the matrix
above he knows
(and thus believes) that he himself lives on
the tallest
mountain.

This proposition would be the object of his

thought that he himself lives on the tallest mountain,
and
so if he knows it he thereby knows which mountain
he is on.

Lewis, the objection goes, has already assumed that
the god
in question has the knowledge that he allegedly lacks.

All of this may follow from Stalnaker's claims about

diagonalization, but it does not show that diagonalization
gives the right account of the example in the first place.

According to Stalnaker, that G1 believes that he himself
lives on the tallest mountain follows from the fact that he

can discern the purely haecceitistic differences between the
two worlds - or, at least, from the fact that he believes
the haecceity being (identical to) G1 to be instantiated by
the god on top of the tallest mountain.

The value of

diagonalization in this case, and as a tool for accounting
for belief in general, is based upon the validity of this

inference; however, there is good reason to think that the

inference does not go through.
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Let us assume that G1 knows the
proposition containing
W alone - i.e., exactly which
world is actual, since he
knows that world V - qualitatively
indiscernible from the
actual world - is not actual, it follows
that he can

distinguish between the worlds in virtue of
their

haecceitistic differences alone.

This ability to discern

the differences between the worlds is the
ability to know
where the haecceities in question are instantiated.

So, G1

knows that the property of being (identical to) G1
is

instantiated atop the tallest mountain and the property
of
being (identical to) G2 is instantiated atop the coldest
mountain, and not vice versa.
This, however, is just where Lewis's point comes in.

Gl's knowledge seems to be consistent with his not knowing

that the property of being (identical to) G1 is his very own

individual essence or haecceity, rather than that of G2
Therefore, his knowing that W is actual and V is not seems
to be compatible with his failing to believe that he himself

lives on the tallest mountain.

essence being G1

,

He might still wonder 'is my

or is it being G2'.

We have been assuming that there is a fact of the

matter as to which of the omniscient perspectives belongs to
which of the individuals atop the two mountains.
assumption might be disputed.

Such an

But even if it is disputed,

the objection remains, since either of the gods could still

wonder whether he lives on the tallest mountain or on the
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coldest one, even though there is no fact
of the matter
about which one it is.
have suggested that there is good reason
not to
identify beliefs about one's own haecceity with
beliefs
about oneself; but I do not claim to have shown
that these
sorts of belief must be distinguished. Nevertheless,
I

it

still seems to me to be correct to claim that, for
example,
if G1 knows precisely which world is actual, then
he knows

exactly when and where his own haecceity is instantiated
but
he need not know that the haecceity in question is his own.

From the fact that G1 can discern the worlds based upon
their purely haecceitistic differences, it does not follow
that he knows that he himself lives on the tallest mountain.
It seems, then, that we should conclude that the approach

taken by Stalnaker cannot account for some beliefs, and

therefore that he has not succeeded in his attempt to solve
the problem of indexical belief within the framework of the

view that belief is a binary relation between

a

conscious

subject and an abstract proposition.
Probably, what has been said so far would do little to

persuade someone like Stalnaker, who would likely stick to
his guns and identify a subject's beliefs about herself with

her beliefs about her own haecceity.

I

am not at all sure

that one could show that such beliefs must be distinguished.
If it could be shown that the beliefs play different roles

with respect to the explanation of behavior, then Stalnaker
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would clearly be in trouble; but again,
this could be done.

I

am not sure that

Let me take one more shot, however,
at

arguing against a view like Stalnaker's.

What follows is an

argument very similar to the preceding one, and it
is also
based upon an argument suggested by Lewis, in a
footnote

to

his paper "Individuation by Acguaintance and by

Stipulation

1,27

Consider logical space - the class of all logically
possible worlds.

Suppose that we have a particular class P

of propositions, themselves total functions from logically

possible worlds into truth values (or, sets of possible
worlds), such that (1) P contains some contingent

propositions, and (2) P is consistent (all propositions
p in
P could be true together).

Then, P determines a class W of

possible worlds, such that for any world w, w is in W if and
only if every p in P is true at w.
In each world w in W, there are various individuals

with various properties, standing in various relations to
one another.

Let us suppose, along with Stalnaker, that the

same individual may exist in more than one possible world,

and that qualitatively indiscernible worlds may differ with

respect to the way in which they represent the identities of

particular individuals, i.e., with respect to which
individuals are which.

27

Lewis (1983b), pp. 24-25 (fn. 16).
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Now, suppose that the following is true:
(A)

There is a subject x such that, for all

propositions y, x believes y if and only if
y

is

in P.

According to Stalnaker

,

one's believed-true propositions

exhaust all of one's beliefs, and so

(A)

gives a complete

characterization of someone's doxastic state.

in other

words, if (A) is true, then there is someone whose
belief

state is characterized completely by P (and hence by w)
For example,

(A)

.

implies either that there is someone who

believes that there are sticks and stones, or that there is
someone who does not believe that there are stick and stones
(which one it implies depends of course upon whether or not
the attributed belief is in P)
If Stalnaker 's view is true, then if (A) above gives a

complete characterization of a subject's belief state, then
it should also entail exactly one of the following:
(B)

There is a subject x who believes himself or

herself to be left-handed
or
(C)

There is a subject x who does not believe himself
or herself to be left-handed.

If there is someone who believes all and only the

propositions in
belief
(C)

- so

P,

and propositions are the only objects of

that nothing is left out

should follow from (A):

-

then either (B) or

again, which one does follow
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must depend upon the details of
(A)

entails neither (B) nor (C).

individual

i

p,

and hence of w.

However,

Even if there is an

at every world in W, and

i

is left-handed at

every world in W, and no other individual
is left-handed at
every world in W it still does not follow
from (A) that
,

there is someone who believes himself or herself
to be lefthanded.
This is because (A) does not give any information
about the identity of the subject who makes it true in

particular

whether or not the subject is

,

To summarize the argument:

i

if Stalnaker's view is

correct, then (A) implies either (B) or (C); but

neither (B) nor (C); so the view is not correct.

(A)

implies

What

should be a complete characterization of a subject's belief
state (of "the world according to the subject"), on

Stalnaker ' s view, turns out not to be.

The problem, it

seems, is that Stalnaker's view requires that a belief state

cannot be characterized completely without information about
the identity of the subject whose state it is.

The identity

of a given subject of beliefs, however, seems irrelevant to

the characterization of a belief state

- of a

way that the

world might be, according to a possible subject of beliefs.
Stalnaker could change his view and maintain that, with
respect to

a

subject's total belief state, the subject is

the only individual that is identical across the possible

worlds in the state.

I

do not know whether Stalnaker would

want to make this move, but he explicitly denies it in the
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paper under discussion here.

in effect, this result is

achieved by a view like Forbes's, according
to which some
propositions are such that they could only be
believed,

desired, considered, etc., by a single subject.

i

cannot

explore this view to the extent that it deserves,
but
suggest that, in addition to being significantly
more

I

complicated than the Property Theory, it leaves
certain
mysteries unsolved

28
.

Even if these mysteries can be solved, there are
at

least two reasons to prefer the Property Theory as a
view of

belief and the other attitudes.

First, a property theorist

need not accept the controversial metaphysical thesis of

Haecceitism in order to give an account of our beliefs about
ourselves.

Second, the Property Theory is simpler than any

view like Stalnaker's.

There seems to be no good reason to

say that my belief that

I

am sitting, for example, is a

proposition that entails that something exemplifies

a

certain haecceity, viz., the property of being me, when it
is open to say that my belief is just the property of being

seated, which

I

self-ascribe

28

For one thing, why are certain propositions
inaccessible to certain subjects, and why isn't this a
barrier to communicating them? (Might there be a God who
thinks of me in the same way in which I think of myself?
Cf. Nozick (1981), p. 72).
For another, just why is my
acquaintance with myself such as to allow me to be the only
individual to appear throughout my belief worlds (on one way
of stating the theory)?
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Of course, there would be reason
to say that my belief
is a proposition,

if there were a good argument against
the

self-ascription view.

in the next chapter, however,

I

review some of the arguments in the literature
against the
Property Theory, including one presented by

Stalnaker, and

find each of them to be unsound.

Finally, in chapter

i

7,

consider some general problems about de re belief
from the
perspective of the self-ascription view. These are
problems
that any account of de re belief will have to face,
and

I

try to show that they can be handled within the framework
of
the Property Theory.
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CHAPTER

6

DEFENDING THE PROPERTY THEORY

In this chapter

I

give a partial defense of the

Property Theory by considering, and objecting to,
some
arguments that have been presented against it.

Arguments

against the Property Theory in the literature are few
and
far between, and persuasive ones are even rarer.

Some of

them raise interesting issues; but it seems to me that all
of them can be defeated plausibly.

The arguments that

I

shall discuss are general

arguments against the self-ascription view, and are not

merely intended to refute one particular version of it,
while leaving another unaffected.

For example,

I

will not

discuss arguments that pertain to Chisholm's version of the

Property Theory but not to Lewis's

- say,

because of the way

in which Chisholm individuates properties. 1

I

will, on the

other hand, consider arguments that have been directed

against a particular self-ascription theorist, if they are
also applicable to the Property Theory in general.

6

.

1

The Property Theory and Self-Awareness

Some have argued that the Property Theory cannot give a

plausible account of self-consciousness, on the grounds that
it cannot distinguish one's thoughts that are about oneself

See, e.g., Villanueva (1991).

from thoughts that are not about oneself.

Allegedly, the

flaw in the Property Theory is its reduction
of de dicto
belief to de se belief, i.e., the claim that
to believe a
certain proposition p is by analysis to
self-ascribe the
property that is necessarily such that anything

has it if

and only if, p is true.

So,

to borrow an example from

Lewis, believing the proposition that cyanoacrylate
glue

dissolves in acetone is self-ascribing the property of
being
such that cyanoacrylate glue dissolves in acetone. 2

Consider the following passage from Peter Markie's
paper "Multiple Propositions and 'De Se' Attitudes":
This reduction of de dicto beliefs to de se ones
keeps the theory from giving an adequate treatment
of self-consciousness.
On Monday, Hume is working
in his laboratory and is so lost in thought as to
be unaware of himself.
The only thoughts going
through his head are chemical equations,
descriptions of chemical reactions and the like.
He comes to the conclusion that cyanoacrylate
dissolves in acetone. On Tuesday, he is back in
his laboratory but cannot concentrate on his work.
He keeps thinking about himself.
The thoughts
going through his head all concern himself as he
comes to the conclusion that he needs to find a
new career. There is a clear difference between
the two cases.
Hume is conscious of himself on
Tuesday in a way in which he is not conscious of
himself on Monday. De se property theorists
cannot explain this difference. 3

Markie clearly thinks that the reason why the Property
Theory cannot explain the difference between the thoughts on

Monday and the thoughts on Tuesday is the reduction of de

2

See Lewis (1983a), p. 137.

3

Markie (1988),

p.

593.

145

dicto to de se belief.

One natural way to explain the

difference would be to say that on Monday,
Hume comes to
have a de dicto belief about chemistry;
whereas

on Tuesday,

he comes to have a de se belief (about
himself).

Markie

thinks that this natural explanation is unavailable
to the
property theorist, who must claim that on Monday
Hume also
comes to have a de se belief.
I

will soon maintain that the natural explanation is

ultimately available for use by the Property Theory.

Markie

entertains that property theorists might respond to his

objection in another way, but he rejects the response:
They might say that Hume is forming de se beliefs
on each occasion, but it is only on Tuesday that
he is consciously aware of the fact that he is
doing so.... We have no reason to assume that
Hume is this reflective on Tuesday. On that
occasion, he does not just think about chemistry;
he thinks about himself, but that is not to say he
takes the extra step of thinking about the fact
that he is thinking about himself.
4

Markie may be right to reject such a reply.

Even if it

usually happens that we have such second-order attitudes
when absorbed in thought about ourselves

- e.g.,

that Hume,

on Tuesday, self-ascribes the property of self-ascribing the

property of needing to find a new career

-

it may be that

such attitudes are not essential to this sort of thinking.
So the reply might not yield a plausible way to distinguish

Hume's thoughts on Tuesday from his thoughts on Monday.

4

Ibid.

,

p.

594.
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However, even supposing the above sort of
reply to be
inadequate, the property theorist can distinguish
any

differences there may be between Hume's mental states,
in
virtue of the contents of those states. The property

that

Hume self -ascribes on Monday (being such that
cyanoacrylate

dissolves in acetone) is of a quite different sort than
the
one he self-ascribes on Tuesday (needing to find a new
career).

The former property, for a start, corresponds to a

proposition

- i.e.,

it is necessarily such that if something

has it, then everything has it - and in this sense it is de
dicto.

We can thus distinguish it from the latter property,

which is not de dicto, and explain the difference in Hume's
states in the natural way, by saying that on Monday, Hume
has a de dicto belief, and on Tuesday, he has a de se (non-

de dicto) belief.

If this does not suffice to distinguish

the way in which Hume is conscious of himself on Tuesday, we

could also point to the fact, say, that the property of

needing to find a new career is necessarily such that
whoever has it is a conscious subject with beliefs, desires,
projects, and so on.
Of course, it might be complained that the same sort of

distinction between mental states is also relevant when we
compare de re attitudes with irreducibly de se ones. 5
example, we may want to say (although
are forced to say) that when
5

Cf

.

I

I

For

do not think that we

believe myself to be sitting

Castaneda (1980).
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down,

I

am conscious of myself in a way in which

conscious of myself when

I

am not

see myself seated in a mirror,

but fail to realize that the person who
I

I

I

see is me (or when

see anyone else sitting down, for that matter).

But the

same sort of explanation is open to the property
theorist in
this case as well:
self-ascribing the property of sitting

down is quite different from self-ascribing, for
example,
the property of seeing someone who is sitting down.

The

latter property is necessarily such that whoever has it

bears a relation of acquaintance to something, and in this
sense it is de re.

The former property is not de re, and so

we may explain the difference between the states by saying

that one of them is a de re belief about the person in the
mirror, while the other is a de se (non-de re) belief about
me

Markie raises a similar objection when he complains
that the Property Theory cannot allow for the possibility
that "some thinkers (perhaps animals, children, or
computers) could be capable of de dicto attitudes but lack
the sort of self-awareness involved in de se ones." 6

It

appears, however, that Markie misinterprets the Property

Theory by maintaining that one must be consciously aware of
oneself, in some intuitive sense, in order to have a de se
belief.

There is no reason to think that more than

special subclass of de se beliefs require such self6

Markie (1988),

p.

594.
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a

awareness.

The Property Theory, it seems to me,
easily

allows for the possibility that a creature
could be capable
of self-ascribing properties that correspond
to propositions
while lacking the sort of self-awareness required
to self-

ascribe other sorts of properties (for example, those

associated with second-order beliefs).
The philosopher who wishes to object along these lines
to the Property Theory must show that there is a need
to

distinguish belief in a proposition p from self-ascription
of the property of being such that p.

there is any such need:

I

do not think that

Markie has not shown that the

latter requires any kind of self-awareness not required by
the former, and it does not seem that they play different

roles in the explanation of behavior.

So,

I

suggest that

when subject to examination the general argument discussed
in this section does not carry much force against any

version of the Property Theory.

6

.

2

The Contingent Existence of the Subject

In an earlier paper, Markie presented another sort of

objection to the general framework of the Property Theory.
This objection involves issues having to do with the

existence and possible nonexistence of a given subject of
attitudes.

Although Markie directs the objection

specifically against Chisholm's version of the Property
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Theory, he clearly intends it to be applicable
to all

versions of the general view.
argument,

I

When discussing Markie's

shall try to make my remarks such that they
may

be incorporated by either Chisholm's or Lewis's
version of

the theory.

Markie introduces the argument as follows:
Sometimes we adopt an attitude de dicto and the
content is an impossibility? sometimes we adopt an
attitude de dicto and the content is a possibility
that includes our nonexistence. Chisholm's theory
fails to capture this distinction because it
reguires that each de dicto instance of an
attitude involves a de se one. 7

Markie gives an example of the distinction with a pair of
sentences, which attribute the attitude of considering
something.

Here are the two sentences:
(1)

Descartes considers its being the case that
two and two does not egual four.

(2)

Descartes considers its being the case that
he neither exists nor has any properties but
someone is wise. 8

The consideration attributed to Descartes in

impossibility, since of necessity

consideration attributed in

(2)

2+2=4;

(1)

is an

but the

is a possibility that

happens to entail the nonexistence of Descartes.
Now, to consider something is not to believe it, and so

self-ascription does not come into play here.

(Presumably,

it would never be correct to attribute to someone the belief

7

Markie (1984), p. 236.

8

Ibid.

(I

have renumbered Markie's sentences.)
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that he does not exist.)

A property theorist, however, will

want to say in general that all attitudes are
relations

between subjects and properties.

In particular,

consideration will be analyzed as a relation between
subjects and properties.

consideration'

,

Markie calls this relation 'direct

and gives the following property-theoretic

versions of (l) and (2):
(la)

Descartes directly considers ... being such
that two plus two does not equal four.

(2a)

Descartes directly considers ... being such
as to neither exist nor have any properties
but to be such that someone is wise. 9

Markie claims that although (la) captures the fact that
(1)

(2a)

involves Descartes' considering something impossible,
fails to capture the fact that (2) involves Descartes'

considering something possible:

it attributes to Descartes

the direct consideration of an impossible property.
call the property attributed in (2a)

'F'

-

(Let us

nothing could

have F, it seems, since if something had F it would have at
least one property, and hence would not exemplify F.)

There seems to be a bit of trickery going on here; but

before we attempt clearly to expose it, let us consider

direct reply to Markie 's objection.

a

All that the property

theorist must do, in order to handle the problem raised by
Markie, is provide a plausible interpretation of

(2)

that

attributes to Descartes a property that something could

9

Ibid.

(Again,

I

have renumbered the sentences.)
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exemplify.

Such an interpretation may be available,
along

the lines of the following:
(2b)

Descartes directly considers: being possibly
such
that he neither exists nor has any properties
while someone is wise.

However, it might be objected that the consideration

attributed to Descartes in

(2)

is something that is not

actually the case, since Descartes does in fact exist;
whereas the consideration attributed in (2b) is
that is actually exemplified by Descartes.

a

property

The objection is

even more weighty in the case of desiring (wishing, wanting)

nonexistence. 10

Any subject who wishes not to exist (never

to have existed) is certainly not wishing to have a property

that he or she actually has

-

like possible nonexistence

-

so an account of such a desire along the lines of (2b) will

misdescribe the facts of the case.
With this in mind, we might wonder why Markie did not
simply use an example having to do merely with the

nonexistence of the subject, such as
(3)

Descartes considers its being the case that he

doesn't exist (never has existed or will exist),
for which he could have given a property-theoretic

formulation along the lines of the following:

xo

What is at issue here is the omnitemporal sense of
'nonexistence'.
Cases of wanting not to exist as of some
time in the future, for example, are easily handled by the
Property Theory.
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(3a)

Descartes directly considers: not existing.

Why doesn't the same problem arise for
(3) and (3a), given
that the consideration attributed in (3) is clearly
possible
while the one attributed in (3a) seems not to be? How
could
the property of being such as not to exist ever be

exemplified by something?
Markie must think that the Property Theory can somehow

plausibly account for

(3)

but not for (2).

I

will argue,

however, that any plausible property-theoretic account of

carries over to (2) as well.

(3)

plausible interpretation of

(3)

subject desires nonexistence)?

How then can we give a
(or of the case in which a

We might take the object of

the consideration of (or the wish for) one's nonexistence to
be the property of being nonidentical with oneself (which is
to be distinguished from the property of being non-self-

identical).
of

(

3

This would yield the following interpretation

)

(3b)

Descartes directly considers: being nonidentical

with Descartes,
as well as an analogous account of the desire not to exist.

Such a treatment of attitudes involving one's own

nonexistence would yield the desired result that the

consideration attributed to Descartes in

(3)

is a

possibility, insofar as it is a property that something

could exemplify.

Indeed everything save Descartes actually

has the attributed property.

However, this fact may give
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rise to a related and familiar problem:

the consideration

attributed in (3) is something that is not actually
the
case; whereas the property that is attributed
in (3b), as we
have noted, is exemplified by many things that
actually

exist.
If this objection has some force (and

I

am inclined to

think that it does), we may replace (3b) with a nearby

alternative that has at least as much plausibility, as
follows
(3c)

Descartes directly considers: being such that

everything is nonidentical with Descartes.
(3c)

has an advantage over (3b) in that the property it

attributes is not actually exemplified by anything, which

corresponds to the fact that the consideration attributed in
(3)

does not actually obtain.

As in (3b), however, the

property attributed in (3c) is one that something could
exemplify:

it is had by everything in possible situations

in which Descartes does not exist. 11

I

suggest, therefore,

that we take (3c) to give the property-theoretic analysis of
(3),

since it has all of the advantages and none of the

disadvantages of (3b).
We can now extend this analysis to cover Markie's

original objection that the Property Theory cannot give an

A counterpart theorist such as Lewis could take the
attributed property to be the one that is exemplified by
something in a world w if and only if there is no
counterpart of Descartes in w.
X1
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adequate account of attribution (2), in which Descartes
is
said to consider someone's being wise while he himself

neither exists nor has any properties.

The property

theorist is not forced to make the implausible claim that
sentence (2) attributes to Descartes the consideration of an
impossible property; such as the property that seems to be

attributed by (2a), viz., being such as to neither exist nor
have any properties but to be such that someone is wise.
A property-theoretic account of attitudes involving

merely the nonexistence of the subject (along the lines of
(3c)

above) can easily be extended to account for examples

of more complicated attitudes like the one attributed to

Descartes in (2).

The following interpretation of (2) seems

to me to get things right:
(2b)

Descartes directly considers: being such that

everything is nonidentical with Descartes and
nothing that is identical with Descartes has any
properties and someone is wise.
Some philosopher might wish to claim that it really is

impossible for something that actually exists to have no

properties whatsoever; if only because of the idea that, for
example, if

I

were to fail to exist,

property of not being human (since
have the property of being human)

.

I

I

would have the

would clearly fail to
Such a philosopher might

want to distinguish a "basic" property like being human from
a "nonbasic" one like not being human,
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and then insert the

term 'basic' before the word 'properties' in
(2b).

might maintain that the part of

(2)

or,

one

that implies that

Descartes considers his not having any properties
does not
add anything to the meaning of the rest of the

attribution,

and so that (2) can be rendered adeguately as follows:
(2c)

Descartes directly considers: being such that

everything is nonidentical with Descartes and
someone is wise.

Regardless of whether (2b) or (2c) is chosen as the
analysis of (2), it is clear that the property theorist can
avoid Markie's objection.

Both (2b) and (2c) capture the

fact that (2) attributes to Descartes the consideration of

something possible that excludes his existence:

in both

cases the property attributed is such that something could

exemplify it but Descartes could not.

6

.

3

Stalnaker and the Exchange of Information

In this section,

I

would like to discuss an argument

presented by Robert Stalnaker, in his paper "Indexical
Belief," against the view that properties are the objects of

belief and other attitudes.

The argument is based upon the

example of Rudolf Lingens, the amnesiac who is lost in the
library and reads a biography of himself, discussed earlier
in chapter 3.

Although Stalnaker 's objection is directed
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against Lewis's version of the Property Theory,
it applies
straightforwardly to any version of the general view.

Stalnaker imagines the following auspicious ending
to
the Lingens saga:
still lost in the Stanford Library
meets Ortcutt.
"I've lost my memory and don't
know who I am," says Lingens.
"Can you tell me?
Who am I?" "You're my cousin, Rudolf Lingens "
replies Ortcutt.
This seems to be a simple case of direct and
successful communication. Lingens requested a
certain piece of information; Ortcutt was able to
provide it, and did. Ortcutt was sincere - he
believed what he said - and Lingens believed what
he was told.
Furthermore, Ortcutt 's reply was
direct: he did not just say something from which
Lingens was able to infer the right answer to his
question. He told him the answer. 12
/

On Stalnaker's view, the objects of belief and the

other attitudes are propositions.

Stalnaker accounts for

our beliefs in much the same way that he accounts for our

assertions, the objects of which, for him, are also

propositions.

Roughly, before Ortcutt replies to Lingens

there is a set of possible situations that represents the

shared background knowledge of the two people.

Ortcutt 's

answer then expresses a certain proposition that narrows
down the members of this set by distinguishing between them
(presumably, between the situations in which Lingens is the

subject of the biography he has read and is the cousin of

Ortcutt and is called 'Lingens', on the one hand, and those
in which these things do not obtain, on the other).

12

Stalnaker (1981),

p.

146.
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According to Stalnaker's account, Lingens has
reguested
a certain bit of propositional information,
which Ortcutt's
reply subseguently expresses. The proposition
expressed
by

Ortcutt's assertion is the very one that Lingens then
comes
to believe.
Stalnaker argues that Lewis cannot account

for

the case in this relatively simple and straightforward
way,
as follows:
If Lewis holds that the objects of speech acts, as
well as of attitudes, are properties - that to"
make an assertion is also to ascribe a property to
oneself - then he will have to describe the case
in something like the following way: Lingens asks
which of a certain set of properties is correctly
ascribed to himself. Ortcutt responds by
ascribing a different property to himself.
Lingens is then able to infer the answer to his
question from Ortcutt's assertion.... The answer
to the question is thus quite indirect, and this
is not a special feature of this example.
The
account I am putting into Lewis's mouth must hold
that all answers to questions are indirect in this
way.
If assertions are always self-ascriptions of
properties, then people talk only about
themselves 13

It seems, however, that it is open to Lewis, as a

property theorist, to claim that the objects of speech acts
and the objects of the attitudes are of different sorts:

in

particular, that although the latter are self-ascribed
properties, the former are propositions.

But Stalnaker has

an argument against this move as well:

Alternatively, Lewis might hold that speech acts,
unlike attitudes, have propositions rather than
properties as objects. But then he must deny that
speech is a straightforward expression of
thought - that what a person says, when he
13

Ibid.

,

pp.

146-7
158

.

.

believes what he says, is what he believes.
Lewis makes this move, then he may save the if
intuition that Ortcutt's reply is a direct
answer
to Lingens's question, but he cannot say
that the
content of the answer is the information that
resolves Lingens's doubt. 14

Stalnaker

'

s

argument appears to be at least partly

methodological one:

a

it concerns the balancing of pre-

theoretic intuitions about the flow of information with
the

utility of more systematic accounts of it.

I

think that it

will be helpful, for purposes of evaluation, to have at hand
a more precise formulation of the argument.

Consider the

following reconstructed version.
(1)

If the Property Theory of belief is true, then

either the objects of assertions are self-ascribed
properties, or else they are propositions.
(2)

If the objects of assertions are self-ascribed

properties, then people talk only about

themselves
(3)

If people talk only about themselves, then all

exchanges of information are indirect.
(4)

If the objects of assertions are propositions,

then assertion is not a straightforward expression
of thought.
(5)

If assertion is not a straightforward expression

of thought, then all exchanges of information are

indirect

14

Ibid.

,

p.

147.
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(6)

Therefore, if the Property Theory of belief
is
true, all exchanges of information are indirect.

(7)

Some exchanges of information are direct.

(8)

Therefore, the Property Theory of belief is not

true
It seems that Stalnaker wishes to maintain premise
(7),

and that he offers the exchange between Ortcutt and Lingens
as a case in point.

An exchange of information from a

speaker to a hearer is direct, it seems, if and only if what
the hearer comes to believe (or, at least, part of what she

comes to believe), in virtue of what the speaker asserts, is
the very object (or perhaps one of the objects) of the

speaker's assertion.

Otherwise, the exchange is indirect

-

what the hearer comes to believe is somehow inferred from
what the speaker says (i.e., the object of the speaker's
assertion) and facts about the context of the utterance.

How might the property theorist in general

,

or Lewis in

particular, object to this version of Stalnaker's argument?
I

would like to consider a pair of plausible objections.

Probably, Lewis would want to say that the objects of

assertion, like the objects of belief, are properties.

In

this way we could express properties that we self-ascribe
but that do not correspond to propositions.

He might,

however, wish to deny that this view entails that every

conversational exchange of information is indirect.
this be the first objection.
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Let

One way of making such an objection is to claim
that

there is some equivocation in the meaning of the word
about' in premises (2) and (3).

Let us distinguish two

possible meanings that the word might have, a "stronger" one
and a "weaker" one.

To say that people talk only about

themselves in the strong sense is to say that in virtue of
our assertions we ascribe properties only to ourselves, and,
in so doing, never ascribe them to others.

If the word

'about' is used in this sense, Lewis can reasonably claim

that premise (2) is false.

Indeed, we have seen that Lewis

has an account of how we ascribe properties to things other

than ourselves, and hence talk about things other than

ourselves, by self-ascribing properties to ourselves.
On the other hand, to say that people talk only about

themselves, in the weak sense, is to say that self-ascribed

properties are the objects of assertions, but assertions are
sometimes used by certain speakers to ascribe properties to

individuals distinct from themselves.

If 'about'

this sense, premise (2) seems to be true.

premise (3)?

is used in

But what about

Could Lewis maintain that premise

(3)

is false

when 'about' is interpreted in this way; i.e., could there
be some direct exchanges of information if people talked

only about themselves, in the weak sense of 'about'?

Given the notion of a direct exchange of information,
the answer to this question appears at first to be negative.
For example, if Ortcutt self-ascribes a property when he
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says

'

you are Lingens', he ascribes something like the

property of looking at exactly one person (and at
who is Lingens.

a person)

Even if we suppose that Ortcutt is talking

only about himself in the weak sense here, and not in the
strong one, the purpose of his remark is not to get Lingens
to self-ascribe the property of looking at exactly one

person who is Lingens; rather, it is to get him to selfascribe the property of being Lingens.

Ortcutt 's self-ascription

,

This is not

however, and so it appears that

Lewis must admit that the exchange is indirect.
In order to undermine premise (3) on Lewis's behalf, we

might claim that although self-ascribed properties are
objects of assertions, so are properties that are ascribed
to other things.

two objects:

Ortcutt 's remark, on this view, would have

the property of looking at exactly one person

who is Lingens, which he self-ascribes

;

and the property of

being Lingens, which he ascribes to Lingens himself (the
individual at whom Ortcutt is looking)

.

We might want to

say, along with Chisholm, that the latter property is the

indirect object of the assertion.

According to the present view about assertion, the
property that Lingens comes to self-ascribe (viz., the
property of being Lingens) just is one of the objects of
Ortcutt 's assertion, and hence, the exchange of information

between them turns out to be direct.

So premise (3) can be

denied on the weak reading of the word 'about'.
162

However,

this line of reasoning has some problems:

first, the

strategy of positing multiple objects of assertions,
simply
for the sake of making possible direct exchanges of
information, seems somewhat ad hoc; and second, we have
not

yet given any reason why Lingens comes to self-ascribe
(and
is intended to come to self-ascribe)

just one of the objects

of Ortcutt's assertion and not the other.

could be done, but

I

No doubt this

think that a more promising objection

to Stalnaker's argument is open to Lewis, as well as to any

property theorist.
The strategy of the next objection is to concede that

Lewis's view of belief entails that information exchanges
are indirect - i.e., that line (6) of the argument is true

but to deny premise (7).

Could Lewis plausibly deny that

some exchanges of information are direct?

that he could. 15

-

It seems to me

All that is needed to accompany this

position is an adeguate explanation of how the relevant sort
of indirectness is in no way an impediment to successful

communication.

I

will try to sketch a plausible account, in

terms of the intentions and beliefs of the subjects, without

15

Clear cases of expression of de dicto beliefs would
be an exception:
for some proposition p, the speaker would
self-ascribe the property of being such that p in order to
get the hearer to self-ascribe the very same property. We
must, therefore, put into Lewis's mouth the somewhat weaker
claim that such cases are the only cases of direct exchanges
of information.
The case under discussion is not of that
sort:
Stalnaker here worries that Lewis's view implies that
de re exchanges of information are indirect.
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going into issues having to do with what sort of
mechanisms
underlie the relevant exchange of information.
We might give such an explanation, for the present
case, in the following sort of way.

Ortcutt says to Lingens

"You're my cousin, Rudolf Lingens," and the unique object
of
his assertion is a certain property that he self-ascribes

Along the lines of our previous characterization, this

property is necessarily such that whoever has it is looking
at exactly one person who is his cousin and is Rudolf

Lingens
Now,

it is probably the case that Lingens doesn't know

exactly which property Ortcutt ascribes to himself; but he
must know that it is one of a class of similar properties,
each of which is necessarily such that whoever has it is in
a

position to point, say, to his cousin Lingens.

As a

result, Lingens comes to believe that Ortcutt (the person

with whom he is talking) self-ascribes a property of this
But Lingens knows much more than this, since he knows

sort.

that Ortcutt has just addressed him with the English word
'you' and he knows that Ortcutt is looking at him and only

at him.

So, Lingens comes to believe that whichever

relation of acquaintance plays a role in Ortcutt's selfascription, he himself is the unique person to whom Ortcutt
is so related.

Lingens is therefore in a position to self-ascribe the

property that Ortcutt intends him to self-ascribe.
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After

all, Lingens knows that Ortcutt's self-ascription
entails

that whoever is at the other end of the relation of

acquaintance is Lingens, and he knows that he himself is the
only person at the other end of the relation, whichever it
is.

So, believing Ortcutt to be sincere, Lingens self-

ascribes whatever properties Ortcutt's self-ascription
entails that this other person has:
the property of being Lingens.

viz., he self-ascribes

The description of the

exchange may seem complicated; but there is no good reason
to think that it should be much simpler, and the complexity
of the description does not preclude the naturalness and

ease with which the information is actually exchanged.
The fact that the object of Ortcutt's assertion is not

identical with the information that Lingens had requested,
therefore, does not prevent Lingens from easily acquiring
it.

The intuition that many conversational exchanges of

this sort are direct in the sense intended by Stalnaker

-

i.e., are such that the object of the speaker's assertion

itself becomes an object of the hearer's belief - can

reasonably be discarded.

This is made even more plausible

when it is remembered that only certain technical senses of
the terms 'direct' and 'indirect' are presently at issue.
In fact,

it seems that Stalnaker 's own account of such

exchanges (in terms of the diagonal propositions expressed
by the various assertions - see chapter

5)

should have to be

much more complicated than he suggests in the passage under
165

consideration here.

I

conclude that Stalnaker's argument,

like the ones discussed earlier, does not constitute a

serious objection to the view of the attitudes taken by

proponents of the Property Theory.

166

CHAPTER

7

SELF-ASCRIPTION AND BELIEF DE RE

The Property Theory of belief is the view that, as

a

matter of some sort of necessity, someone believes something
if and only if there is a property such that he or she self-

ascribes it.

In this chapter,

I

evaluate the Property

Theory with respect to some issues concerning de re belief.
I

intend both to defend the theory as

a

view about the

attitudes in general, and to point out, and try to resolve,
some problems about de re belief for the view defended in

particular by David Lewis.
In the first section,

I

de re belief given by Lewis.

review the general account of
Some remarks by Kripke in

Naming and Necessity suggest that no such account of de re
belief will work.
section.

I

discuss Kripke's argument in the second

The next two sections of the chapter contain

discussions of more arguments against Lewis's propertytheoretic account of de re belief:

in the third

I

object to

an argument presented by Thomas McKay, and in the fourth

present what
view.

I

I

I

think is a stronger argument against Lewis's

also attempt to modify the Property Theory in light

of the objection to one version of it.

fifth section,

I

Finally, in the

turn to some issues having to do with de re

beliefs about pluralities and the individuals contained

within them.

7

•

1

Do Re Belief and the Property Theory

I

think that there is a kind of pre-analytic notion of

believing something of, or about, an object or collection of
objects.

Such believing is typically attributed with

sentences like the following:
Ash believed to be from a great explosive eruption
that buried the Minoan colony on the island of
Santorini 36 centuries ago has been extracted from
deep in an ice core retrieved last year from
central Greenland. 1
This sentence entails that some people, presumably experts,
believe, of a certain bit of volcanic ash recently taken

from a certain ice core, that it came from a certain place
at a certain time.

The logical features of relevantly

similar sentences have received much recent attention.
Sentences like the example above do not convey much

information about how the subject or subjects would express
the attributed belief.

Suppose for simplicity that the

sentence attributes belief to just one person, say, Sarah.
We do not know, then, in virtue of knowing that the sentence

expresses a truth, how Sarah thinks of the ash in question,
and hence we do not know how she might express her belief:
she might be in a position to point to the sample of ash,

and so might express it by saying (if she speaks English)
'that ash comes from Santorini...'; or, she may think of it
as the ash that Sasha sent her, and so might say 'the ash

^he New York Times, Tuesday, June
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Sasha sent me comes from Santorini...'; or she might have

named the sample 'Sam' and so might express her belief by
saying 'Sam comes from Santorini...'.

What appears to make this sort of belief attribution
true is, roughly, a state of affairs in which the denoted

subject thinks of the res

- in

this case, the ash

-

in some

way or other and thinks of it as having whatever property is

expressed in the attribution.

Moreover, it seems that the

subject can think of the res in this way only if she has had
some sort of interaction or epistemic contact with it; even
if it is the sort of interaction that is mediated by the

attitudes and behavior of others.
Some philosophers are skeptical about the notion of de
re belief.

One of them is Daniel Dennett, who argues that

there is no principled way to distinguish de re belief as

a

"subvariety" of belief proper (a concept about which Dennett
is also skeptical).

Consider the following passage:

Suppose I am sitting in a committee meeting, and
it occurs to me that the youngest person in the
room (whoever that is - half a dozen people
present are plausible candidates) was born after
the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Call that
thought of mine Thought A. Now in the weak sense
of 'about', Thought A is about one of the people
I look at each of
present, but I know not which.
them in turn and wonder, e.g., 'Bill, over there Call
is it likely that Thought A is about him?'
this thought of mine Thought B. Now surely (one
feels) Thought B is about Bill in a much more
direct, intimate, strong sense than Thought A is,
even if Thought A does turn out to be about Bill.
For one thing, I know that Thought B is about
This is, I think, an illusion. There is
Bill.
only a difference in degree between Thought A and
Thought B and their relation to Bill. Thought B
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(weakly) about whoever is the only person I am
looking at and whose name I believe to be Bill and
... for as long as you like.
Bill, no doubt, is
the lone satisfier of that description, but had
his twin brother taken his place unbeknownst to
me, Thought B would not have been about Bill, but
about his brother. 2
is

We might agree with Dennett that there is no subvariety
of belief called 'de re belief', if only because de re

belief involves more than just psychological content, or
belief proper.

It seems, however, that Dennett wants to

make a stronger claim

- viz.,

belief doesn't make sense.

that the notion of de re

Dennett backs this claim up by

arguing that there are no plausible grounds for holding that

Thought B is a de re thought about Bill, whereas Thought A
is not.

The obvious reply is to claim that Thought B is caused
by Bill (in some ordinary sense) but Thought A is not.

One

who favors the Property Theory might want to add to this the

claim that Thought A does not involve or imply a relation of

acquaintance that Dennett bears to Bill (since 'the youngest
person in the room' expresses no such relation, even though
it denotes Bill), whereas Thought B does imply a relation of

acquaintance that Dennett bears to Bill (e.g., the relation

expressed by 'the person
I

I

am looking at' or 'the person who

am now attending to').
It seems to me that this reply is more or less correct;

but Dennett might wish to respond by maintaining that the
2

Dennett (1982), p. 84.
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notion of

a

relation of acquaintance is vague, and that any

distinction between a relation of acquaintance and a mere

description will be a matter of degree and will not mark
difference in kind.

As to this second point, we may note

that sometimes a difference in degree can make for

difference in kind.

a

a

For example, the difference between

Smith's skill level in carpentry and Jones's may just be a

difference in degree; but in virtue of this difference it
might be the case that Smith is a master and Jones is
journeyman.

a

These are kinds that may be very useful for

certain purposes.
It may also be true that the notion of de re belief is

infected with vagueness.

However, this would not entail

that one ought to be skeptical about the very notion, since

there may still be clear cases in which subjects have de re
beliefs.

This is not to say anything about the theoretical

fruitfulness of the concept in question, which is another

matter about which Dennett entertains some doubts. 3
not much concerned with this issue here; rather,

I

I

am

am trying

to make a pre-theoretical notion somewhat more precise.

But

as we shall see below, a concept of de re belief might be

useful for certain purposes, e.g., in accounting for one of
the ways in which subjects can be said to share beliefs.

The Property Theory implies that the belief attributed
by any belief sentence, even one with a de re reading
3

See, e.g.,

ibid. p. 86-87.
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i.e., a mental state of affairs needed to make the
sentence

true - is of the same kind as all other belief:

it is a

relation between a subject and a property that the subject

self-ascribes

.

We can, however, distinguish a few different

sorts of property in order to find the one that is generally

associated with de re belief, i.e., ascribing a property to
an object. 4

First of all, de re self-ascriptions do not

correspond to propositions

- e.g.,

excluded are such

properties as the property of being such that every elm is
deciduous.

The properties that we seek are not necessarily

such that if something has one of them, then everything else
also has it.

Those properties are used (fairly,

I

think) by

the Property Theory to account for propositional (de dicto)

belief
Next, de re self-ascriptions generally imply that the

subject bears a relation of acquaintance to some object or
other. 5

For example, if

I

were to believe something that

I

might express by saying 'that man is a spy', then according

It might be said that on the self-ascription view, all
beliefs are de re, insofar as they are about the subject, or
In the sense outlined in the text,
ascribed to the subject.
however, a subject may have de se beliefs without believing
Of
(See also chapter 4.)
anything, de re, of himself.
(the
someone
which
in
cases
with
familiar
are
course, we
messy shopper, or Rudolf Lingens) has a de re belief about
himself without having what we might call a corresponding de
se belief.
4

Such relations have been discussed, e.g., in chapters
Of course, to have a de re belief it is not enough
3 and 4.
to merely self-ascribe a property of this sort; one must
also bear the relation in question to a res.
5
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to the Property Theory my belief is a self-ascription of a

property

-

e.g., the property of looking at a man who is a

spy - that has the following feature:

it is necessarily

such that whatever has it bears a relation of acquaintance
to something or other.

In this way, de re beliefs may be

distinguished from de dicto beliefs and de se ones (which,
in the sense intended here, are neither de dicto nor de re).

Lewis takes belief to be a relation that obtains

between a subject and a property in virtue of some intrinsic
state of the subject

-

the objects in one's environment are

not directly relevant to the individuation of one's beliefs:
The main purpose of assigning objects of attitudes
is, I take it, to characterize states of the head;
to specify their causal roles with respect to
If the
behavior, stimuli, and one another.
assignment of objects depends partly on something
besides the state of the head, it will not serve
this purpose. The states it characterizes will
not be the occupants of the causal roles. 6
I

am inclined to agree with Lewis.

Even if we think that

objects of belief, to be properly so-called, must play

another role

- e.g.,

a

semantic role

-

that is determined in

part by the identities of the things in a given subject's

environment, we may stick with the Property Theory and
7
define the needed objects of belief.

6

Lewis (1983a), pp. 142-43.

For example, if you believe that
See chapter 4.
believe that too, we may want to say
and
I
pretty
is
London
of belief, viz., the proposition
object
an
share
that we
This may be the case even if we are
pretty.
that London is
different ways and hence if we
in
London
acquainted with
properties.
self-ascribe distinct
7
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It is this commitment to a narrowly psychological view

of belief, perhaps, that leads Lewis to make the paradoxical

remark that de re beliefs are not really beliefs.

According

to Lewis, "they are states of affairs that obtain in virtue
of the relations of the subject's beliefs to the res in

question." 8

The relevant beliefs, in this case, are self-

ascribed properties that have a form in common:

anybody who

has one of them stands in an acquaintance-relation to

exactly one thing that has a certain attribute.
On Lewis's view, a de re belief (sticking with the

simple case of ascribing a property to

a

single individual)

is a state of affairs in which (1) the subject does in fact

self-ascribe a property that entails standing in some
relation to something that has a particular attribute, and
the relation in question is a suitable relation of

(2)

acquaintance that the subject bears uniquely to the res.
For example, there is the state of affairs in which (1)

Ralph self-ascribes the property of watching a spy, while
Ralph is watching Ortcutt and nobody else.

(2)

(Again, a

relation of acquaintance is a more or less extensive causal

dependence of the states of the subject upon those of the
res

.

In the analysis above, condition (1) is the

psychological part of the compound state of affairs, and

8

Lewis (1983a), p. 152.
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condition

(2)

is the non-psychological part. 9

The present

account of de re belief may be restated more clearly, as
follows:

a

subject S believes of an object 0 that it has

property P if, and only if, there is a relation of

acquaintance R such that S bears R to 0 and only to

and

0,

self-ascribes the property of bearing R to something that
has P.

(The Property Theory could also be used to sketch a

semantics for de re belief attributions.

For example,

consider the (de re reading of the) sentence 'Pierre
believes that London is pretty'

.

We could say that the

sentence is true if and only if there is a relation of

acquaintance R such that Pierre bears R to London and only
to London, and self-ascribes the property of bearing R to a

thing that is pretty.

We might also want to posit a

contextually supplied restriction on the domain of relations
of acquaintance.)

On Lewis's view, then, de re reduces to de se:

i.e.,

the object of the subject's belief, in a de re belief state
of affairs, is a property that the subject self-ascribes.

Moreover, the property will not in general correspond to

a

proposition, since it could be true of one inhabitant of

a

possible world and false of another.

In the next section,

I

Some may complain that condition (1) leaves out part
- e.g., that
of the psychological description of the subject
I do
the res itself enters into the psychological content.
it
because
part
in
here,
issue
this
not wish to address
seems to me that it might be to a large extent a
terminological one. Perhaps Dennett's phrase orgamsmic
contribution to belief' would be helpful here.
9
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:

would like to discuss a point made by Kripke before the

self-ascription view was even put forward, but which he
seems to want to use against the view of reference implied
in the present account of de re belief.

7

.

2

De Re Belief and Identifying Descriptions

Consider the following passage, in which Kripke seems
to be maintaining that someone may succeed in referring to

something even if he, the subject, does not know of any

description that is true of it, the res, and of nothing
else
Someone, let's say, a baby, is born; his parents
call him by a certain name. They talk about him
to their friends.
Other people meet him. Through
various sorts of talk the name is spread from link
to link as if by a chain.
A speaker who is on the
far end of this chain, who has heard about, say
Richard Feynman
may be referring to Richard
Feynman even though he can't remember from whom he
first heard of Feynman or from whom he ever heard
He knows that Feynman is a famous
of Feynman.
physicist. A certain passage of communication
reaching ultimately to the man himself does reach
He then is referring to Feynman even
the speaker.
identify him uniquely. 10
can't
though he
.

.

.

Kripke implies that someone can believe that Feynman is
a famous physicist (have a thought about him,

say something

about him) without being able to identify Feynman uniquely.
If this were correct,

by Lewis and Chisholm.

10

it would refute the views put forward

On Lewis's view, for example,

Kripke (1980), p. 91.
176

I

can

believe that Feynman is a famous physicist only if there is
a suitable relation R between myself and Feynman (and nobody

else) such that

I

self-ascribe the property of bearing R to

a famous physicist.

It seems impossible to deny that if

cannot identify Feynman uniquely,
such property.

If

I

I

I

cannot self-ascribe any

can still believe that Feynman is a

famous physicist, then something is wrong with Lewis's view.

Kripke might want to hold that in the case envisaged,
the man would have de dicto beliefs about Feynman, but not

any de re ones. 11

This may come from a suspicion about the

very notion of a de re belief, or of a de re reading of an

attribution of belief.

I

will not discuss Kripke 's views on

this issue, in part because it seems to me that we do have a

clear enough notion of de re belief, even if it does not
apply to borderline cases.

For example, if we think that

more than mere reference is necessary for having a de re
belief about something, then there may be no determinate

answer to the question whether a certain four-year-old, say,
has de re beliefs about Aristotle.

Before discussing Lewis's reply to the worry raised by

Kripke 's remarks,
one.

I

would like to consider an inadequate

The reply runs as follows:

in the above case,

I

do

not refer to Feynman, and hence do not have any beliefs

about him, even though the name 'Feynman' refers to him and

“See Kripke (1979); e.g., Salmon and Soames (1988),
104-06.
pp.
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is part of my vocabulary.

This claim may perhaps rest upon

the idea that for obvious reasons

adequate mastery of the name.
to Kripke 's assumption,

I

I

have a less than

So, the reply goes, contrary

do not really know (and hence

believe) that Feynman is a famous physicist.

Another way of stating this reply might be to say that
in this case

I

do not have a concept of Feynman.

Perhaps

one who favors such a reply might also claim, for example,

that

I

lack the concept of a beech or an elm, and so cannot

have any beliefs about these.

This sort of reply, however,

is clearly inconsistent with ordinary usage.

In the case

that Kripke describes, it is surely right to say that the
man in question believes that Feynman is a famous physicist.
(Of course, we are not thus committed to any particular

analysis of this attribution of belief.)

To claim otherwise

would lead one to say that a great many of our ordinary
attributions of belief (which presumably would typically be

considered true by English speakers) are simply false.
a position is untenable and should be avoided,

Such

if possible.

Lewis wishes to maintain that, when the man in Kripke 's

example believes that Feynman is a famous physicist, this is
in virtue of there being some relation of acquaintance R

between him and Feynman such that the man self-ascribes the

property of bearing R uniquely to a famous physicist.

In

this case, R is probably the relation expressed by 'having

heard of under the name of "Feynman"
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.

The fact that the

.

man can identify Feynman with a description that mentions
his name is ready to be exploited.

So,

according to Lewis,

it turns out that the man in question can identify Feynman

uniquely after all, in relation to himself.

Consider

Lewis's remark on a similar example:
I have a belief that I might express by saying
"Hume was noble," I probably ascribe nobility to
Hume under the description "the one I have heard
of under the name of 'Hume'." That description is
a relation of acquaintance that I bear to Hume.
This is the real reason why I believe de re of
Hume that he was noble. 12

If

Probably, Lewis would maintain that the relation

between the man and Feynman is a suitable relation of causal
acquaintance, for roughly the same reason that Kripke gave
in support of the claim that the man refers to Feynman:

"A

certain passage of communication reaching ultimately to the
man himself [Feynman] does reach the speaker [the man]."
The relation expressed by 'having heard of under the name of
"Feynman"' obtains between the man and Feynman just in case
some present state of the man (presumably, his current self-

ascription) depends causally, in the appropriate sort of
way, on some prior state of Feynman (e.g., an extrinsic

state like his baptism)

Perhaps

I

can identify something uniquely if

I

have a

purely qualitative description of the thing that fits it and

nothing else.

Clearly,

I

can identify something uniquely if

Lewis (1983a), p. 155. Schiffer makes a similar
point in his (1978), see especially pp. 198-99.
12
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:

I

.

am in a position to look at it under good conditions
and,

say, point to it.

But Lewis claims that other sorts of

relation between a subject and an object will suffice to
allow the subject to have de re beliefs about the object.

Consider the following passage from On the Plurality of

Worlds
A relation of acquaintance needn't be so very
direct and perceptual. Other relations will do,
so long as they afford channels for the flow of
information.
For instance there is the relation
which obtains when one has heard of something by
name.
Let us say that one is 'Londres' -acquainted
with something when one has heard of it under the
name 'Londres'.
Each of Pierre's doxastic
alternatives is 'Londres '-acquainted with a pretty
city; Pierre himself is 'Londres '-acquainted with
London; thereby Pierre ascribes prettiness to
London; and that is how he believes that London is
pretty. 13
Lewis, then, has an answer to Kripke's puzzle about

belief, with which

I

assume familiarity. 14

Pierre, having

some French names in his English vocabulary, is ready to say

something like 'Although Londres is pretty, London is not'.
Pierre's doxastic alternatives are those possible men who

self-ascribe

and have, every property that Pierre actually

,

self-ascribes

:

they inhabit worlds that, for all Pierre

believes, are actual.

Pierre happens to be

'

Londres '-

acquainted and 'London '-acquainted with the same city;
however, this is not the case with any of his doxastic

alternatives
13

Lewis (1986), p. 33.

“See Kripke (1979).
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Analogously, on Lewis's view, the man who believes that

Feynman is a famous physicist does so in virtue of

(l)

being

'Feynman '-acquainted with Feynman and only with Feynman, and
(2)

self -ascribing the property of being

'

Feynman '-

acquainted with someone who is a famous physicist.

It

doesn't really matter whether or not we wish to say, in
virtue of the fact that the man is 'Feynman '-acquainted with
Feynman, that he can thereby identify Feynman uniquely;

perhaps he can in one sense and can't in another.

Either

way, it seems that Lewis is able to give a plausible account
of the kind of case that Kripke has in mind, in which one

has heard of something by name but is presumably unable to

produce a certain kind of qualitative description that fits
the thing uniquely.
We should note that the descriptions that Lewis prefers
to use in cases of this sort make essential reference to the

person who, so to speak, employs them in thought:

e.g.,

I

have a belief about Feynman by thinking of some relation

that

I

bear to him, for instance by thinking of him as the

person of whom

I

have heard under a certain name.

Hence, on

Lewis's view, the object of an attitude in which such a

description occurs is still irreducibly de se:

I

self-

ascribe the property of having heard of someone under the
name 'Feynman'....

Nevertheless some complications arise.

I

might have

heard of two or more distinct people under a single name,
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say 'Bach
then,

I

and

7
,

am not

I

'

might be fully aware of this.

Probably,

Bach ' -acquainted uniquely with anyone? but

this fact can hardly prevent me from having de re beliefs

about the various Bachs with whom

I

am acquainted.

In a

typical case, the name in question can be disambiguated by

means of more or less qualitative descriptions of the things
that bear it.

For example, if the description 'the one

I

have heard of under the name of "Bach"' could express a

relation of acquaintance between two people, then 'the
composer named "Bach" who wrote the Brandenburg Concertos'
could also

15
.

It is less clear that there could be cases in which a

subject believes something de re of an object, but has no

linguistic description of it that picks it out uniquely.
But perhaps this is possible.

Perhaps

something about Bach, as the composer

I
I

could believe
have heard of under

the name 'Bach', without being able to produce a qualitative

description that disambiguates (or somehow yields the bearer
of) his name.

In an extreme case of this sort,

it seems that we need

to depend upon something like the notion of the causal role

played by "a token of a name in a person's head," i.e.,

a

As is well known, a name that has only one bearer
(let us suppose) may also be disambiguated (wrongly) by a
subject who thinks that two or more things share the name,
thus the descriptions 'the musician I have heard of called
"Paderewski"' and 'the politician I have heard of called
15

"Paderewski" '
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self-ascription of

a

property that implies that someone or

something bears the name in question.

We need to assume,

roughly, that in virtue of the various causal roles played
by different name tokens, the tokens may be classified into
types, in such a way that tokens of the same public-language

type or that are in some sense syntactically identical
(e.g., would sound the same if uttered or would look the

same if written) may be tokens of distinct types.

Any

theory of belief, it appears, will have to make a similar

assumption in order to handle such extreme cases.
Mark Richard has used the locution 'representational
type' when discussing this sort of classification of mental

tokens. 16

He suggests, roughly, that two name tokens

(e.g., of the name 'Bach') are of the same representational

type for a certain subject if and only if they are of the
same public-language word type, and the subject groups them

together or uses them as if they named the same thing.

Richard considers two different name tokens to be of
the same word type only if they have the same bearer, so

that two tokens of 'Bach' may be of different word types.
The justification for this is essentially the causal theory
of naming, according to which a given token of a name

denotes its bearer in virtue of its place in

a causal

chain

of name tokens going back in time, perhaps to some sort of

See Richard (1990), pp. 182-85. Richard's notion of
one being
a mental term token is not quite the same as the
used here.
16
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.

baptism of the bearer or some other reference-fixing use of
the name. 17

We may employ something like Richard's account

to the sort of case under consideration.

Suppose that
but that

I

am

I

Bach' -acquainted with two composers

'

cannot disambiguate the name(s) by means of

descriptions, and that

I

have de re beliefs about each of

them (for example,

I

famous composer)

Now suppose that

.

property of being

'

believe of each one that he was a
self-ascribe the

I

Bach' -acquainted with someone who was a

distinguished organist.

In this case, my self-ascription

implies that someone is named 'Bach', and it (i.e., my self-

ascription) is a node in a causal chain that ultimately goes

back to one of the two men with whom
This, then, is the one whom

I

am

I

'

Bach' -acquainted

believe to be a distinguished

organist
What makes my belief about one Bach rather than another
is therefore a matter of what goes on outside of my head, of

which events caused my self -ascription
case that

I

believe that

I

.

What makes it the

have heard of two distinct

individuals called 'Bach' is a matter of my psychology
somehow, in my thought

I

-

manage to track certain occurrences

of the name 'Bach', grouping some of them together as a name
of one person, and some others together as a name of someone

This is all quite rough and vague, but the topic of
naming is far from central to the thesis. Of course, the
causal relations that constitute the chain must be of the
See Kripke (1980),
sort appropriate to preserve reference.
especially around p. 96.
17
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else

:

.

As a result the various name tokens will play one of

two different causal roles, so to speak, in my head.

7

.

3

McKay's Objection to Lewis

If Lewis's account of de re belief is correct, then a

subject's beliefs about an object are individuated by

a

relation of acquaintance that she bears uniquely to it, even
if it is the relation of having heard of something under a

certain name.

According to Lewis, a subject has a de re

belief about a certain thing if and only if there is some

suitable relation of acquaintance R that she bears uniquely
to the thing, such that she self-ascribes the property of

bearing R uniquely to something that is such-and-such.
In his paper "De Re and De Se Belief," McKay presents

an argument against Lewis's view of de re belief.

The

argument is based upon an example, which McKay describes as
follows
Smith can stand in a relation of acquaintance to
Wilson, yet believe that he (Smith) stands in that
relation to Jones. Thus Wilson might be hatless
and visible to the left of Smith; Smith might also
see Jones, who is on his right, and believe
If Smith
(correctly) that Jones is wearing a hat.
confuses left and right, the following will be
true

Wilson (and only Wilson) is perceived from
(i)
the left of Smith
Smith self-attributes perceiving someone from
his left who is wearing a hat.
(ii)
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Yet Smith's belief is about Jones, not Wilson,
contrary to Lewis's analysis. 18
I

take it that McKay is arguing against Lewis's view

both as a sufficient and as a necessary condition for de re
belief:

the former because (i) and (ii) may be true even if

Smith does not have a belief about Wilson; and the latter

because Smith can have a belief about Jones even if he does
not self-ascribe a property which implies a relation of

acquaintance that he actually bears to Jones.
does not seem to me to succeed, however.

I

The argument

think that it

rests upon a confusion between Smith's belief, on one hand,
and the way in which Smith would express his belief, on the
other.

McKay's claim (ii) about the property self-ascribed

by Smith,

I

shall suggest, is unwarranted because it does

not follow from the earlier assumption that Smith confuses
left and right.

The only way to make sense of someone's confusing left

and right is to construe it as some sort of linguistic
mistake:

he somehow uses or understands the word 'left',

for example, to mean what the word 'right' in fact means, or

vice-versa.

(It thus requires the distinction between

linguistic meaning and speaker (or thinker) meaning.)

So,

in the example above, although Smith might express his

belief by saying 'the person on my left is wearing

a hat'

Austin (1988), p. 209. McKay uses the term 'selfattributes' where Lewis would use self-ascribes and
Chisholm would use 'directly attributes'.
18

'
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,

it does not follow that he self-ascribes the property of

perceiving someone from his left who is wearing a hat.

in

virtue of confusing left and right, Smith would incorrectly
express the property that he in fact self-ascribes.

Suppose we accept McKay's premise that Smith believes
that Jones is wearing a hat.

It is then open to Lewis - and

it seems to me that this is correct - to maintain that Smith

really does self-ascribe the property of perceiving someone
from his right who is wearing a hat, and that this is how he

believes de re, of Jones, that he is wearing a hat (given
that Smith does actually see Jones from his right)
(ii)

.

Since

is not true, moreover, Lewis's account does not entail

the falsehood that Smith believes de re, of Wilson, that he
is wearing a hat.

Although more could be said about the issues raised by
the present argument and objection to it,

I

think that

have shown that McKay's argument does not go through.

I

It

seems to me that something about it (or about the intuition

behind it) is correct, however, and so

exactly what it is in the next section.

I

shall try to locate
In particular,

I

shall attempt to describe a case in which Lewis's account

implies that a subject has de re beliefs about a particular

object (a person), when in fact the subject does not believe

anything de re of this person (but instead has de re beliefs
about somebody else).
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4

The Case of the Shy Secret Admirer

The example to be presented in this section raises

general problems about de re thought, and views of belief

other than the Property Theory could be tested against it.
However, it is my intention to apply it here to Lewis's

version of the Property Theory, and to make some suggestions
about how one might modify the theory in order to give a

plausible account of the case.

Along the way

I

will make

some reference to other discussions of de re belief; but it
is not my purpose to evaluate these other views here.

Suppose that Fran has a shy secret admirer, Frank.

Frank engages a friend of his, Fred, to write letters on his
behalf to Fran, signed only 'A secret admirer'.

Frank, let

us suppose, sometimes tells Fred what to write but sometimes
he doesn't.

Whenever Frank has Fred write things about him

to Fran, they are true.

Moreover, what Fred writes about

Frank on his own is also mostly true.

No description in any

of the letters, however, identifies Frank uniquely.

One of

the things that Frank has Fred convey to Fran is his

fondness for French films.
Like the detective who has de re beliefs about the

suspect being traced (after a bit of investigation, of
course), or like the messy shopper, who has de re beliefs

about the person whose trail of sugar he is following, Fran
has de re beliefs about her secret admirer, Frank.
188

We may

suppose that given the information she already has, she

could more or less easily follow the trail back, through
Fred or otherwise, to Frank.

One such belief is her belief,

of Frank, that he is fond of French films.

An English

sentence such as the following could be used to attribute
this belief:

Frank is believed by Fran to be fond of French films.
This sentence is true partly in virtue of what Fran

believes, in virtue of her psychology.

Of course, Fran

would not express her belief by saying 'Frank is fond of
French films', since she does not think of Frank under the
name 'Frank'.

Instead, she thinks of Frank as her secret

admirer, and if she were to express her belief in English
she might say something like 'my secret admirer is fond of

French films'.

sentence false.

But all of this does not make the above

Moreover, Fran believes truly, because

Frank does in fact like French films.
false beliefs about Frank, however:

She also has some

one of them is her

belief, of Frank, that he wrote the letters she received.
We should note that the relation expressed by the

phrase 'my secret admirer' (or, more precisely,

'x is the

secret admirer of y') is not a suitable relation of causal
acquaintance.

Hence, if it must be the case that some

relation of causal acquaintance is part of the content of
Fran's belief, then the relation of being someone's secret

admirer will not do the job.

So Fran cannot believe that
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Frank is fond of French films simply in virtue of self-

ascribing the property of being secretly admired (uniguely)
by someone who is fond of French films. 19

A different

object must therefore be assigned to her self-ascription.
What, then, makes it the case that Fran can believe

things de re of Frank?

The answer is fairly clear.

Fran

has read some letters about Frank, most of which have their

origins in his own intentions.

Indeed Frank is ultimately

responsible for all of the letters that Fran has read.

In

this way Fran is acquainted with her secret admirer, and in

virtue of this acquaintance she has acquired

a

fair bit of

information about him.
There is a way in which the case of the secret admirer
is similar to the cases that Donnellan used to illustrate

the distinction between referential and attributive uses of

definite descriptions. 20

In such cases, a speaker succeeds

in saying something about a particular individual with a

0ne possible response to this problem might be to
adopt a view along the lines of the one suggested in Kaplan
According to such an account, there are cases in
(1968).
which a subject has beliefs about an object with whom she is
en rapport where no part of the content of the belief is a
relation of acquaintance that she bears to the object.
Instead, what makes the belief de re (in our terminology) is
a condition on the subject's representation of the object:
it must be a sufficiently "vivid" name of the object for the
One could adapt this solution to the framework of
subject.
the Property Theory, but there are good reasons to include
relations of acquaintance as part of the content of belief.
In particular, a subject's dispositions to behavior will in
general depend upon such relations.
19

2

°See,

e.g., Donnellan (1966).
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sentence containing a definite description, even
though the

description does not literally denote that individual
(and
indeed may denote something else).

in the present sort of

case, one of a subject's self-ascriptions implies a
relation
of acquaintance that the subject bears to something (e.g.,

Fred)

but in virtue of the self-ascription the subject has

;

a belief about something else (Frank), a thing to which the

subject in some sense intends to refer.
We are now in a position to raise a problem for Lewis's

view of de re belief.

Suppose that Fran self-ascribes the

property of having read some letters written by someone who
is fond of French films

21
.

Since the relation expressed by

'x has read some letters written by y'

is a suitable

relation of causal acquaintance that Fran in fact bears to
Fred, Lewis's view implies that Fran believes de re, of
Fred, that he is fond of French films.

case,

I

But the facts of the

suggest, are such as to make Fran's de re beliefs

about her secret admirer beliefs about Frank; she does not

have any such beliefs about Fred.

It seems to me, as a

result, that Lewis has not presented adequate sufficient

conditions for belief de re:

a subject may bear a relation

of acquaintance R to an object, and self-ascribe bearing R

to something that has a certain property F, without thereby

The word 'written' is probably ambiguous between
Since Fran thinks that her
'inscribed' and 'authored'.
letters himself, it will be
the
secret admirer has inscribed
reading.
former
convenient for us to use the
21
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having a de re belief about the object to the effect that it
has F

What rules out Fred as an individual about whom Fran
may have de re beliefs?

To answer this question, we could

if we wished exploit the conception of propositions as sets

of possible worlds and talk about Fran's "belief worlds,"

the set of possible worlds at which all of the propositions

that she believes are true.

The Property Theory implies

that her belief worlds do not completely characterize her

system of beliefs, however, since surely some of her self-

ascriptions do not correspond to propositions (see chapter
3).

So let us for the moment talk about Fran's doxastic

alternatives, viz., the possible individuals who selfascribe, and have, all and only the properties that Fran

actually self-ascribes
Each of Fran's doxastic alternatives has received

letters written by a unique secret admirer who is fond of

French films, and each of her alternatives bears

relations of acquaintance to her secret admirer:

a

number of
e.g.,

having read about him, having read letters authored by him,
having read letters written by him, etc.

When we consider

Fran herself, we notice that she does not bear all of these

relations to the same person.

As a result, in the actual

world there are two people, Frank and Fred, who are similar
to the secret admirers of Fran's doxastic alternatives with

respect to the relations of acquaintance between them.
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In terms of doxastic alternatives, my claim
about the

case goes roughly as follows:

the relations of acguaintance

between Fran and Frank are more similar to the relations
of

acquaintance between her alternatives and their secret
admirers, than are the relations between Fran and Fred.
Give

the fact that Frank and Fred have somehow been merged

;!"1

or identified in Fran's beliefs, this is what makes it the

case that she ascribes the property of being fond of French
films to Frank, rather than Fred, when she ascribes it to

the person who wrote the letters that she has read.

(We

cannot just compare the intrinsic qualities of Frank, Fred
and the alternative secret admirers here, since for example

Frank might have conveyed

a lot of

misinformation about

himself in the letters to Fran.)
For convenience, let us introduce two relations called
'Rfrank'

and

'

Rf red

'

Rfrank

•

is one of the relations of

acquaintance that Fran actually bears to Frank, e.g., the
relations of having read about him, or having read letters
of which he is ultimately the author.

R fred is one of the

relations of acquaintance that Fran bears to Fred, like the

relation of having read letters written (inscribed) by him.
Let us also use

'

F'

for the moment to denote the property of

being fond of French films.

Finally, let us define a class

of acquaintance relations, called

'Ra^irer'

/

such that for

any relation r, r is in Radralrer if and only if Fran self-

ascribes the property of bearing r and Rfrank
193

(

or

Rfred)

t° the

same thing.

We have already pointed out some of the

relations in R adnlrer

,

like the relations of having read

certain letters about someone and having read certain
letters written by someone.
Fran self-ascribes the property of bearing R fred to

someone who has

Why then is her belief about Frank

F.

rather than Fred (to whom she bears R fred )?

(Compare:

why

does the speaker refer to the man drinking water by using a

description

- e.g.,

'the man drinking a martini' - that does

not denote him?)

I

goes as follows:

(a)

viz.,

Rf rank -

suggest that the answer, in this case,
there is a relation of acguaintance -

that Fran bears to someone other than Fred,

such that (b) she self-ascribes the property of bearing it

and

Rf red

to the same thing, and (c) the relations between

her and Frank are more similar to the relations in R admlrer

than are the ones between her and Fred.
This,

I

think, is what rules out Fred as an object of

Fran's belief, and what accounts for the fact that, were
Fran to come to learn that she bears R frank and R fred to

distinct people, she would continue to self-ascribe bearing
Rfrank

to someone who has F, but would no longer self-ascribe

bearing R fred to someone who has

F.

Needless to say, the

notion of similarity between relations being employed here
is quite vague, and

I

have not discussed it at anything more

than an intuitive level.

What follows, then, may be viewed

as a sketch of a modified theory of de re belief within the
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framework of the Property Theory, a sketch in need of

a

more

detailed account of the relevant notion of similarity.
How can we modify Lewis's account in the light of the
case of the secret admirer?

I

suggest the following, with a

new technical term to be defined below:
(DR) A subject s ascribes a property F to an object x
if and only if there is a relation of acquaintance

R such that (1) s bears R uniquely to x, and s

self-ascribes the property of bearing R uniquely
to something that has F; and (2) for any object y

distinct from x, if there is a relation of
acquaintance R' such that

s

bears R' uniquely to

y,

and self-ascribes the property of bearing R and

R'

to the same thing, then y is ruled out as an

object of belief for

s.

In order to define the consequent in (2) in terms of

the notion of overall similarity between relations of

acquaintance, it will be useful to introduce the notion of

what

I

shall call an identification class of relations (of

which R admirer above is an example)

,

or a class of relations

of acquaintance that a subject believes herself to bear to

the same thing.

Here is a definition:

(IC) C is the identification class of R for s = df

.

s

self-ascribes the property of bearing R uniquely
to something, and for all relations of

acquaintance

r,

r is in C if and only if s self-
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ascribes the property of bearing r and R to the
same thing.
We may now say what it is for something to be ruled out
as an object of someone's beliefs:
(RO)

y is ruled out as an object of belief for s = df

there is an object x distinct from y such that

(i)

there are relations of acquaintance R and R' such
that s bears R uniquely to x and

uniquely to y, and (ii)

s

s

bears R'

self-ascribes the

property of bearing R and R' to the same thing,
and (iii) the relations of acquaintance that s

bears to x are more similar to the identification
class of R (or R'

acquaintance that

for s than are the relations of

)

s

bears to y.

(DR) gives the following account of the case of the

secret admirer:

Fran ascribes the property of being fond of

French films to Frank, since conditions

(1)

and (2) obtain

(in particular, Fred is ruled out as an object of belief for

Fran)

;

but Fran does not ascribe this property to Fred,

since, although condition (1) obtains, condition (2) does
not:

Fran.

Frank is not ruled out as an object of belief for
It seems to me that (DR) gives a fairly plausible

treatment of cases in which a subject bears many different
relations of acquaintance to distinct objects, but wrongly
thinks that she bears them to a single res.
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Any account of de re belief should have something to
say about the general problem raised by examples like the

case of the secret admirer.

For example, a view couched in

terms of singular propositions

-

Kaplan, Perry, Salmon and others

like the Triadic View of
-

must give an account of

how and why Fran refers to Frank, so as to grasp a singular

proposition about him rather than one about Fred.

Some of

the groundwork for such a view was discussed in chapter

but as

I

have said, here

I

2;

am only considering the problem

with respect to the Property Theory of belief.

7

.

5

Pluralities and De Re Belief

In this section,

X

would like to discuss some issues

concerning plurally de re beliefs, and how they relate to
individually de re beliefs.
a

I

will make some remarks about

few different types of cases illustrated by different

examples, and will try to give some plausible general

principles, within the framework of the Property Theory,
The account from the

that govern the various cases.

previous section - viz., (DR)

-

may have to be revised in

order to account for the examples to be discussed here.

Although
I

I

will not present a fully detailed modified view,

will try to say something about how such

would go.
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a

modification

First, suppose for example that Mary is a knowledgeable

lover of violin music who is listening, through a single
speaker, to a solo being played by Peter, who is a skilled

violinist.

Suppose that she is auditioning violinists by

listening to demo tapes on which they play certain solos.
We may stipulate that Mary stands in a suitable relation of

acquaintance uniquely to Peter

-

the one expressed by 'x is

listening to a violin solo played by y'

-

and that she self-

ascribes the property of listening to a violin solo being

played by a virtuoso.

Hence, on the analysis given by the

Property Theory, Mary ascribes virtuosity to Peter:

i.e.,

she believes de re that Peter is a virtuoso.
Now, suppose that we change the example somewhat.

Instead of listening to Peter play a violin solo, Mary is

listening to virtuoso-level violin music being piped through
a single speaker; however, what Mary now hears is the music

of two distinct people, Peter and Paul, simultaneously

playing the piece.

Their timing is so precise that Mary

cannot tell that what she hears is the music of two players,
and so she mistakenly thinks that she is listening to a

single violinist.

We may suppose Mary to be in the same

(narrow) psychological state as in the previous example

- in

particular, she self-ascribes the property of listening to

violin solo being played by a virtuoso.

Overtly, she might

say something like 'this candidate is really a virtuoso!'.
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a

.

Since the non-psychological facts about Mary have been
changed, she now does not bear the relation expressed by

'listening to music being played by' uniguely to anyone at
all (i.e., she does not bear it to some person and only to

that person; although she does bear it to Peter and Paul).

According to the property-theoretic accounts of de re belief
discussed so far

-

Lewis's original view and (DR) above

-

then, Mary does not have any de re beliefs either about

(According to these views, she may

Peter or about Paul.

have some de re beliefs about the plurality containing Peter
and Paul, since she does bear a relation of acquaintance

uniquely to it.

I

shall return to this point shortly.)

We may want to hold, contrary to the results given by

Lewis's view and (DR), that in this case Mary does believe
de re, of Peter, that he is a virtuoso, and that she does

believe de re, of Paul, that he is a virtuoso.

After all,

she is willing to admit that anyone who can play a violin

piece like the piece to which she is listening must be

a

virtuoso, and the piece to which she is listening is played
by Peter and Paul

.

I

suggest that Mary does in fact have

these de re beliefs; although

I

do not have any arguments

that are likely to convince anyone who does not share this

intuition
re,
In making this claim about what Mary believes de

I

other,
do not intend to be making any analogous claims about

may be
perhaps similar, cases, from which the present case
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distinguished.

Certain facts about this case,

warrant these de re attributions to Mary.

I

think,

First, Mary does

stand in a suitable relation of acquaintance uniquely to
(the plurality consisting of) Peter and Paul.

Second, Mary

stands in the above relation to Peter, and also to Paul;

although she does not stand in it uniquely to either of
them.

Third, Mary self-ascribes the property of listening

to music played by a virtuoso.

Fourth, the property of

being a virtuoso is a property that both Peter and Paul can
have (unlike, say, the property of being the best violinist
in the world), and Mary knows this.

All of these points,

I

suggest, should make us think that Mary believes de re that

Peter is a virtuoso, and that Paul is too.
We may contrast this case with another in which a

subject has a plurally de re belief without having one of
the corresponding individually de re beliefs.

suppose that from a distance

thousand or so people.

I

I

For example,

see a large gathering of a

may come to believe de re of the

crowd (of them) that each member is a person (that each one
of them is a person).

Would

I

thereby come to have a de re

belief about a particular member of the crowd, say Mr.
the effect that he is a person?

seems clearly to be, if

I

X,

to

Surely not, the answer

am in no way acquainted with Mr. X

himself (uniquely or otherwise).

What are the differences between the case of the crowd
and the case of Peter, Paul and Mary?
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There are at least

two that may be relevant to attributions of belief de re:
first, in the case of the crowd,

plurality for a single res

(a

I

do not mistake the

single person); whereas Mary

does make a mistake of this sort, since she takes herself to
be listening to a single violinist when in fact she is

listening to two of them.

(This may be the reason, or part

of the reason, why there is no way that

I

could be said to

believe de re of Mr. X, say, that he is big, if
believe de re of the crowd that it is big.)
case of the crowd,

I

I

were to

Second, in the

do not bear a relation of acquaintance

to every member of the group (e.g.,

I

do not see Mr. X)

;

whereas Mary does bear such a relation to Peter, as well as
to Paul (although, as we have said, she bears it uniquely to

neither of them)

22
.

With these differences in mind, let us attempt to

distinguish various cases of plurally de re beliefs, and
also to determine, with respect to each sort of case,

whether or not an individually de re belief about one or
more members of the plurality is possible.

All of the

relevant cases will have a subject who bears a relation of

will want to say that, in the case of the crowd, I
do bear a relation of acquaintance uniquely to the crowd, so
that I can have de re beliefs about it; but this cannot mean
that I bear this relation to each one of its members and to
nobody else. So, I must say something like this: I can be
acquainted with them (with the plurality) in virtue of being
acquainted with some of them. For example, I might see the
fact
ones who are closest to me. This is analogous to the
second
its
say,
of,
virtue
that a building can be on fire in
story being on fire.
22

I
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acquaintance uniquely to a plurality.

These cases subdivide

into those in which the subject stands in a relation of

acquaintance to some of the members of the plurality, but
not uniquely to any of them (like the case of Peter, Paul
and Mary); and those in which there are no relations of

acquaintance to the individual res (like the case of Mr. X
and the crowd)

.

Each of these further subdivides into cases

where the subject wronqly thinks that he has acquaintance

with an individual, rather than

a

plurality; and cases where

the subject does not make such a mistake.
Let us first consider an example like that of Peter,
Paul and Mary, but in which Mary does not wronqly take

herself to be listeninq to

a

sinqle musician.

Suppose that

Mary knows that she is listeninq to two violinists.
cannot single out either Peter or Paul:

Mary

any acquaintance

relation that Mary bears to Peter is such that she also
bears it to Paul.

Nevertheless Mary is acquainted with

Peter, since she is listening to music being played by him.

The same goes for Paul.

In such a case, Mary might self-

ascribe the property of listening to music being played by
Clearly, then, she would believe de re of Peter

virtuosos.

and Paul (the plurality of them) that each of them is a

virtuoso.

I

suggest that in this case, as before, Mary has

the corresponding de re belief about Peter, and about Paul.
If Mary has a de re belief about Peter, how does she

have it?

It seems to me that four conditions are jointly
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sufficient, viz.,

she bears the 'listening to music

(1)

being played by' relation uniquely to the plurality

containing Peter and Paul;
to Peter;

(3)

she self-ascribes the property of listening to

music being played by
is a virtuoso;

she bears the same relation

(2)

a

plurality such that each one of them

and (4) the property of being a virtuoso does

not imply the property of being a member of a plurality
i.e.,

-

it is not necessarily true that whatever is a virtuoso

is a member of some plurality.

I

think that condition

(4)

is needed in order to handle the following sort of example:

suppose that Mary knows that the violinists to whom she is

listening are the Dynamic Duo.

Then she might self-ascribe

the property of listening to music being played by a

plurality such that each one of them is a member of the
Dynamic Duo.

It seems to me that if this were the case, we

should not say that Mary believes de re of Peter (or Paul)
that he is a member of the Dynamic Duo.
We may give a general principle connecting plurally de
re beliefs with individually de re ones, with respect to the

sort of case presently being considered.

If a subject s is

acquainted with a plurality X and does not mistake X for an
individual, then s believes de re, of some x in

X,

that x

has property F if and only if there is some relation of

acquaintance R such that
bears R to x,

(

iii

)

s

(i)

s bears R uniquely to X,

(ii)

self-ascribes the property of bearing

R uniquely to an X such that every x in X has F, and (iv) F
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s

does not imply the property of being in (a member
of, one
of)

a plurality.

In the (admittedly uncommon) cases where

such conditions hold, a subject's plurally de re belief
that
X is such that every x in X has F will yield an
individually

de re belief that x has F.

What about cases like the above, except for the fact
that the subject wrongly thinks that he is acquainted with
an individual rather than a plurality?

Such cases are very

similar to the one just discussed; but here there is always
a

chance that the subject will ascribe to the plurality a

property that cannot be exemplified by more than one of its
members: 23

for example, in the original case of Peter,

Paul and Mary, Mary could have believed herself to be

listening to the best violinist in the world.

Unlike the

property of being a virtuoso, that of being the best

violinist in the world is one that cannot be exemplified at
the same time by Peter and by Paul.
If Mary did in fact self-ascribe the property of

listening to music being played by the best violinist in the
world, it may be wrong to say that she believes de re that

Peter is the best violinist in the world, and also that Paul
is.

This may be wrong because, if Mary were to learn that

0f course, there is also the chance that the subject
will ascribe to the plurality a property that could not be
exemplified at all by a plurality of things (e.g., the
property of being a virtuoso?). I suggest that by itself
this doesn't rule out the ascription of such properties to
an individual res in cases such as the one in the text.
23
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she had been listening to two musicians rather than just
one, she would surely retract her belief that she was

listening to the best one in the world

24
.

We could rule out such attributions that arise from

mistaking a plurality for an individual by maintaining

a

principle similar to the one given for the previous sort of
case.

If a subject s, then,

is acquainted with a plurality

X and with the individuals therein, but wrongly thinks that

he is acquainted with an individual and not a plurality,

then s believes de re, of some x in X, that x has property F
if and only if there is a relation of acquaintance R such

that (i)
s

s

bears R uniquely to X,

s

bears R to x,

(iii)

self-ascribes the property of bearing R uniquely to

something that has
X,

(ii)

with whom

s is

F,

and (iv) it is possible for every x in

acquainted, to have F (at the same time).

Since condition (iv) is necessary, this rules out the

possibility that Mary, in the case being considered, has a
de re belief about Peter to the effect that he is the best
in the world, and also that she has the analogous de re

belief about Paul.

The principle does allow Mary to believe

Mary would, in this case, believe de re, of the
plurality consisting of Peter and Paul, that it is the best
violinist in the world. This may seem odd; but there are
other cases in which a subject ascribes to an individual a
property that the individual could not have; e.g., Smith
might see Jones in the distance and think that what he sees
is his goat, thereby coming to believe de re that Jones is a
And of course it is well known that a subject can
goat.
ascribe to something (e.g., London) two properties that
cannot jointly be exemplified.
24
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de re that, say, Peter is a virtuoso.

It also does not rule

out the possibility, for example, that in this case Mary

could believe de re that Peter is one of the best two

violinists in the world (and similarly for Paul).

if Mary

had been listening to music being played simultaneously by

three violinists, however, the principle implies that she

could not have a de re belief about any one of them to the
effect that he is one of the best two violinists in the

world (since it is not possible for each of the three to be
one of the best two in the world)

I

.

hope that to the

extent that anyone has any clear intuitions about these
cases, the principle does not violate them.

What about the cases in which a subject is acquainted
with a plurality containing
with the individual itself?

a

certain individual, but not
Given that some sort of

acquaintance is at least necessary for de re belief, we
should hold that in such cases a subject can have de re

beliefs about the plurality, but not about the individual.

Consider again the case in which
one thousand or so people.

I

am looking at a crowd of

It is quite likely that

I

am

also looking at some of the individual people in the crowd
and hence that

example,
hat.

I

I

am acquainted with them individually:

for

might notice Jones, who is wearing a bright red

However,

I

will not be acquainted individually with

most of the people in the crowd.
lurking around in the midst of

a
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I

will not see Mr. X

thousand people.

In this case, where of course

I

do not mistake the

crowd of people for an individual
person,

I

may have de re

beliefs about the crowd (e.g., that
it is big, unruly, or
that everyone in it is a person),
and about Jones (e.g.,
that she is a person, or is wearing
a hat); but not about
Mr. X.
I cannot believe de re, for
example, of Mr. x, that
he is a person.
Lewis's original account of de re belief,
it seems to me, gives all of these
results for the present

case.

The principles suggested to cover the previous
two

sorts of case may be used to supplement Lewis's
account
the revised account (DR) - to cover other similar
cases

-

or

25
;

but no independent issues arise for this sort of
example.
The same goes for cases in which a subject bears no

relations of acquaintance to (some of) the individuals in

plurality

,

a

and mistakenly takes himself to be acquainted

with an individual res and not

a

plurality.

One such case

is that of a subject who sees a group of three goats, say,

from a distance, and takes himself to be looking at a single

goat (or a person; it doesn't make

a

difference).

point and say 'that goat is coming toward me'.

He might

It seems to

me that the subject might lack acquaintance with each of the
25

For example, someone might be listening, at a certain
time, to a recording of an orchestra playing a symphony.
It
could be the case that at that time the person is uniquely
acquainted with a few different things (the orchestra, the
lead violinist); is acquainted, but not uniquely, with a few
different things (the violists, who are simultaneously
playing the same notes and are all equidistant from the
microphone); and is unacquainted with a few different things
(the tympanist, e.g., who is not making a sound).
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three goats, if for example his distance from
them is such
that he could not see an individual goat from
so far away.

In that case he would be acguainted with
the plurality but

not with any of the individuals in it.

But even if this

were impossible, the subject could lack acquaintance
with
one or more of the goats, e.g., if one were hidden
behind

another
In this example, the subject may have de re beliefs

about the plurality with which he is acquainted.

He might

believe (correctly) of it that it is moving toward him, and
he might believe (wrongly) of it that it is a goat.

As with

the previous sort of case, here the subject cannot have any

de re beliefs about the individual members of the plurality

with which he is not acquainted.

Again, the present case

warrants no new de re attributions of belief that are not
derivable from Lewis's original view or from (DR), and so
raises no new problems for the attempt to give a general

account of belief de re.
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